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ABSTRACT
A Cognitive Process Approach to Interpreting Performance on the Booklet
Category Test and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
by
Phillip R. Wolfe, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 1992
Major Professor: Michael R. Bertoch, Ed.D.
Department: Psychology
Modified administration techniques that relied on patient verbalization of
reasoning on each item were devised. For the WCST, verbalized scores
correlated highly with conventional scores. However, patterns of age, education,
and IQ covariates for each scoring condition were very different, raising
questions concerning what such verbalized scores measured.

Further research

based upon a prospective research design was suggested to address this
question. Factor analysis of WCST scores for each scoring condition resulted in
almost identical three-factor solutions in each case: (a) ineffective, perseverative
responding; (b) nonperseverative

number errors; and (c) Maintaining Set. A

three-part hierarchy of response determinants for the CT was utilized, consisting
of (a) concrete perceptual attributes; (b) cognitive organization of perceptual
attributes into abstract patterns; and (c) relating abstract patterns to the
corresponding number responses. Decision trees were devised to prescribe a set
of rules for coding each score. Utilization of this approach yielded adequate testretest reliability for recoding responses. Sets of variables for each subtest were
factor analyzed, with second order factor analysis of all factors from each subtest

XI

in order to determine if common cognitive process scores on each subtest
described cognitive process scores on other subtests. Results revealed similar
factor solutions for each subtest, but subtest-specific factors were not predictive
of similar factor scores on other subtests, except for Subtests V and VI, which are
based upon the same principle. Factors related to Maintaining Set predicted
most of the variance in subtest error scores. Factor scores related to Determinant
Shifting were predictive of error scores to a much lesser degree than Maintaining
Set factor scores. Determinant Shifting factor scores appeared to be independent
of Maintaining Set factor scores, and also showed much more independence from
age, education, and IQ covariates. The relationship between CT and WCST
factor scores was slightly lower than the relationship between CT error scores
and WCST summary scores. Suggestions for further research were discussed.
(259 pages)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

CJinica] neuropsycho1ogy is that branch of psychology which is concerned
with the assessment of behavior changes resulting from brain dysfunction
(Lezak, 1983). Commonly, clinica] neuropsycho]ogists are asked to eva]uate
whether an individual patient displays evidence of cortical dysfunction, and if so
what course of recovery or debilitation might be expected. Questions posed to
neuropsychologists

by referral sources often include requests for predicting

performance of everyday activities such as self-care, driving an automobi]e,
living independently,

managing finances, returning to work, or any of a number

of other behaviors. Increasingly, the results of neuropsychological eva]uation are
used to guide cognitive rehabilitation planning. Not surprisingly, these disparate
goals of neuropsycho]ogical eva]uation call for different strategies.
Neuropsychology

in this country evolved from the psychometric tradition in

p sychology of measuring individual differences. The first ful1-time
n europsycho]ogy laboratory was established at the University of Chicago in 1935
b y Ward Campbe11 Halstead (Kleve, 1974) for the purpose of investigating the
biological basis of intelligence, particularly with respect to the functioning of the
frontal lobes of the human brain, which was thoughtto have particular
:significance for higher cognitive functions (C~apman & Wolff, 1959). Toward
this goal, Halstead meticulously mapped location and extent of brain damage in
patients referred by cooperating neurologists, and quantified the performance of
these patients on a series of tasks which he developed or adapted for that
purpose, in comparison with the performance of nonbrain-damaged

subjects on

those same tasks (Halstead, 1947a). Although other researchers had long
attempted to specify cognitive impairments characteristic of particular lesion
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]ocations, Halstead was the first to apply standardized measurement techniques
to cognitive tasks sufficient]y sensitive to demonstrate clear differences in
adaptive behavior as a consequence of specific brain damage. This series of tasks
evolved into the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery (HRNB), which
remains among the most commonly used standardized batteries of
neuropsychological tests in this country (Guilmette, Faust, Hart, & Arkes, 1990).
The focus of interest in such an assessment strategy is on the quantifiable features
of the patient's test behavior that allow each individual 's test performance to be
compared to group test results--a statistical or quantitative

norm--which

permits inferences to be made concerning the relative adequacy of performance
(Goldstein, 1987).
These data may be viewed from a variety of perspectives, and Ralph Reitan,
Halstead's first graduate student at the University of Chicago (Boll, 1981), who
has refined and extensively validated this battery of tests over the past 40 years,
has strongly recommended a four-pronged approach to evaluating test
performance: (a) ]evel of performance; (b) patterns and relationships among
individual test results; (c) specific deficits and pathognomonic signs; and (d)
patterns of performance that may be attributed to differential functioning of the
two sides of the brain (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985). This strategy may be referred to
as an actuarialstrategy, which, when applied to neuropsychological functioning,
is well suited to addressing questions of whether cerebral pathology is present,
and to a lesser degree the course of the disease process, and what part of the
brain is preferentially affected. Predictions concerning the behavioral capacity of
individual patients may also be inferred from such normative data. Such
conclusions are consistent with Halstead's original research goals of identifying
the behavioral correlates of brain function (Reitan, 1986).
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These endeavors have long been identified as comprising the raison d'etre of
clinical neuropsychology

(Diller, 1987). However, the use of neuropsychological

evaluation for cognitive rehabilitation planning has become increasingly
important in recent years. This goal necessitates a shift in focus and purpose from
the structure and function of cerebral systems to cognitive processes and
behavioral adaptation (Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989). DilJer (1987) conceptualized
that relationship between neuropsychology

and rehabilitation in the following

terms:
The primary language of neuropsychology is one of impairment.
Impairments are deficits which are dysfunctions in underlying mental or
physical structures. Deficits are identified by responses to standardized tests.
The primary language of rehabilitation is one of disability. Disabilities are
limitations in actual functioning in daily activities ... The neuropsychologist
has a problem in translating the language of impairment into a language of
disability without a complex chain of assumptions . While the
neuropsychologist can categorize the complaint, the data are too nonspecific
to ilJurninate management issues at more refined levels. (p. 4)
Clearly, a different methodology is necessary to meet this challenge .
Rehabilitation of cognitive disabilities requires careful specification of skill
parameters which are impaired as well as those which are not, and a conceptual
model which relates cerebral dysfunctions to these skill domains (Sohlberg &
Mateer, 1989). The data of actuarial assessment--quantifiable

scores--represent

"the final orchestrated result of many different cognitive functions" (McKenna &
Warrington, 1986, p. 32), and fail to specify how those scores are related to the
cognitive processes which must be targeted in a systematic treatment approach.
That goal may be better accomplished by process approach. This
methodology retains the standard administration

of psychometric instruments

but data collection techniques are systematically modified to permit testing the
limits of patients' abilities in order to more specifically describe cognitive
strengths and weaknesses.

An hypothesis testing approach is employed on
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many tasks in order to better specify the cognitive processes which contributed to
patients' performances. This approach has been applied with success to the
assessment of diverse cognitive processes, but ironically while more complex
cognitive functions tend to be most sensitive to the effects of brain-damage, these
abilities lend themselves Jess readily to process analyses (Mi]berg, Hebren, &
Kaplan, 1986). Induded among these so-called higher cognitive functions are
reasoning and problem-solving ability, concept formation, cognitive flexibility,
abstract thought, and a variety of executive skil1s. These are the abilities which
are most called upon in accomplishing the tasks of daily living and therefore
tend to be the focus of treatment goals (Goldstein & Levin, 1987).
Two tests which are most often employed to assess these skills are the
Halstead Category Test (CT), one measure of the HRNB, and the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test(WCST). Many similarities in the constructs measured by these
tasks have been noted in the clinical literature, but in the few studies in which
error scores on both tests have been compared, only approximately 30% shared
variance has been found. Consequently, the CT and WCST have each been
considered to contribute unique information concerning higher cognitive
functioning to the neuropsychological evaluation. Yet little research effort has
been directed toward delineating precisely what unique information each test
contributes (Anderson, Damasio, Hones, & Tranel, 1991) or the nature of the
problem-solving strategies which are reflected in the scores reported for these
tests. Consequently, although validation research has shown that performance on
these tasks is among the most sensitive indicators of brain damage (Kl0ve, 1974),
and differential performance on these tasks may be of some value in localizing
the site of damage (Boll, 1981; Lezak, 1983), that information is of limited value in
planning and implementing intervention strategies. Patients may show deficits
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in comp]ex, nonverbal problem-solving skiHs (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) due to
cognitive perseveration, assuming a very stimulus-bound approach to the task,
inability to generate alternative hypotheses, inability to maintain cognitive set, or
a variety of other reasons. All of these approaches may yield similar quantitative
(error) scores, leading to similar interpretive conclusions in the
neuropsychological evaluation, yet these scores are of little va]ue in directing
attention to the specific cognitive skills which are deficient in producing this
result or in suggesting specific remediation strategies.
The problem which this study addressed was that conventional
administration of both the CT and the WCST yie]ds only quantitative scores
which do not support inferences concerning the cognitive strategies used on
these tasks by individual patients. It has been suggested that asking patients to
verbalize their reasoning on these tasks may be one method for assessing the
cognitive processes employed by patients as they seek to solve the problems
presented to them by these tasks (Bond & Buchtel, 1984). Others have also
recommended this methodology as a means of clarifying the reasoning
underlying patients' responses (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), but use of this approach
has not previously been reported in the clinical or research literature;
In view of the need for a more accurate description of the cognitive deficits
that characterize the problem-solving behavior of patients with brain injuries, the
purpose of this study was to devise a coding system to classify CT and WCST
responses using a "think aloud" methodology, in order to achieve the following
goals: (a) describe the cognitive strategies employed by individual patients in
performing these tasks, and (b) differentiate the cognitive strategies assessed by
the CT versus the WCST.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Both the Halstead Category Test and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test have
been extensively validated, but the focus of much of this research activity has
been concerned with accurately discriminating brain-damaged from a variety of
nonbrain-damaged

groups, or differentiating a variety of brain-damaged groups

from each other. While this approach is useful from a diagnostic perspective, it is
entirely "conceptually opaque" (Bertram, 1984), and adds little to understanding
what is being measured. This literature, therefore, is generally peripheral to the
purpo ses of the proposed research, and will be only selectively reviewed here
within the conte xt of providing background history. The theme of the review of
the literature which foJJows will be to describe research to date which elucidates
the nature of the cognitive processes required for successful performance on the
CT and WCST. Toward this end, literature relating to the development and
construct validity of the CT will be considered first, followed by a review of the
literature relating to the development and validation of the WCST. Those few
studies which have directly compared performance on both tests will also be
described, with a view toward elucidating the basis of common and unique
variance.
The Halstead Category Test
Historical Background
Until the beginning of this century, most theories of cerebral functioning
sought to associate specific cognitive "faculties" with discrete areas of the brain,
although this was by no means a universal view. Flourens (1794-1867), for
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example, anticipated the notion of equipotentiality, arguing that the extent of
tissue damage is more critical than the specific site of damage (Walsh, 1987).
However, the theory of functional localization gained preeminence with Paul
Broca's demonstration that articulate speech was impaired in patients with
lesions in the posterior portion of the left frontal lobe. That discovery
precipitated intensive efforts to localize other faculties in specific regions of the
brain (Filskov, Grimm, & Lewis, 1981). However, a combination of influences
produced a reaction against the excesses of functional localization. In the
interval between the two world wars, the experimental work of Karl Lashley
supported a shift of emphasis to more global theories of cerebral functioning
(Lezak, 1983). In studies of the effects of cortical ablations on maze learning in
rats, Lashley demonstrated that the mass of intact brain tissue is more critical
than location of lesions . Thus, different cortical regions were seen as
equipotential in subserving specific functions (Filskov et al., 1981).
Aga inst this background, Kurt Goldstein's work with brain-injured
individuals prompted him to theorize, drawing upon Hughlings Jackson's work
(Chapman & Wolff, 1959), that the brain is organized in hierarchical levels, with
higher levels inhibiting and subsuming the functions of lower levels. Goldstein
postulated that cerebral insults caused regression to more primitivelevels

of

functioning due to disinhibition of lower levels. Such regression could be chiefly
distinguished by manifestation of the "concrete attitude" and loss of capacity for
the "abstract attitude" (Goldstein, 1940). That distinction was described as
follows:
The concrete attitude is realistic. It does not imply conscious activity in the
sense of reasoning, awareness or a self-account of one's doing. We surrender
to experiences of an unreflective character: we are confined to the immediate
apprehension of the given thing or situation in its particular uniqueness. This
apprehension may be by sense or percept, but is never mediated by
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discursive reasoning. Our thinking and acting are directed by the immediate
claims which one particular aspect of the object or of the outerworld situation
makes .... The abstract attitude embraces more than merely the "real"
stimulus in its scope. [t implies conscious activity in the sense of reasoning,
awareness and self-account of one's doing. We transcend the immediately
given situation, the specific aspect or sense impression: we abstract common
from particular properties; we are oriented in our action by a rather
conceptual viewpoint, be it a category, a class, or a general meaning under
which the particular object before us falls. We detach ourselves from the
given impression, and the individual thing represents to us an accidental
example or representation of a category. (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941, pp. 2-4)
Goldstein and his co-workers devised a series of sorting tasks to assess the
abstract attitude, but evaluated patients' performances qualitatively as they
viewed abstract vs. concrete thought as dichotomous.

Goldstein argued:

Even in its simplest form, ... abstraction is separate in principle from concrete
behavior. There is no gradual transition from the one to the other. The
assumption of an attitude toward the abstract is not more complex merely
through the addition of a new factor of determination; it is a totally different
activity of the organism. (Goldstein, 1940, p. 258)
Within this historical context, the emergence of the assumption that
organicity was characterized by "a central and therefore universal defect"
(Lezak, 1983) appeared reasonable. It is not surprising, consequently, that
unidimensional tests of "organicity" to distinguish brain-damaged from
nonbrain-damaged

patients proliferated (Boll, 1981). However; that goal was

elusive. Goldstein's qualitative sorting tasks appeared to have some potential in
this regard, but inadequate quantification procedures impeded further
development (Berg, 1948).
Development of Halstead's Battery
Halstead (1947a) approached the problem from a somewhat different
perspective. He was keenly aware that these attempts to diagnose organicity
failed to address the essential question of how biological changes in brain
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damage influenced behavioral or psychologicaJ events. This, then, became his
goal. Toward that end, Halstead developed or adapted a variety of tasks which
tested various domains of behavior, carefully specifying location and extent of
brain lesions in his patients who had been referred to him by cooperating
neurologists in the University of Chicago Department of Medicine. He selected
those tests which were readily subject to quantification, and submitted the results
of 50 patients who had undergone Jobectornies and 30 control subjects to both
Holzinger (Halstead, 1945) and Thurstone for factor analysis . Both solutions
produced four discrete factors, but Thurstone's analysis formed the basis for
Halstead's Theory of Biological Intelligence (1947a), by which he sought to relate
the adaptive coping of the individual to the intact functioning of the central
nervous system. These four factors included:
1. A central integrative field factor C. This factor represents the organized
experience of the individual. It is the ground function of the "familiar" in
terms of which the psychologicaHy "new" is tested and incorporated. It is
a region of coalescence of learning and adaptive intelligence. Some of its
parameters are probably reflected in measurements of psychometric
intelligence which yield an intelligence quotient.

2. A factor of abstraction A. This factor concerns a basic capacity to group to
a criterion, as in the elaboration of categories, and involves the
comprehension of essential similarities and differences. It is the
fundamental growth principle of the ego.
3. A power factor P. This factor reflects the undistorted power factor of the
brain. It operates to counterbalance or regulate the affective forces and
thus frees the growth principle of the ego for further ego differentiation.
4. A directional factorD. This vector constitutes the medium through which
the process factors, noted here, are exteriorized at any given moment. On
the motor side it specifies the "final common pathway," while on the
sensory side it specifies the avenue or modality of experience. (p. 147)
Included in the group of 10 tests (see Table 1) validated by Halstead was the
Category Test, which had evolved from stimuli similar to Goldstein's sorting
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Table l
Description of Original Halstead-Reitan Neuropsycho]ogical Battery
Test Description
l.

Category Test: Subject is presented with 208 stimulus figures on a milk
glass screen projection apparatus. Below the screen are four numbered
levers, and the subject is instructed to pull the numbered lever which
corresponds to the number which is suggested by the figure presented. If
the response is correct, a bell sounds; if not, a harsh buzzer sounds.

Cut-Off
Score
51 or more
errors

2. Critical Flicker Test Frequency: An electronic instrument with a short flash
duration provides light of variable frequency. The subject's task is to adjust
a knob until the variable frequency light appears to fuse into apparently
steady light. Score is light frequency, in cycles per second.

20.9 and
below

3. Critical Flicker Test Deviation: Deviation from mean values of Critical
Flicker Frequency for five successive trials.

15.7 and
above

4. Tactual Performance Test -Total Time: A form board with 10 geometric
figures cut into the board is placed on a stand in front of the subject, along
with wooden blocks which fit into each space. The subject is blindfolded
and must fit each block into the correct space, first using only the preferred
hand, then only the nonpreferred hand, then both hands together. Score is
total time for the three trials.

15.7 minutes
and above

5. Tactual Performance Test - Memory. After completion of the third trial
(described above), the subject is asked to draw a picture of the board,
which he/ she has never seen, with as many of the geometric figures as
possible in the correct placement on the board. Score is expressed in terms
of number of geometric shapes correctly recalled.

5 figures and
below

6. Tactual Performance Test - Localization: Score is number of geometric
shapes correctly localized in drawing described above.

4 figures and
below

7. Rhythm Test This is a subtest of the Seashore Test of Musical Talent. The
subject is required to differentiate which of 30 pairs of rhythmic sounds are
the same and which are different. Number of correct responses are
transformed into a rank score, ranging from 1-10.

Rank score6
and above

8. Speech Sounds Perception Test: 60 oral nonsense words, which are variants
of the "ee" sound, are presented. Subject must determine which of four
alternatives were presented. Score is number of errors.

8 errors and
above

9. Finger Oscillation (Tapping) Test: Subject must tap a finger tapping device
with the index finger of each hand for five trials of 10" each.

Mean score of
50 and below

10. Time Sense Test - Memory Component: Subject presses a key which
261 and above
permits a sweep hand to rotate on a clock face. The task is to stop the
sweep hand after 10 rotations in the same position in which it started.
After 20 trials, the clock face is removed, and the subject must duplicate the
visually controlled performance as closely as possible. The score is error
made for memory trials.

Adapted from Reitan (1966b)

1]

tasks. These tasks required subjects to sort objects into hierarchical categories
(Weigl, 1941). Halstead's initial quantitative analysis of the results clearly
differentiated brain-lesioned patients from normal subjects, though qualitative
analysis did not support Goldstein's prediction that the strategies employed by
the two groups would be qualitatively distinct (Bertram, 1984). In Thurstone's
factor analysis, this test loaded most highly on the abstraction factor (A), with
secondary loading on the central integrative factor (C) (Halstead, 1947a). These
results suggested that the Category Test demands abstraction of salient features
of the stimuli presented and the capacity to integrate new with previously
learned information.
Further development and validation of HaJstead's battery of tests was
undertaken by his former student, Ralph Reitan, who initiated a series of studies
with the goal of validating the usefulness of Halstead's 10 measures (derived
from seven tests) in differentiating brain-damaged from nonbrain-damaged
patients . Although he stated that he employed the "same tests administered in
the same way" (Reitan, 1955a, p. 29), in fact, in consultation with Halstead
(Wetzel, 1983), he shortened the Category Test to 208 items and deleted two of
the nine original subtests, proportionally decreasing the criterion error score
from 80 to 50 errors.
The current version of the CT retains that format. As presently constituted,
the CT consists of photographic slides of geometric figures of systematically
varied complexity, organized into seven subtests presented in sets of similar
items ranging in number from 3 to 17, though a number of items are presented
singly. Test subjects are informed as follows (after completing the initial practice
items which comprise Subtest I):
... This test is divided into seven subtests. In each subtest there is one idea
or principle that runs throughout the subtest. Once you have figured out
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what the idea or principle in the subtest is, by using this idea you will get the
right answer each time. Now we are going to begin the second subtest and
the idea in it may be the same as the last one or it may be different. (Reitan,
1979, p. 33)
These instructions are reiterated throughout the test in abbreviated form, in
order to clarify the task as much as possible. Further, Reitan emphasized that the
subject's task is discovering the organizing principle in each subtest, not
discovering what is required by the .task. Therefore, rephrasing and repeating
instructions as necessary is encouraged.
The slides are displayed on a screen with four numbered response keys below
the screen, and the subject is instructed, "Something about the pattern on the
screen will remind you of a number between one and four ... " (Reitan, 1979, p.
33). The subject presses the key corresponding to that number for each slide to
obtain feedback concerning response accuracy. A correct response sounds a bell,
while an incorrect response causes a harsh buzzer to sound.
The first two subtests are essentially practice items, and few subjects, even
those who are severely impaired, miss more than one or two items. Subtest I
consists of 8 items and requires the simple matching of Roman Numerals to the
appropriate response key. Subtest II has 20 items and requires simple counting
of the number of designs on each slide. Subtest ill contains 40 items and requires
identification of the linear position of the form which is most dissimilar from the
other three. Subtest IV also has 40 items and requires identification of the
quadrant of the design, numbered clockwise, which is discrepant.

Each

quadrant on the first six items of this subtest contains a Roman Numeral
corresponding

to the number of the quadrant, thereby providing practice items

to familiarize the subject with the correct principle. Subtests V and VI each
consist of 40 items and are based upon the same principle. The subject is
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required to select the lever that corresponds to the numerator of the fraction of
the figure which is pictured (1 / 4, 2/ 4, 3/ 4, 4/ 4). The final subtest contains 20
items which review the principles contained in the first six subtests, and is
commonly regarded as a memory task (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985).
Predictive Validity
Reitan's (1955a) original cross-validation of Halstead's battery established the
methodology for much subsequent validation research in neuropsychology
(Goldstein, 1969). In this initial demonstration of that model, Reitan compared
50 pairs of subjects, matched for age, sex, education, and ethnic origin, with one
member of each pair with confirmed brain damage, and the other member of the
pair serving as a control subject 1 . Results of these pairwise comparisons
indicated that al1 tests in the battery, with the exception of two measures based
on Critical Flicker Fusion, discriminated between the two groups of subjects at
levels equal to or greater than those in Halstead's originalstudy.
In this analysis, the Category Test proved to be the most accurate
discriminator of all the tests administered, second only to Halstead's Impairment
Index, a summary measure computed as the proportion of measures which
exceed the criterion for discriminating impaired vs. normal performance.

In a

subsequent study, Reitan (1956) demonstrated that the CT error score correlated
substantially with the Impairment Index (r=.71 for brain-damaged subjects and
r=.50 for nonbrain-damaged
multidimensional

subjects), and he concluded that the CT is a

task in terms of cognitive and perceptual elements. That

complexity is confirmed by findings (Reitan, 1955a) that the sensitivity of the CT
1Control subjects consisted of 13 paraplegics, 17 depressed inpatients, 6 patients with acute

anxiety state, 2 obsessive-compulsive neurotics, and 12 "normals."
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to cerebral impairment is not confined to specific lesion sites. These resu1ts have
subsequently been confirmed by numerous other investigators. For example, in
their cross-validation of Reitan's (1955a) results, Vega and Parsons (1967)
compared the performance of a group of 50 persons with confirmed braindamage representing a variety of etiologies and 50 control subjects without
evidence of brain pathology on Halstead's measures, which by this time were
referred to as the Halstead -Reitan Neuropsychological Battery. Again, all
measures discriminated between the two groups at a level far exceeding chance
(p <.001) for all but the Time Sense Test. However, using the recommended

cut-

off score on the Impairment Index (.6), 54% of the control subjects were
misclassified as brain-damaged, but upward adjustment of the cutoff score to .7
yielded a correct classification rate of 73%. The less than expected efficiency of
this battery, including the CT, in accurately discriminating groups was attributed
to the fact that the control subjects were "malfunctioning individuals" (p. 623)
resembling "pseudoneurologic"

patients and were older than subjects in other

studies reported in the literature .
Heilbrun (1962) suggested that it is precisely this form of discrimination
which is most useful in clinical neuropsychological evaluations. Most often,
neuropsychologists

are asked to assist in ruling out organic pathology when

patients present neurologic-like symptoms. Addressing this problem, Matthews,
Shaw, and Kl0ve (1966) compared the performance of 32 brain-damaged patients
with 32 "pseudoneurologic"

patients, hospitalized with complaints of headaches,

paraesthesias, motor weakness and/ or incoordination, gait disturbance, visual
difficulties, or ictal episodes simulating epilepsy, but for whom extensive
neurological testing yielded negative results. Both groups were matched on age,
sex, and years of education, thus maximizing the similarities between the groups.

]5

Again, all measures, including the CT, significantly discriminated between the
groups. The authors reported that no single measure by itself was able to obtain
accurate agreement with neurological findings for members of both groups on
this difficult task, but the example they provided for the composite Impairment
Index, comprised of 10 separate measures, indicated a rate of correct
classification of 83%, which compared very favorably with the accuracy of other
techniques.
Shaw (1966) found a significant correlation (r=.64) between magnitude of total
error score on the CT and Severity Continuum scores, computed as an expanded
Impairment Index utilizing nine HRNB variables, for a heterogenous group of
674 subjects referred for neuropsychological

evaluation, indicating 41% common

variance between these measures . Numerous other studies have confirmed the
usefulness of the CT in discriminating brain-damaged from nonbrain-damaged
groups (Hevern, 1980; Kl0ve, 1974), although it has been much less successful in
discriminating between brain-damaged and psychiatric patients, possibly
because of the organic basis of many psychiatric disorders (Goldstein, 1969).
Localization Studies
Despite Halstead's initial claims that the CT effectively discriminated between
patients with frontal lobe lesions and posterior lesions (Halstead, 1939; Halstead,
1940; Halstead, 1947a; Halstead & Settlage, 1943; Shure & Halstead, 1958),
subsequent researchers have failed to confirm consistent localizing effects for
either caudality or laterality. Walsh (1987) noted that the original claims were
based upon small group comparisons and levels of statistical significance were
accepted which were far short of those which are conventional today.

Chapman

and Wolff (1959) reanalyzed Shure and Halstead's (1958) data, controlling for
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size of cerebral lesions, laterality, and locus (frontal vs. nonfrontal), and found no
significant main effects for side or site of lesion, but degree of impairment on the
CT was directly related to the mass of cerebral tissue affected. Those findings
were confirmed by Matthews and Booker (1972), who correlated
pneumoencephalographic

measurements of ventricular size with

neuropsychological test performance. The CT was one of only 3 of 24
neuropsychological measures that showed significant differences on all three
ventricular size group comparisons (largest vs. sma11est planimeter and linear
measurements of the lateral ventricles and largest vs. smallest third ventricle
measurements).
McFie and Piercy (1952a) found that left brain-damaged patients performed
significantly worse on a task (Weigl, 1941) with which the CT shares common
ancestry, in comparison with right brain-damaged patients, appearing to suggest
a role for language mediation on this task, but no difference in performance was
found for aphasics vs. nonaphasics within the left brain-damaged group, as
might be expected if this task were facilitated by linguistic analysis. De Renzi,
Fagliori, Savoiardo, and Vignola (1966), employing a modified version of Weigl's
Test, also found poorer performance by left-brain-damaged patients, but only
those with aphasic symptoms, in comparison with right brain-damaged and
nonbrain-damaged

hospitalized control patients. Left brain-damaged

nonaphasic patients performed more like right brain-damaged patients and
control patients. De Renzi et al. postulated that these discrepant results reflected
different proportions of patients with prefrontal lesions in their left braindamaged group in comparison with those studied by McFie and Piercy, due to
differing etiologies, and frontal dysfunction has been specifically associated with
impaired abstracting ability (Milner, 1963)
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Although this task is similar in some respects with the CT, similar results
have been inconsistently obtained with the Category Test. Reitan (1960)
investigated the relationship between thinking and language by comparing
performance on neuropsychological

testing, including the CT, of 32 dysphasic

patients and 32 nondysphasic patients, matched, insofar as possible, on sex,
color, chronological age, years of education, and type of brain lesion. Verbal
subtests of the Wechsler-Bel1evue Scale of Adult Intelligence significantly
discriminated between groups, but both groups were approximately equally
impaired on the CT, prompting Reitan to conclude that language skills are less
important in complex thinking than was generally presumed.
Similarly, Doehring and Reitan (1962) found no significant difference in CT
total error scores for 50 left brain-damaged
brain-damaged

patients in comparison with 50 right

patients, although both groups were significantly impaired in

comparison with a nonbrain-damaged

comparison group, and both brain-

damaged groups displayed a pattern of performance on the Wechsler-Bellevue
Adult Intelligence Scale consistent with site of lesion.· Subtest analysis of all three
groups revealed a similar pattern of relative performance across all CT subtests,
suggesting that differential patterns of brain damage did not result in
qualitatively different patterns of cognitive processing.
Parsons, Jones, and Vega (1971) obtained similar results in comparing the CT
performance of left and right brain-damaged
of psychological impairment.
nonbrain-damaged

patients matched for general level

Both groups were impaired in comparison with a

comparison group, but did not differ from each other with

respect to total error score. However, the left brain-damaged

group made

significantly more errors on Subtest IV in comparison with Subtest III than the
other groups. It was suggested that these results may have resulted from the
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verbal content (Roman Numerals) of the sample items on this subtest, with
which left brain-damaged patients might be expected to have difficulty.
However, that pattern is discrepant with results obtained by Doehring and
Reitan (1962).
Schreiber, Goldman, Kleinman, Goldfader, and Snow (1976), using
neurological diagnosis as a criterion, evaluated the accuracy of the HRNB in
discriminating brain-damaged from nonbrain-damaged

patients and localizing

lesion site. They found the CT to be the single most sensitive test of brain
damage, but it was not useful in identifying lesion site. Similar results have been
reported by Matthews and Booker (1972), Goldstein and Shelly (1973), Russell
(1974), and Bornstein (1986).
Thus, somewhat paradoxically, although CT performance is regarded as a
reflection of perceptual organization or visuospatial skills, which are genera11y
attributed to predominantly right hemisphere functions (Lansdell & Donnel1y,
1977), it has repeatedly been found to be insensitive to lesion site. Reitan
attributed this paradox (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) to the complexity of skills
required by this task which necessarily involves, in addition to visuospatial
elements, adequate visual memory, abstract reasoning skills, and the ability to
translate visual stimuli into verbal concepts (Rothke, 1986), reflecting the overall
integrity of the cerebral cortex.
On the other hand, Doehring and Reitan, in an earlier study (Doehring &
Reitan, 1961), compared the performance of brain-damaged patients with right
or left homonymous visual field defects, brain-damaged patients without visual
field defects, and nonbrain-damaged

patients on neuropsychological tests,

including the CT. All tests administered significantly discriminated the
nortbrain-damaged ·comparison group from the three brain-damaged groups and
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visual field defects did not produce significantly more impaired performance
than brain-damage not associated with visual field defects. Surprisingly, patients
with left visual field defects were significantly more impaired on the CT than
patients with right visual field defects, implicating right hemisphere dysfunction
with poorer CT performance. The authors postulated, given a similar pattern of
results on Total Time on the Tactual Performance Test, that right hemisphere
mediated deficits in shape recognition may account for these results, a conclusion
which seems intuitively reasonable given the strong association of the CT with
the Block Design subtest on the WAIS, which is generally viewed as a
predominantly right hemisphere -mediated task.
However, the failure of subsequent studies to replicate those results has led to
inferences that the CT lacks localizing significance due to the complexity of the
task which calls upon multiple cortical systems (Bornstein, 1986) Nonetheless, a
more recent study which has obtained results reminiscent of Doehring and
Reitan's earlier findings again raises questions concerning possible lateralization
· of CT performance. Winkleman (1982), in seeking an optimal combination of
measures not dependent upon intact motor/ sensory skills that would accurately
discriminate right hemisphere deficits, unexpectedly found that the CT alone
discriminated lateralization of lesions nearly as well as a combination of
measures identified through a review of the literature. The CT, in combination
with the Picture Arrangement subtest of the WAIS, equaled the discriminating
power of the literature-derived

battery. Winkleman suggested that these

discrepant results may have been due to differences in the rehabilitation
population she studied in contrast to the acute care population referred for
neuropsychological evaluation in most medical centers, from which most
previous studies have drawn their subjects. The possibility that a systematic
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difference in severity between right and left hemisphere groups may have
accounted for these results was considered, but rejected. Rather, Winkleman
suggested that recovery of function by nonfocally affected cortical tissue may
have produced systematic differences in her rehabilitation population in
comparison with an acute care population. This suggestion is reminiscent of
Hughlings Jackson's argument that the signs and symptoms produced by specific
brain lesions can only .be understood within the context of the manner in which
those lesions affect the remaining intact cortical areas (Reitan, 1966b).
Moderator Variables
Discrepant results such as these point to the methodological problems faced
by neuropsychological researchers who attempt to specify the cognitive
processes tapped by a wide variety of behavioral measures.

Since it is not

feasible (nor desirable if it were) to randomly assign subjects to lesion groups in
order to control for a host of organismic variables which may affect results in
unknown ways, it is especially important to define .moderator variables which
may systematically influence performance on the psychological measures of
interest. A number of such individual variables have been identified whi .ch
correlate substantially with CJ performance.
In Halstead's (1947a) original validation of his battery of tests, he carefully
specified age, sex, education, socioeconomic status, and occupation of his
subjects, but apparently did not treat these demographic v.ariables as covariates
of test performance . Nonetheless, in Reitan's (1955a) cross-validation, braindamaged and nonbrain -damaged subjects were matched for race, sex, age, and
years of formal education, to control for possible confoundiµ.g effects produced
by these demographic variables. This procedure yielded better discrimination
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between groups than in HaJstead's original study (Parsons & Prigatano, 1978).
Consequently, Reitan (1955b) investigated chronological age as an independent
predictor of test performance for new groups of brain-damaged (N =194) and
nonbrain-darnaged

(N=133) subjects on Halstead's neuropsychoJogical battery of

tests. Each group was divided into 5-year cohorts ranging in age from 15 to 65.
For the brain-damaged group, age was only weakly correlated with the
Impairment Index, a summary measure representing the proportion of tests
performed within the brain-damaged range (r=.23), but the correlation was much
more substantial for the nonbrain-damaged

group (r=.54). Further analysis

revealed that this relationship was primarily generated by subjects over 45 years
of age. Under that age, no significant relationship between age and test
performance was apparent. These results appeared to support evidence of
organic brain changes in older adults, although it was noted that some
individuals in each age group continued to score within the normal range.
Subsequently, Reed and Reitan (1963a) compared the relative performance of
a young brain-damaged group and a young nonbrain-darnaged
relative performance of an old nonbrain-damaged
nonbrain-damaged

group with the

group (age 40-49) and an older

group (age 50 and above). The scores for each test on

Halstead's battery were ranked from poorest to best performances for each group
and the resulting distribution of ranks were converted to a normalized T-score
distribution with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10. T ratios were then
computed for each test. The results for the young groups indicated the
sensitivity of each test to the presence of brain damage, while for the older
groups the resulting T ratios indicated the sensitivity of each test to differences
associated with age. Results of the rank-order distributions for the two sets of
comparisons suggested that the decrements in performance associated with
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brain-damage for the young group were similar to the decrements in
performance associated with age for the older group (r=.49). Analysis of
covariance revealed that educational differences between the two older groups
were not responsible for these results.
Vega and Parsons (1967) obtained similar results in their cross-validation of
Reitan's (1955a) validation study, although they found a substantial correlation
with education (r=.56) as well as age (r=-.57) for their control group, whereas
both correlations were significantly attenuated in the brain-damaged group
(r=-.33 and r=.20, respectively). Both correlations were significant at p = .01 for .
the nonbrain-damaged

group, but for the brain-damaged group only age was a

significant predictor, and only at the p = .05 level. The CT was the measure most
highly correlated with age for both the brain-damaged and nonbrain-'damaged
groups, followed by other complex measures (Tactual Performance Test and
Impairment Index). It was concluded that this battery of tests, especially
including the CT, is sensitive to any factor which impairs the integrity of physical
and psychological functioning.
The confounding role of nonbrain-damage

variables, including age,

education, and psychiatric status, was more specifically addressed in Prigatano
and Parsons' (1976) cross-validation of Vega and Parsons' (1967) results.
Whereas in the earlier study the brain:..damaged group was severely impaired, in
the cross-validation study degree of impairment was more moderate.
Additionally, the nonbrain-damaged

g·roup in the cross-validation consisted of

psychiatric patients referred for neuropsychological
neurological from pseudoneurological

evaluation to differentiate

deficits. Age was again significantly

correlated with all test variables for the nonbrain-damaged

group, but education

was not for either group, and the relationship between age and test performance
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was attenuated by the presence of brain damage. The CT and other complex
tasks continued to be strongly associated with age in this study, although the
relationship was attenuated somewhat in the psychiatric control group. The fact
that partialing out the contribution of education to test performance in the
nonbrain-damaged

group in the earlier study attenuated the relationship

between age and test performance, but had no such effect on the nonbrain damaged psychiatric group in the cross-validation, appeared to suggest that .
these patients failed to bring prior learning experiences to bear on solving
problems, which the authors suggested may have prompted their referral for
neuropsychological evaluation.
This series of studies appears to suggest rather convincingly that
chronological age is associated with predictable organic brain changes in most,
but not all, individuals which impact problem-solving skills on
neuropsychological tests in a manner similar to brain damage in younger
subjects. However, in the presence of confirmed brain damage, the impact of
chronological age is much less predictable.

The contribution of educational level

appears to be much more moderate.
The specific pattern of cognitive changes associated with aging was
investigated by Meyerink (1982). He studied 125 subjects with no evidence of
neurological injury or disease, divided into five age groups: (a) 20-29 years of
age; (b) 30-39 years of age; (c) 40-49 years of age; (d) 50-59 years of age; and (e)
60-70 years of age. Multivariate analysis of variance, based uponHRNB
performance, suggested that tests related to prior learning showed little change
across age groups, and sensory input functions and simple motor functions also
showed little change, but as tasks became more complex, greater deterioration of
functions across age groups became evident. Thus, substantial decrement of
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complex visual-spatial abilities occurred with advancing age, and tasks involving
reasoning, abstraction, and logical analysis showed pronounced deterioration.
Among the tasks most representative of these complex cognitive skills is the
CT. Reed and Reitan (1963b) asked three experts to rate 29 tests, including the
HRNB, on a continuum of those most highly dependent upon prior experience
and learning to those most dependent upon immediate adaptive ability, with
consideration given to the complexity of problem-solving involved. The CT was
rated most dependent upon immediate adaptive ability and complex problem solving skills, and was also the task which best discriminated the performance of
an older group (mean age = 52.96; S.D. = 6.27) and a younger group (mean
age = 28.05, S.D. = 5.07). The differences between the groups on tasks rated most
dependent upon previous experience and learning were minimal. These results
were subsequently replicated on a group of 283 subjects with long -standing
confirmed cerebral dysfunction, divided into old (mean age = 49.66, S.D. = 10.72)
and young (mean age = 24.21, S.D. = 5.98) groups (Fitzhugh, Fitzhugh, & Reitan,
1964).
Mack and Carlson (1978) compared the performance of 41 bright, aged
normal subjects (mean age= 69.76, S.D. = 4.87), 40 young normal subjects (mean
age= 25.03, S.D. = 3.70), and 43 neurological1y impaired patients (mean
age= 41.70, S.D. = 16.47) on the CT. Although the older group scored
significantly higher on IQ testing (mean WAIS FSIQ 119.90) than either of the
other two groups, they scored significantly worse than the young normal group
and similar to the neurologically impaired group on all CT subtests and on total
error score, although the young normal group .barely exceeded the cutoff for
impaired performance. Both the aged and neurologically impaired groups
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experienced significantly greater difficulty on the most complex subtests (III and
V) than those which were somewhat less complex (V and VI).
While the contribution of age to CT performance has been fairly consistent
1cross studies, the contribution of education has been more variable. As noted
>reviously, Vega and Parsons (1967) found significant education effects among
heir nonbrain-damaged

group, although less substantial than age effects, but

)rigatano and Parsons (1976) cross-validation did not find significant
:orrelations of education with CT performance for either their nonbrainiamaged psychiatric group or their brain-damaged group. However, Finlayson,
ohnson, and Reitan (1977) did find that education substantially influenced CT
>erformance, as did Ernst (1987), utilizing the Booklet Category Test (BCT), a
>ortable form of the CT which yields comparable results (Defilippis,
vfcCampbelJ, & Rogers, 1979).
In view of this variability, Heaton, Grant, and Matthews (1986) performed a
arge normative study (N =553), drawing normal subjects from three diverse
;eographical areas, and investigating possible interaction effects among age,
~ducation, and sex. Subjects were divided into three age categories (less than 40
rears of age, 40-59 years of age, and over 59 years of age) and three education
:ategories (less than 12 years of education, 12-15 years of education, and over 15
1ears of education). Males and females were matched on age and education
variables. Results indicated that age accounted for approximately 32% of the
variance in CT total error score, while education accounted for about 13% of the
variance. However, age by education interaction effects were evident.

These

effects suggested that the least educated individuals show the least adequate
erfortnance initially and display the greatest decline from the young to middle
age periods, but the best educated persons tend to "catch up" in old age,
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showing little superiority at that point over the least educated individuals.
Heaton et al. postulated that these results may reflect accumulated insults to the
central nervous system that occur during the life span of the individual.
This hypothesis receives some indirect support by the results of Reitan and
Shipley's (1963) study concerning the relationship between changes in serum
cholesterol levels and neuropsychological test performance. Serum cholesterol
levels of 156 medically healthy individuals between the ages of 25 and 65 were
measured at the beginning of the study, 6 months later, and again 12 months
later. Differences in neuropsychological test performances at the beginning of
the study and at the end were compared for younger (under 40 years of age) vs . .
older (40 years of age or more) subjects, who had decreased serum cholesterol
blood levels by 10% or more ·vs. those who had not decreased serum cholesterol
levels. Results indicated that test-retest changes could not be attributed to
decreased serum cholesterol levels for the younger group, but individuals in the
older group who had not decreased serum cholesterol levels showed progressive
decline in neuropsychological test performance in each 5-year interval between
age 40 and 65, while those who had lowered serum cholesterol showed no such
decline. These results appear to suggest increased vulnerability to cerebral
insults among older persons, which may be reflected in relative impairment on
tasks designed to assess cerebral integrity.
Construct Validity
Goldstein (1940) argued that the loss of the abstract attitude accompanying
brain damage produced a qualitative difference in the cognitive behavior of
brain -damaged persons in comparison with nonbrain-damaged

persons. lf so,

quantitative scores on a given task would be measures of different abilities,
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precluding group comparison upon which research concerning the behavioral .
consequences of brain damage was based. Reitan (1958) addressed this issue by
reasoning that if performance on Halstead's battery assesses different cognitive
processes in the two groups, that performance would be revealed by
significantly different interrelationships between scores comprising the battery.
Using results obtained in his (Reitan, 1955a) cross-validation study, Reitan found
that the correlations between CT subtest scores for each group did not
substantially differ. Subsequently, these results were cross -validated (Reitan,
1959a). Each CT subtest is based upon a different principle, except for Subtests
V and VI, which require a response based upon the proportion of the design that
is pictured. Consequently, Reitan reasoned that if brain-damaged patients'
performance is based upon qualitatively distinct processing characterized by an
incapacity for assuming the abstract attitude, they will be unable to demonstrate
improvement from Subtest V to Subtest VI, unlike nonbrain -damaged subjects.
Results revealed that while absolute level of performance on CT subtests
significantly discriminated the groups, the relationships among subtests were not
significantly different for the two groups. Reitan concluded, therefore, .that
similar cognitive processes were utilized by both groups in these studies,
although the efficiency with which they did so was significantly different.
Reitan assumed that the abstract organizing principle of proportionality was
the governing principle utilized by both groups, with differing levels of
efficiency, but inspection of the stimuli reveals that these are the only two
subtests (other than one of the introductory subtests on which few patients make
any errors) where a simple counting response would be reasonably successful.
Thus, utilizing a concrete approach to this task may achieve a level of success
statistically comparable to that achieved by deducing the abstract principle;
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Perhaps as a result of the quantitative tradition out of which the CT
developed, only one study to date has examined such item-by-item response
determinants.

Simmel and Counts (1957) conducted extensive analysis of

response determinants of CT performance for 21 patients who participated in a
study of the effects of lobectomy on psychomotor epilepsy, 14 patients with
psychomotor seizures who did not undergo surgery, and 26 student nurses.
Results revealed that both patients' and nurses' responses to CT stimuli are
stable and systematic, whether responses were correct or incorrect.
Simmel and Counts (1957) reported a large number of "correct" responses are
"incidentally" rather than "essentially" correct; that is, correct responses were
given for the wrong reasons. The most persistent response tendency identified
was some form of counting conspicuous parts of the stimulus configuration -number of stimuli presented, number of stimuli that were identical or similar,
number of stimuli that were unlike the others, number of component parts in the
stimulus configuration, number of similar or dissimilar stimub in spatial
contiguity, et cetera. This was observed not only initially for each subtest, when
subjects were attempting to discover the organizing principle, which they had
been informed would remain the same throughout each subtest, but also often
when the stimulus configuration within a subtest changed, even though they had
previously demonstrated
Counts remarked,

11
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having learned the organizing principle. Simmel and

It appeared almost as if our subjects said to themselves:

'If in doubt, count"' (p. 137). This response tendency was attributed to several
factors. First, the combined effect of the apparatus, the instructions, and the
stimulus material encourage counting (see Appendix D). For example, the
subject is instructed that the numbered response keys are to be used to
communicate "a number suggested ... by the pattern on the screen" (p. 137).
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Second, the organization of the CT reinforces counting responses. One of the
introductory subtests, which serves as a training set, is based upon the principle
of counting stimuli, a principle which requires apparently no learning trials,
since few subjects make any errors on this subtest. Consequently, counting as a
response tendency is well established prior to the presentation of the test stimuli.
Simmel and Counts described counting as a "necessary but not sufficient
condition for attaining essentially correct responses" (p. 137). Throughout the
remainder of the test, counting continues to be rewarded, and the correct answer
can be obtained by counting some feature on 75% of the 180 items in subtests IIIVII (excluding only the introductory subtests) . This would be sufficient to obtain
a score within the normal range, if utilized consistently

2•

Simmel and Counts (1957) reported that approximately one half of the items
on the CT in this study showed nonrandom error distributions, indicating a
systematic basis for subjects' incorrect responses. Further, it was noted that the
same items which were difficult for patients were difficult for the student nurses,
and both groups tended to make the same errors on those items . Those findings
lend support to Reitan's conclusions concerning the comparability of cognitive
processing for brain-damaged and nonbrain-damaged

groups, although the

reasoning on which those conclusions were based is not supported by this study.
Slightly under one half of the items did show random error distributions, but
Simmel and Counts observed that statistical random error distributions do not
necessarily suggest that individual subjects are responding randomly to those
items. For any given stimulus configuration, several alternative hypotheses are
2Only 35 % of the items on subtest N will be correct using counting responses, but correct
responses can be obtained on 85 % of the items on subtests III, V-VII using counting responses,
although counting rules may need to change.
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available as response determinants, Hypothesis A, Hypothesis B, Hypothesis C,
et cetera. On those items where the stimulus characteristics do not "favor" a
given alternative, which would bias the distribution of errors, each subject may
systematically problem-solve among those alternatives, but choose different
hypotheses for a given item. Thus, the group error distribution may appear
random, when in fact it was individually systematic. Simme] and Counts (1957)
commented:
This assumption [the a priori assumption of the random nature of errors] is
frequently stated explicitly, and even more often quietly implied in the
treatment of correct and incorrect responses of a test, i.e., the "scoring" of the
test. Specifically, it stated that, for any given test item, errors are made only
because the subject does not know the correct answer, and that each of the
various error alternatives is therefore equally likely to be selected. In other
words, this assumes that the knowledge of the right answer is the one and
only determinant of the subjects' responses, just as it is in fact the only
determinant for the person who scores the test. Everything else is irrelevant
for the tester, ergo it is thought to be for the subject. (p. 152)
Frequently, both correct and incorrect responses may be the product of partial
insight, or what Simmel and Counts called "working rules" (p. 147). This results
from incidentally correct responses that are reinforced, at least on certain
configurations, and therefore the hypothesis on which those responses were
based is not rejected, but is not adequate to produce correct responses on all
configurations.

For example, on Subtests V and VI, on which Reitan's (1959a)

study was based, the abstract principle is "proportion of the figure which is
pictured within the solid lines," but "counting parts" of the figure can result in
incidentally correct responses to as many as 73 of 80 items. This characteristic of
the CT prompted Simmel and Counts to question the degree to which this may
actually be considered a test of abstraction. They noted:
Abstraction does demand the rejection of conscious and unconscious mental
sets induced by the immediate perceptual characteristics of the stimuli, by the
explicit and implicit features of the various aspects of the surroundings, by
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learned content, and everyday common procedures and manipulations.
However, while this holds for the principle of correct responses, it does not
necessarily -- or even typically -- hold for the individual correct responses
which are actually given by the subjects ... Therefore, a high number of correct
responsesdoes not necessarilyreflectthe attainment of the principle, nor does it
indicate the level of abstractionat which the subject actually operated,nor the degree
of abstraction.of 1Dhichhe might be capable[italics theirs]. (p. 155)
Simmel and Counts concluded, however, that the stimuli comprising the CT
might serve as the basis for a test of abstraction and permit the response
tendencies which they identified to be explored systematically. They suggested
that individual differences manifesting in different response tendencies might
have clinical implications. This suggestion has not been implemented in
subsequent research, however .
CT/ IO Covariation
Simmel and Counts noted a substantial connection between IQ and CT
performance for the patient population, although not for the student nurses, and
suggested that errors may reflect abstraction difficulties or may be related to low
intelligence. Other researchers have also found level of intellectual functioning
to exert a substantial influence on CT performance for both brain-damaged and
nonbrain-damaged

subjects. In fact, it is the nature of that relationship which has

served as the focus of investigations concerning the construct validity of the CT.
The failure of psychometric tests of intelligence to reflect the biological
condition of the brain is the factor which prompted Halstead (1947a) to devise
measures of what he referred to as "biological intelligence," which he described
as follows:
[W]hat I mean by biolog ical intelligence raises a difficult problem in brief
communication. Some years ago Cannon used the title The Wisdom of the
Body for one of his books. I do not believe that Cannon intended to omit the
nervous system in his concept. In biological intelligence I am trying to direct
attention to the "wisdom of a healthy nervous system." It is my belief that
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psychometric intelligence, as reflected by the I.Q., does not adequately
indicate this 'wisdom' of the healthy or of its alterations in the pathological
nervous system. We have repeatedly found normal or superior I.Q.'s in
neurosurgical patients lacking up to one-fourth of the total cerebrum
foJJowing frontal lobectomy. Yet our measurements of biological inteUigence
indicate that these are not normal individuals ... Biological intelligence, we
bebeve, with high adaptability, is the normal outcome of the functioning of a
healthy nervous system. (Halstead, 1947b, cited in Reitan, 1956, p. 537)
The insensitivity of psychometric intelligence testing to cerebral dysfunction
was the subject of some controversy in the 1930's and 1940's when Halstead
devised his tests of "biological intelbgence." This controversy focused on the
function of the frontal lobes, which some researchers, including Halstead,
believed had some special significance in subserving human intelligence.

Some

researchers reported decrements in inteJJectua] functions subsequent to frontal
Jobe injury, while others found none (Walsh, 1987). In part, these discrepant
findings stemmed from the nature of tasks employed. Intelligence tests at that
time were highly verbal in content (Lansdell & Donnelly, 1977) and presumably
heavily influenced by prior learning . This is the type of task which Heaton et al.
(1986) found to be least sensitive to cerebral dysfunction. Halstead was the first
researcher to devise a series of quantifiable tasks which reliably reflected brainbehavior relationships (Goldstein, 1969). As noted previously, the CT is among
the most sensitive of Halstead's measures of biological intelligence (Reitan,
1955a), but somewhat paradoxically has been criticized for failing to assess
cognitive abilities separate from psychometric intelligence (Rattan, 1986). This
discrepancy is central to understanding

what constructs are, in fact, measured by

the CT.
In Halstead's (1947a) factor analysis, the CT loaded predominantly on the
abstraction (A) factor (.63), but also showed a secondary loading on the central
integrative (C) factor (.49). Two other measures which also loaded substantially
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on those same factors included the Henmon-Nelson Test of Mental Ability (.27,
.58, respectively), a test of verbal intel1igence, and the Carl Hollow-Square Test
(.45, .25), a test of nonverbal intelligence. Although these results have not been
subsequently replicated and the latter tests have since disappeared from common
usage, these factors appear to correspond to Horn and Cattell's (1966) theory of
fluid and crystallized intelligence. Crystallized abilities referred to the influence
of "experiential-educative-acculturation"

variables, reminiscent of Halstead's

conceptualization of psychometric intelligence, while fluid abilities were
described as "the measurable outcome of the influence of biological factors"
(p. 254), which Halstead called "biological intelligence." These results, then,
suggested substantial overlap between psychometric and biological intelligence,
but indicated also that these were not measures of identical constructs.
Subsequent research has generally supported these conclusions, but discrepant
findings have also been reported.
Presently, the most commonly employed individual measure of adult
intelligence in the United States is the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)
or its successor, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R) (Lezak,
1983). These measures, like their predecessor, the Wechsler-Bellevue Adult
Intelligence Scale (W-B), consist of 11 subtests, each of which is converted to a
standard score, allowing inter-subtest comparisons. Six of these subtest scores
are summed to yield a Verbal Scale IQ score and five are summed to yield a
Performance IQ score. The sum of the Verbal Scale scores and the Performance
Scale scores yield an age-corrected Full-Scale IQ score. A variety of factor
analytic studies have been conducted to ascertain the relationships among these
subtests. These studies have consistently yielded three factor solutions, which
have been referred to as Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual Organization, and
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Memory/ Freedom from Distractibility (Cohen, 1957; Leckliter, Matarazzo, &
Silverstein, J 986; Matarazzo, 1972). While recent studies have found two stable
factor patterns, Verbal Comprehension and Perceptual Organization, that have
appeared little affected by neurological or psychiatric dysfunction (Fowler,
Zillmer, & Newman, 1987; Zillmer, Fowler, Newman, & Archer , 1986), others
have found that factor structure varies according to type of brain damage
(Zimmerman, Whitmyre, & Fields, 1970).
Reitan (1956) correlated Wechsler-Bellevue IQ scores with performance on all
HRNB variables, including the CT, for 50 brain-damaged subjects matched on the
basis of sex, race, chronological age, and years of formal education with 50
nonbrain-damaged

subjects. Correlations between Verbal, Performance, and

Ful1-Scale IQ scores and the CT ranged from .58 to .72 for both the braindamaged and nonbrain-damaged

groups. These results suggest that

approximately 34-52% of the variance on one measure can be accounted for by
the other measure. All Wechsler-Bellevue subtest scores also showed substantial
correlation with the CT. Unlike the age and CT relationship, the presence of
brain damage did not significantly attenuate the IQ/ CT relationships.
Reitan interpreted these results as supportive of Halstead's concept of the
factorial structure of biological intelligence. This interpretation appears
warranted not only on the basis of the shared variance between biological and
psychometric measures of intelligence, but also in view of findings which
demonstrate that IQ measures also are moderately successful in differentiating
groups of brain-damaged from nonbrain-damaged

patients.

Goldstein and Shelly (1984) compared the discriminative validity of the
HRNB, the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery (LNNB), and the WAIS.
Results revealed that the WAIS correctly classified 65.5% of subjects, in
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comparison with 77.4% correct classifications for the HRNB and 79.8% for the
-:..
NNB. Misclassifications for the WAIS included significantly more false
aegatives.
A variety of approaches for differentiating brain-damaged from nonbraindamaged subjects on the basis of W-B or WAIS performance have been
presented, with variable results. Wechsler (1944) devised a Mental Deterioration
Index (M.D.I.) which was computed as a ratio of subtest scores which did not
vary significantly as a function of age, "Hold" subtests, and those subtest scores
which show marked deterioration with increasing age, "Don't Hold" subtests.
Wechsler proposed that Hold subtests on the Wechsler-Bellevue included
Vocabulary, Comprehension, Picture Completion, Object Assembly, and
Information. Don't Hold subtests included Arithmetic, Digit Span, Digit Symbol,
and Block Design. Subsequent validity studies applying this procedure reported
some success was achieved in discriminating nonbrain-damaged

from brain-

damaged groups (Rogers, 1950a), but application to questions of differential
diagnosis found disappointing results (Allen, 1948). Allen sought to improve
discriminant validity by comparing performance on the two subtests seen as
most resistant to cerebral dysfunction, Information and Comprehension, with
performance on the two subtests seen as most sensitive to cerebral dysfunction,
Digit Span and Digit Symbol, but these efforts were largely ineffectual (Blake &
McCarty, 1948; Rogers, 1950b). Similar ratios were also proposed (Hewson, 1949;
Reynell, 1944), but these were not substantially more successful in clinical
application (Gutman, 1950).
These approaches were characterized by an assumption that brain-damage is
a diagnostic entity that will be manifest unidimensionally, while, in fact, as
Reitan (1966a) noted, the effects of brain-damage are enormously complex and
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multidimensional.

Somewhat more success has been achieved relating various

patterns of performance on IQ tests to more specific patterns of brain damage.
Kl0ve (1959a) compared groups of patients manifesting a variety of
differential EEG patterns, including a group with EEG abnormalities maximized
over the right hemisphere and a group with EEG abnormalities maximized over
the left hemisphere. Results of comparisons of these groups revealed that the left
hemisphere group achieved Verbal IQ scores which were significantly lower than
those achieved by the right hemisphere group, and vice versa with respect to
Performance IQ scores, although in the latter case the difference was less
pronounced, perhaps because three of five Performance Scale subtest
comparisons were not significantly different. Two of these nonsignificant
findings, for Picture Completion and Digit Symbol, might have been predicted as
these are not viewed as lateralizing subtests.
Doehring, Reitan, and Kl0ve (1961) compared the performance of patients
with right homonyrnous field defects, indicating left hemisphere dysfunction,
with the performance of patients with left homonyrnous field defects, indicating
right hemisphere dysfunction, and two control groups. They found a pattern of
performance similar to that reported by Kl0ve (1959a), with less consistent
lateralization effects for Performance IQ scores, but subtest comparisons between
the two groups revealed only 4 of 11 comparisons were significantly different
and only one, Comprehension, reached the p<.01 level of confidence.
Russell (1979) compared the performance of four groups of subjects
manifesting differing patterns of cerebral functioning: (a) nonbrain-damaged
control subjects for whom neurological examination had ruled out neurological
problems; (b) neurology patients with slowly progressive diffuse cortical
degenerative disease; (c) patients with acute right hemisphere lesions; and (d)
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patients with acute Jeft hemisphere lesions. Results revealed three different
patterns of performance on the WAIS. The first pattern was demonstrated by the
control group and was characterized by normal performance or above on all
subtests. The second pattern was characterized by relatively high verbal scale
subtests, with Arithmetic somewhat more impaired, and relatively low
Performance Scale subtest performance, except for Picture Completion. Thj s
pattern was obtained by both diffusely impaired patients and right hemisphere
impaired patients. The thlrd pattern consisted of slightly better Performance
Scale scores, except for Digit Symbol, than Verbal Scale scores, but the difference
did not obtain statistical difference. This pattern was achieved by left
hemisphere impaired patients.
Russell suggested these results appear to be produced by interactions of three
effects of brain damage on IQ test performance.

First, a general effect of brain

damage appears to impair performance on all subtests, as evidenced by the
signilicantly better performance of the control group across all tasks. However,
some tasks are more sensitive to the effects of general cerebral impairment than
others, presenting a pattern of deterioration somewhat similar to that observed
by Wechsler and others, although the pattern of subtest deterioration appears to
correspond roughly to the verbal/ performance dichotomy, except for Picture
Completion, rather than in terms of formulas previously proposed. Second, in
right hemisphere damage, which preferentially affects visual-spatial skills, Block
Design, Picture Arrangement, and Object Assembly are significantly more
adversely affected than verbal subtests. Third, in left hemisphere damage, the
opposite pattern obtains, but is attenuated by the fact that these Performance
subtests are also Don't Hold tests whlch are differentially sensitive to the general
effects of brain-damage in comparison with Verbal Scale subtests, whlch are
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Hold tests. Thus, the decrement in verbal skills associated with left hemisphere
dysfunction tends to be offset by a similar decrement in nonverbal skills, as
represented by Block Design, Picture Arrangement, and Object Assembly,
because these are the tasks on the vVAISwhich are most representative of
Halstead's (1947a) concept of biological intelligence or Horn and Cattell's (1966)
concept of fluid intelligence, and are differentially sensitive to general cerebral
dysfunction. The marked difference between Verbal and Performance Scales for
the right hemisphere impaired group reflected lateralization effects reinforced by
deterioration effects. The pattern for the diffusely impaired patients was not
differentiable from the right hemisphere group due to the greater sensitivity of
Performance Scale subtests, except for Picture Completion, to general cerebral
impairment, while for the left hemisphere patients lateralization effects on verbal
subtests were offset by deterioration effects on performance subtests.
While these individual effects of brain damage on IQ test performance have
been previously well established (Reitan, 1955c), this pattern of interactions
between lateralization effects and differential deterioration effects has not been
identified. Russell noted that previous studies may have failed to discern the
pattern of interactions due to the use of heterogenous samples of brain-damaged
subjects and use of T-score means, which in normalizing subtest variability tends
to minimize differentiable subtest sensitivity. Moreover, as Reitan (1959b) noted,
no two groups of brain-damaged subjects are exactly comparable. This is
especially true in studies comparing the performance of lateralization groups on
psychological test variables, since not only may one group of subjects with
lateralized brain damage not be comparable with a similarly defined group in
another study, lateralization groups within the same study may not be
comparable with respect to variables other than locus of lesion. For example,
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severity of impairment may be systematicalJy different between right and left
hemisphere lesion groups since severely impaired left hemisphere lesion subjects
may be expected to display receptive and/ or expressive aphasia to the extent of
being unable to comply with test instructions, whereas equivalent severity with
respect to right hemisphere impairment may not preclude testing. In such a case,
the relationship between test variables may vary as a function of severity rather
than lateralization effects or deterioration effects per se, or some interaction
between them. Nonetheless, some support for Russell's hypothesis may be
found in Matthews and Reitan's (1964) meta-analysis comparing the WechslerBellevue performances of 20 groups of subjects (six right hemisphere, six left
hemisphere, and eight nonlateralized brain-damaged groups) derived from six
separate published studies (Doehring et al., 1961; Fitzhugh, Fitzhugh, & Reitan,
1962; Kl0ve, 1959a; K10ve, 1959b; Kl0ve & Reitan, 1958; Reitan, 1955a). A
correlation matrix for the 20 groups based upon rank orders of WechslerBellevue subtest means was computed. Somewhat greater consistency of
correlations among rank-ordered subtest means was found for right hemisphere
groups than for left hemisphere groups (median coefficients of .80 vs .. 67,
respectively), and somewhat more consistency was also found among right
hemisphere vs. nonlateralized group comparisons than among left hemisphere
vs. nonlateralized group comparisons. These relationships are in the direction
predicted by Russell, despite marked differences among the groups on a variety
of other variables.
Taken together, these studies provide suggestive support for the
hypothesis that the factor structure of the WAIS and W AIS-R is invariant for a
variety of diagnostic groups, but the relationship among subtests may be
attenuated for at least some brain-damaged groups due to the greater sensitivity
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of some Performance Scale subtests to the general effects of cerebral dysfunction.
The nature of that relationship has not been identified, but the variability of the
correlation between the CT and inteJlectual performances among different
groups may provide some insight.
Shore, Shore, and Pihl (1971) reported that WAIS Full Scale scores were the
best predictor of CT total errors, correlating at =.87, for 29 nonbrain-damaged
subjects. Correlations between CT total errors and Cohen's factors on the WAIS
were similarly high: .84 with Verbal Comprehension, .72 with Perceptual
Organization, 1.00 with Memory, and .76 with General Intellectual Functioning.
Shore et al. concluded that these results were not consistent with the use of the
CT to diagnose "organicity" independently of intelligence.
However, Lin and Rennick (1974) obtained inconsistent results when they
compared performance on the CT and the WAIS for two larger samples (N=177
and 62) of epileptic subjects. In the first sample, correlations between CT total
errors and Verbal Scale subtests were relatively moderate, ranging from .35 to
.47, while correlations with Performance Scale subtests were somewhat higher,
ranging from .37 to .59. The highest correlation was with Cohen's Perceptual
Factor (.61), consisting of the sum of scaled scores on Block Design, Picture
Arrangement, and Object Assembly. However, on the second sample, the
relationships were reversed, and correlations with Verbal Scale subtests were
now higher than for Performance Scale subtests. The highest correlations (r=.68)
were with Verbal IQ and Cohen's Verbal Factor (sum of Information,
Comprehension, Similarity, and Vocabulary) and Information (r=.69).
Insufficient information is available to explain this variability, but Lin and
Rennick suggested that the greater severity of the first sample may have
influenced results. Additionally, many subjects in the second sample had
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previously taken the WAIS and a practice effect may have elevated their scores,
producing greater heterogeneity which tends to increase intercorrelation
patterns.
Lansdell and Donnelly (1977) factor analyzed the WAIS, CT, and Finger
Tapping Tests of 94 patients, including 59 with psychiatric diagnoses (primarily
depression) and 24 with neurological disorders (principally epilepsy). The mean
CT total error score of the psychiatric subjects was 70.6, considerably greater than
the mean error score of the neurological patients, 50.0, which was barely in the
normal range. Factor analysis of scores for the combined group produced a four
factor solution, including the usual three factors common the other factor
analytic studies of the WAIS: Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual Organization,
and Freedom from Distractibility (which Lansdell and Donnelly called
numerical). The CT loaded predominantly on the Perceptual Organization
factor, as did most Performance Scale subtests. Lansdell and Donnelly concluded
that the CT does not measure an ability separate from nonverbal intelligence.
Cullum, Steinman, and Bigler (1984) found higher correlations between
Performance IQ and CT total error scores (r=.52) than between CT error and
Verbal IQ scores (r=.31) or Full Scale IQ (r=.47) for 92 cerebral trauma patients
with confirmed brain damage, although the authors did not report whether these
correlations were significantly different statistically. They computed prediction
formulas for estimating expected CT performance on the basis of given
Performance IQ scores, although the normative value of predictions based upon
a brain-injured population is of questionable use clinically. For example,
predicted CT scores do not reach the normal range until Performance IQ exceeds
120. In contrast, Logue and Allen (1971) computed a prediction formula using
WAIS Full Scale IQ scores, based upon the relationship between CT total error
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score and Wechsler-Be11evue Full Scale IQ reported by Reitan (1959b) for 50
normal subjects (r=.65), which did not predict impaired performance on the CT
until Full Scale IQ scores fell below 70.
Corrigan, Agresti, and Hinkeldey (1987) also found a stronger relationship
between Performance IQ and CT total errors (r=-.644) than between Verbal IQ
and CT performance (r=-.111) for 102 patients in a rehabilitation hospital with
diagnosis of either dosed head injury (CHI) or cerebrovascular accident (CVA).
Multiple regression analysis revealed that Performance IQ accounted for
approximately 36% of the variance in CT total errors, and age, which entered the
equation next, accounted for an additional 26% of the variance. This combination
of variables was viewed as somewhat redundant since Performance IQ is already
age-corrected, and the addition of the age variable might be expected to
contribute little additional variance. Consequently, the analysis was recomputed
without an age correction, by summing the scaled scores for Block Design,
Picture Arrangement, and Object Assembly, the triad comprising Cohen's
Perceptual Organization factor. This nonage corrected variable was the only one
that accounted for substantial variance (59%). The authors conduded these
results suggest age affected both CT performance and this combination of WAIS
subtest scores.
Wiens and Matarazzo (1977) investigated the relationship between WAIS and
CT performance for two groups of 24 young normal subjects with above average
intelligence (mean age 23.6 and 24.8; mean FSIQ 117.5 and 118.3). Group II was
used to cross-validate the results for Group I. Results revealed that only
performance on the Block Design subtest significantly predicted CT performance
for both groups, although when only Group I was considered, both Performance
IQ and Full Scale IQ were significantly associated with CT performance (r=.68
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and r=.56, respectively). These results suggest that for normal subjects with
above average intelligence, individual differences in intellectual abilities may be
of only minor significance with respect to problem-solving skills that are
measured by the CT.
Moses (1985) investigated the contribution of level of performance variability
on HRNB measures, including the CT, for a heterogenous group of 480. He
computed a series of multiple regression analyses, using each HRNB measure as
the dependent variable and WAIS subtest scores as the predictor variables. With
respect to the CT, the Block Design subtest accounted for approximately 34% of
the variance in CT performance, followed by Arithmetic, Picture Arrangement,
Vocabulary, Picture Completion, and Object Assembly, which together
accounted for an additional 9% of the variance.
When level of performance was estimated by the Impairment Index (not
including the contribution of the CT in the ratio), which was entered into the
equation first, results were virtually identical, with the same subtests entering
into the same order, except for Object Assembly. This result was predictable in
view of previous findings that the CT is essentially equivalent with the
Impairment Index in discriminating brain damage (Reitan, 1955a). However,
when level of performance was estimated employing a T-score mean (TMean) of
all HRNB variables, derived from published score distributions, and again
entered into the equation first, a substantially greater proportion of the variance
in CT performance was explained, 56%. The TMean alone contributed 31% of the
variance, followed by Block Design (an additional 20%). Digit Symbol, Picture
Completion, Vocabulary, Arithmetic, and Picture Arrangement entered the
equation next, accounting for an additional 2% of the variance.
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Moses subsequently employed Russell, Neuringer, and Goldstein's (1970)
Average Impairment Rating (AIR) as a level of performance estimator. The AIR
rates performance on each measure of the HRNB on a four-point scale, to permit
finer gradations in ratings of severity of impairment than the Impairment Index
allows for. Entering AIR into the regression equation first accounted for 39% of
the variance in CT scores, followed by Block Design, Vocabulary, Arithmetic,
Picture Arrangement, and Digit Symbol, which together contributed another 7%
of the variance.
These findings have several implications. First, despite the substantial degree
of relationship between CT and WAIS subtest performances, these were clearly
not measures of identical constructs, and a greater proportion of the variance
remained unexplained than was explained. Second, perceptual organization
skills, especially as represented by the Block Design subtest, displayed a much
stronger relationship with CT performance than verbal comprehension skills, yet
CT performance does not vary with lateralization, as do perceptual organization
skills. Third, a substantial proportion of that variance appeared to be
represented by a factor related to intact cerebral functions, as represented by
Russell et al.'s Average Impairment Rating. This factor appears similar to
Halstead's biological intelligence or Cattell and Horn's fluid intelligence.
Factor Analytic Studies
The CT is the product of a factor analytic approach to identifying the
cognitive sequelae of brain-damage.

It is fitting, therefore, that factor analysis

should be the methodology utilized for further investigations concerning the
cognitive process variables which determine CT performance.

A number of

researchers have utilized this approach, usually assessing the CT in the context of
all or part of the HRNB and a variety of other neuropsychological

measures.
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This technique offers the advantage that variance common to a number of tasks
may be extracted and the cognitive processes contributing to such common
variance may be more readily identified. Aftanas and Royce (1969) factor
ana]yzed the performance of 100 normal persons ranging in age from 16 to 70 on
a battery of 25 tests, chosen from an extensive literature review on the basis of
validity, reliability, and objectivity of scoring procedures. The entire HRNB,
except for Finger Oscillation, was included in this battery, but it did not include
the Wechsler Scales. Factor analysis yielded 12 factors, but only three of these
were readily interpretable. The CT achieved a modest loading (.443) on a factor
interpreted as Perceptual Organization.

Other variables which had high loadings

on this factor included the TPT, Ravens Colored Progressive Matrices, Porteus
Mazes, Memory-for-Designs, and Hooper Visual Organization Test. A common
element required in all of these tests is the ability to integrate relevant aspects of
nonverbal, perceptual stimuli for problem-solving.

In that sense, this factor

appears to relate to adaptive problem-solving behavior with limited reliance on
previously learned skills, characteristics which are used to describe Halstead's
biological intelligence. However, the relatively modest loading of the CT on this
factor lends support to interpretations concerning the complexity of cognitive
processes involved in CT performance -- at least for this normal population.
Few other factor analytic studies utilizing normal subjects have been
performed, but Barnes and Lucas (1974) performed separate factor analyses on
test results of 39 subjects referred for routine psychological and
neuropsychological evaluation for whom no neurological deficits were
subsequently discovered, but who were diagnosed with neurosis or character
disorders, and 77 subjects who were found to display definite neurological
dysfunctions.

All subjects completed the HRNB and WAIS, although only the
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WAIS Full Scale score was entered into the correlation matrix. Both analyse s
:iesu]ted in six factor solutions, with the CT loading on Factor I in both cases. The
(T loaded on a factor which Barnes and Lucas named Basic Adaptive Ability or

}iological Intelligence . A variety of measures that are especially sensitive to
,erebral dysfunction loaded highly on this factor, including WAIS Full-Scale IQ.
~hese results, therefore, do not support the distinction of psychometric versus
iiological intelligence for either the psychogenic group or the organic group, but
he failure to enter WAIS subtest scores separately leaves that question open.
lames and Lucas suggest that cerebral dysfunction may impair cognition less
7ervasively, if more severely, than nonpsychotic personality problems, but
1bserve that Reitan (1956) has suggested that psychogenic -organic differences
7robably relate more to a pattern of impairment than a dichotomous
<haracteristic.
Boyle (1988) also included normal subjects in his factor analytic study of the
<onstruct validity of a shortened form of the CT, following the suggestion of
Chelune (1983) that analyses of data across diagnostic groups have the advantage

,£ increasing variability so that relationships are more easily seen. Like Barnes
.nd Lucas, Boyle did not enter WAIS subtest scores in the correlation matrix, but
lid enter Verbal and Performance IQ scores, as well as Full-Scale score . Results
:evealed a high loading for all IQ scores on the same factor on which the CT also
oaded highly. Boyle referred to this factor as a general intelligence factor.
-Iowever, the high loading of education (.76), combined with the low loading for
,ge (.19), and the substantially higher loading for Verbal IQ (.98) than
Jerformance IQ (.66) might suggest, rather, that this factor represents
Jsychometric intelligence. That conclusion would appear to be supported by the
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fact that the shortened CT loads only moderately (-.42) on this factor. The
principal portion of the remaining variance in the CT was unexplained.
Boyle also reanalyzed Halstead's original (1947a) correlation matrix, using
modern factor analytic techniques, and reported results similar to his own factor
analytic study, with both nonverbal (Carl Hollow Square) and verbal (HenmonNelson) intelligence measures loading to approximately the same degree on the
same factor as the CT. Boyle again concluded that this factor represents a general
cognitive-intellectual dimension, although again the equivalent loadings of the
IQ measures on this factor (.56 and .59, respectively) might equa11y well support
an interpretation similar to Halstead's Abstraction (A) factor .
Other factor analytic studies have yielded findings more nearly comparable to
Halstead's interpretation.

Russell (1982) found the CT loaded principally on a

nonverbal or figural factor, in an investigation of the factor structure of a research
version of the Revised Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-R), and Goldstein and
Shelly (1972) found the CT loaded on a factor which appeared to represent
complex, primarily nonverbal problem-solving ability , in a large factor analytic
study. All of the WAIS Performance Scale subtests, along with TPT and Trails B,
loaded substantially on this factor, in addition to the CT, while no Verbal Scale
subtest did. The Performance Scale subtests also loaded to a lesser degree, with
the CT, on the same factor on which Verbal Scale subtests loaded highly.
Goldstein and Shelly noted the similarity of this factor structure to that obtained
by Halstead.
Russell (1982) also found the CT loaded principally on a nonverbal or figural
factor, in an investigation of the factor structure of a research version of the
Revised Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-R). Similar findings were reported by
Corrigan and Hinkeldey (1988), who concluded that this factor may represent
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more than one component, and suggested that it may be sensitive to
nondominant cerebral hemisphere functioning and reflect active processing of
nonverbal information. They suggested that unique patterns of performance
may be related to particular clusters of patient abilities, and may be useful for
clinical inference and rehabilitation .
.Several researchers have moved in that direction by separately considering a
variety of variables which relate to CT task performance. Royce, Yeudall, and
Bock (1976), in a continuation of the research of Aftanas and Royce (1969),
addressed the task of identifying the brain correlates of cognitive factors in a
factor analytic study in which CT subtest performance was analyzed separately.
CT subtests loaded on three different factors. Subtest IV, which requires
identification of the clockwise numbered quadrant of the design that is
discrepant, loaded moderately (.40) on a perceptual organization factor, which
also included most elements of the TPT, the Trail Making Test, parts A and B,
and WAIS Block Design and Object Assembly, among other tests. This factor
was interpreted as comparable to the Perceptual Organization factor identified
by Aftanas and Royce.
All CT subtests also loaded oh two factors identified as Halstead Abstraction I
and II. Subtests V and VI comprised Halstead Abstraction I, with a lesser loading
for Subtest VII (-.45), which is regarded as a memory subtest involving items
from the previous six subtests. Subtests III and IV comprised Halstead
Abstraction II, again with a lesser loading for Subtest VII (-.39). Royce et al.
(1976) suggested that this multifactorial loading of CT subtests reinforced
previous suggestions regarding the multidimensionality

of abstract, problem-

solving behavior (Haynes & Sells, 1963). That interpretation is reinforced by
different correlation patterns between each of these factors and brain-damage
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sites. Royce et al. reported that factor scores on Halstead Abstraction I correlated
with damage throughout the right hemisphere, whereas Halstead Abstraction II
correlated with damage restricted to the frontal and parietal regions of the right
hemisphere. This distinction supported suggestions that Halstead Abstraction I
represented more factorially complex abilities than Halstead Abstraction IL
Assumptions regarding the multidimensionality

of the CT were reinforced by

Holland and Wadsworth's (1976) findings that while none of five concept
formation scores, including CT total errors and CT subtest scores considered
separately, could discriminate schizophrenic from brain.damaged subjects,
subtest IV minus subtest V did significantly discriminate between groups
(although at a level well short of that required for clinical usefulness).
Appraisal
The CT has been described as a measure of complex concept formation, which
has been defined in the following terms:
It requires sophisticated ability in noting similarities and differences in
stimulus material, postulating hypotheses which appear reasonable with
respect to recurring similarities and differences in the stimulus material,
testing these hypotheses with respect to positive or negative reinforcement
... and the ability to adapt hypotheses in accordance with the reinforcement
accompanying each response. (Reitan, 1967)

Halstead defined this ability as "abstraction," and factor analysis revealed
that the CT loaded more highly on this factor than any other test in his battery.
Simmel and Counts' (1957) careful item-by-item analysis of patients' responses
confirmed that this process appears relevant for essentially correct responses, but
not necessarily for incidentally correct and incorrect responses. As a result, they
noted, performance on the CT does not necessarily reflect abstraction or conceptformation skills of particular subjects.
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While the discriminant validity of the CT has been well-established, there has
been no follow-up on Simmel and Counts' suggestion that individual variations
in response determinants may well be clinically significant. Reitan (1958) sought
to establish that both brain-damaged and nonbrain-damaged

groups utilized

similar cognitive processes in approaching the task presented by the CT, but his
results may well have been obtained if one or both groups predominantly
utilized concrete counting responses, rather than abstract principles, as he
supposed. Criterion-related validity studies, using brain lesion sites and age and
intelligence as criteria, and factor-analytic studies have confirmed that CT
performance is sensitive to the integrity of the cerebral cortex, but the question of
the nature of cognitive processes called upon in performing the task presented by
the CT has produced much conflicting information. Research findings have
generally suggested that the CT taps nonverbal problem-solving skills and so
varies with Performance IQ (or Perceptual Organization ability), though CT
performance is more sensitive to cerebral dysfunction than is Performance IQ.
Results of studies have indicated, however, that skills assessed by the CT are
essentially equivalent to those measured by Performance IQ and so are
redundant in the neuropsychological evaluation. Still others have found the CT
to correlate more highly with Verbal IQ. Other unresolved questions
surrounding the CT relate to whether the relationship with Performance IQ is a
function of the Perceptual Organization skills tapped by both measures, or if it
relates to the distinction between previously learned skills and adaptive
problem-solving skills not calling upon previous learning, or some interaction
between these two skill domains. Questions have been raised, too, concerning
the "odd" relationship of the CT to Perceptual Organization skills, wherein the
latter are clearly lateralized to the right hemisphere but CT performance is not.
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These inconsistencies have typically been resolved in the literature by
describing the CT as a measure of complex nonverbal problem-solving skills, or as
multidimensional. While this is clearly the case for group results, it may be less

true in individual cases. As Simmel and Counts (1957) noted, individual
patients' performances may be characterized by different cognitive features:
Perhaps the behavior of some subjects is determined more strongly by the
perceptual characteristics of the stimulus than that of others. Some subjects
might be more affected by what they have learned on an immediately
preceding group of items and may have special difficulty in rejecting what
was, but is no longer, rewarded. Still other subjects may find it particularly
difficult to free themselves of specific procedures which are practiced in
everyday life and which have in the course of their long history achieved a
considerable degree of automaticity. Still others may be more victimized by
the mental sets induced by the explicit or implicit characteristics of the
surroundings, e.g., the apparatus, the response keys, etc. Some subjects may
have special difficulty in rejecting a dichotomous response tendency . For
some, the variation of basic stimulus figures may be disorganizing, while
others may profit from the changes and thereby attain principles of greater
generality. (p. 156)
The relevance of these individual differences for the cognitive behavior of
individual subjects needs to be more fully explored, as suggested by Simmel and
Counts.
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is often regarded as similar to the
CT with respect to the cognitive constructs measured by each. Both are
purported to assess "abstract thinking," "concept formation," "conceptual
flexibility," "problem-solving,"

and "new learning" (Strang, 1983). Both the CT

and WCST were developed from common roots, but followed different paths of
development (Perrine, 1984). Unlike the CT, much of the research related to
development of the WCST focused on determination of the response
determinants in contrast to clinical validation. A variety of quantitative process
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g:ores were developed to describe subjects' performance. Only after testing
11rocedures and scoring protocols were established within the context of concept
brmation theory was the WCST applied to clinical uses.
WCST Development
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test also combined many features from the
Weigl (1941), Goldstein-Scheerer (1941), and Vigotsky Tests (Hanfmann &
fasa nin, 1936) sorting tests employed by Goldstein and coworkers to assess
,bstract thinking, with the difference that it permitted objective, quantitative
~oring (Grant & Berg, 1948). Berg (1948) observed that neurologically intact
Ihesus monkeys at the University of Wisconsin Primate Laboratory responded to
mifts of positive and negative stimuli with no observable clues other than a
<hange in stimulus object rewarded, but brain-lesioned monkeys lost their ability
b follow shifting problems, although they were able to solve discrimination
problems which did not require shifting. Consequently, she sought to apply this
nethodology to assess human abstraction and shift of problem-solving set.
Unlike the CT, the WCST was developed from the context of concept formation
heory using nonclinical subjects. Berg devised 60 response cards, which
yictured one to four geometric figures (stars, crosses, triangles, or circles), of
iifferent colors (red, blue, green, or yellow). Thus, each card might be sorted or
iategorized in terms of three dimensions: shape of stimuli, number of stimuli,
.nd color of stimuli. Four stimulus cards were also created: (a) one red triangle;
b) two green stars; (c) three yellow crosses; (d) four blue circles. Each of these
rrimulus cards were also exactly reproduced in the response cards. Thus,
~sponse cards might match stimulus cards on only one dimension, on two
imensions, or all three dimensions.
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Fifty-one psychology students at the University of Wisconsin were used as
subjects. They were instructed, "I want you to put these cards into four groups,
underneath the ones lying on the table. I will tell you whether you are 'right' or
'wrong.' " If the subjects asked for more direction, instructions were repeated, "I
will tell you whether you are 'right ' or 'wrong.'"

The initially correct category

was chosen arbitrarily in advance, and after each subject sorted five successive
cards correctly, the "correct" category shifted without explanation, so that now
the previously correct percept received feedback of "incorrect'' and a different
category received feedback of "correct."

When again the subject obtained five

successive correct responses to the new percept, the category shifted to a third
principle without warning. This continued until the subject had completed nine
categories.
Results revealed three different patterns of behavior for test subjects. Slightly
less than one third of the subjects, Group A, readily deduced the nature of the
task and were able to verbalize the rules without difficulty. Approximately 40%
of the subjects, Group B, became confused when previously correct sorting
principles received "incorrect'' feedback, and they showed perseveration to the
former principle, even though it was no longer effective, and were unable to
precisely verbalize the rules of the task. Nonetheless, these subjects were able to
complete all nine categories. Slightly under one third of the subjects, Group C,
showed extreme perseveration or extreme variability in their responses,
sometimes continuing to sort to the previous principle for more than 100 trials.
Testing was discontinued for subjects in this group due to time limitations. The
difference in mean errors between Groups A and B was not significant until the
fourth category, reflecting the greater learning curve of Group A. In contrast, the
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difference between Group C and Groups A and B was significant by the second
category.
These suggestive findings were further explored by Grant and Berg (1948) in
an investigation concerning the influence of reinforcement strength on shift of
set. The card sorting task was modified somewhat in this study. Response cards
were increased to two sets of 64 cards, representing all possible combinations of
color (C), form (F), and number (N). Additionally, the initially correct sorting
category was predetermined to be color, whereas previously it was randomly
selected. This was followed by number, then shape, in the following sequence,
C, F, N, C, F, N, and testing was discontinued after completion of six categories.
Cards were presented in standardized order within sets as well, so that no like
color, form, or number was presented consecutively.
Psychology students at the University of Wisconsin again served as subjects,
and were divided into seven groups of approximately 20 students in each group.
Number of consecutively reinforced trials, ranging from three through eight and
ten, was varied for each group. It was hypothesized that increased number of
reinforced trials would decrease likelihood of shifting set. Responses were
classified as (a) correct; (b) errors; (c) perseverative responses; or (d)
nonperseverative

errors. A perseverative response was defined as one which

would have been correct in the immediately preceding category3. These
responses were usually, but not always, errors and represented failures to shift
solution.
31£responses were ambiguous (matched the stimulus card on more than one dimension, one of
which was correct in the immediately preceding category) and were both preceded and followed
by a perseverative error, it was counted as a perseverative response. For example, if the
following responses were obtained, C, C, C, CF, C, CNF, C, F, F, F, F, F, after shifting from color
(C) to form (F), scoring would be psv error, psv error, psv error, psv correct, psv error, psv
correct, psv error, correct, correct, correct, correct, correct.
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Contrary to expectations, increased number of consecutively reinforced trials
did not decrease likelihood of shifting set; rather, the opposite result was
obtained: Increased reinforcement increased the likelihood of shifting set when
the previous response was no longer reinforced. This difference reaches
statistical significance for categories five and six, when groups were combined
into less reinforced and more reinforced groups. This effect was even more
pronounced in a subsequent study by Grant and Cost (1954), where the number
of consecutively reinforced trials was increased to 5, 10, 20, and 40, presented in
the following order: C, F, N, C, F, N. Grant and Cost noted, however, that the
distributions were markedly skewed and recommended the use of the following
score transformation for purposes of group comparisons: tx = R(x+.5), where tx
is the transformed score and x is the original frequency score.
Subsequently, Grant, Jones, and Tallantis (1949) investigated the comparative
difficulty of the various dimensions -- color (C), form (F), and number (N) -- as an
influence on what was called for the first time the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
It was hypothesized, based on Heidbreder's (1948) and Heidbreder and
Overstreet' s (1948) research concerning transformations in concept formation,
that form would be the easiest category attained, followed by color, then number.
The procedures described above were followed, except that the order of correct
concepts was varied, with all 24 sequences utilized in which no concept was
consecutively repeated and all concepts were utilized prior to repetition. Shifts
occurring without explanation following ten consecutive correct responses.
Contrary to expectations, results revealed that number was the concept most
easily obtained, followed by form, and color was most difficult. However, none
of these differences reached statistical significance, although a significant
relationship was demonstrated between ease of acquisition of the number
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concept and perseverative errors on the following category. Thus, the number
concept was more easily acquired and tended to perseverate longer. Grant et al.
(1949) suggested that these results may have been due to perceptual features of
the cards, in which the configuration of figures rather than number per se was
the salient characteristic4.
Grant (1951) confirmed that suggestion by alternating the standard
systematically arranged response cards and a set of specially created response
cards in which the figures were arranged unsymmetrically, so that they did not
perceptually match the stimulus cards. Order of administration was C, F, N, C,
F, N. Scoring procedures were revised somewhat so that the initial perseverative
response, following a shift, was not scored, nor were ambiguously correct
responses. Additionally, correct responses did not include responses in the
criterion run of 10 consecutive correct responses, so that the larger the number of
correct responses, the lower the subject's efficiency in shifting from the previous
percept to the new. These results revealed that unsystematic configurations were
more difficult for subjects to acquire than systematically arranged figures which
matched the configuration of the stimulus cards, and when asked to explain
"what they were doing and had been doing" (p. 28), 38% of the subjects
confirmed they had sorted to color, form, and configuration.
These results suggested that the conclusions of Grant et al. (1949) concerning
relative difficulty of the three sorting categories were probably due to this
artifact. Consequently, Grant and Curran (1952) replicated the design of that
study, except that they used the unsystematic response cards and the scoring
4 On

cards with one figure, the design is centered on the card; for two figures, the designs are
placed diagonally; for three figures, the designs form an equilateral triangle; and for four figures,
the designs form a square shape .
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conventions introduced by Grant (1951). Whereas in the initial study the number
concept was the most easily acquired and subsequently the most likely
"perseverate to" principle, in this study the number concept was the most
difficult to acquire as the initial sorting principle, and form was acquired most
readily. However, once acquired, number remained the most likely
"perseverate-to"

principle, and showed no appreciable decrease following the

third category, as did perseveration to color and form. These results correspond
more closely to Heidbreder's

(1948) and Heidbreder and Overstreet's (1948)

hypotheses than did the earlier results . The authors suggested that abstraction as
measured by this test is a multidimensional
for by simple unidimensional

construct which cannot be accounted

quantitative scores.

Unlike the clinical tradition of the CT, the research tradition out of which the
WCST developed was concerned with delineating the response determinants
which related to the acquisition of concepts. Thus, WCST researchers addressed
the question of determining the process by which subjects decided, ''This is [X];
this is not [X]." Of primary concern in this regard were those determinants
which influenced perseveration

of responses which were no longer reinforced.

This behavior has long been defined as cognitive rigidity (Pishkin & Williams,
1977) as it is assumed that subjects will shift hypotheses following
disconfirmation

through absence of reinforcement (Levine, 1966; Restle, 1962;

Trabasso & Bower, 1966). However, Matthews and Patton (1975) demonstrated
with a group of normal college students that the degree of success experienced
with a given hypothesis prior to disconfirmation is related to failing to shift
subsequent to disconfirmation.

Matthews and Patton suggested that an

hypothesis may not be immediately abandoned simply because it leads to an
error, but instead must rely on what is most probable.
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Perseveration might be considered a function of the degree to which
irrelevant dimensions are reinforced. Since the 64 response cards represent all
possible combinations of color, form, and number, correct responses might match
the stimulus card on only one dimension, an unambiguous match, or on two or .
three dimensions, an ambiguous match. The standard set of cards includes 24
cards which can match on only one dimension, 36 cards which, depending on
placement, may match on one or two dimensions, and 4 cards which can only
match on all three dimensions simultaneously.

Thus, up to 40 responses for each

set of cards may receive reinforcement of ambiguous dimensions, and the subject
may perseverate due to difficulty in ruling out the irrelevant features.
Gormezano and Grant (1958) investigated the influence of intermittent
reinforcement of irrelevant features on concept acquisition, by rearranging
unsystematically configured response cards into sets of 48 in which a given
dimension might be ambiguous 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75% of the time. Criterion
performance was successful completion of the first two categories, color and
number, within the 48-card set. Subjects were divided into four groups (N=40).
The first group received a set of cards in which, when sorted correctly to color,
none of the cards matched for number; the second group received a set of cards
in which 25% when sorted to color also matched on number. In the third group,
50% of the cards were ambiguous as to number. In the fourth group, 75% were
ambiguous as to number. Each of these groups was then divided into four
groups (N=lO), and the process was repeated with sets of cards which varied in
ambiguity as to form, when cards were correctly sorted to number. Transformed
frequency scores were used for comparison of groups. Results revealed that
increased reinforcement of irrelevant dimensions made acquisition of the
relevant concept more difficult, but increased reinforcement of the number
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dimension when it was irrelevant had no effect on acquisition of the number
concept when it became relevant. These findings were interpreted in terms of
concept formation theory (Bourne, 1965; Bourne, 1974; Brown, 1974; Buss, 1953;
Buss, 1956; Dominowski, 1973; Dominowski, 1974; Kendler, Glucksberg, &
Keston, 1961; Peterson & Colavita, 1964; Wetherick & Dominowski, 1976).
Up to this point, WCST research was related to investigating response
determinants which influenced concept acquisition and cognitive rigidity.
Methods of administration and scoring protocols which had developed were
directed toward those research goals, but normative data had not been provided
nor was any information available relative to discriminant validity with clinical
groups. These concerns now became paramount in the further development of
the WCST.
Localization of Brain Damage
Sorting tasks from which the WCST was developed have long been associated
with cerebral dysfunction. As noted previously, McFie and Piercy (1952a; 1952b)
found that left brain-damaged

patients were more impaired on Weigl's (1941)

Test than right brain-damaged patients, but no differences for aphasics vs.
nonaphasics within the left hemisphere group. In contrast, De Renzi et al. (1966),
employing a modified version of Weigl's Test, also found more impaired
performance by left-brain damaged patients, but only those with aphasic
symptoms. They postulated that these discrepant findings might be attributable
to different proportions of patients with prefrontal lesions in their left braindamaged group in comparison with those studied by McFie and Piercy, as
Goldstein and co-workers had long contended.
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Whi]e the Weigl Test was similar to the WCST in many respects, it could only
be scored dichotomously as "pass" or "fail" and was often considered too easy
to discriminate subjects effectively. Milner (1963) was the first to study the utility
of the WCST in localization of brain lesions. She compared the performance of 33
patients with frontal lobe surgical excisions for control of focal epilepsy with the
performance of 61 patients with surgical excisions at a variety of other sites.
Most patients were tested both preoperatively and postoperatively (N=71), but
the remainder (N=23) were tested on]y postoperatively, in some cases several
years after the surgery. Surgeon's records were obtained in each case to obtain
precise localizing information. The frontal lobe group was further subdivided
into lesions of the dorsolateral aspect (superior) and the medial orbital aspect
(inferior). All of the surgical excisions for the dorsolateral group were unilateral
(14 nondominant right hemisphere and 11 dominant left hemisphere, although
Broca's speech area was spared in all cases). The nonfrontal group consisted of
34 patients with excisions of the dominant left hemisphere, 30 patients with
excisions of the nondominant right hemisphere, 3 patients with excisions of the
nondominant left hemisphere, and 2 patients with bilateral surgical excisions.
Groups were equivalent with respect to age and IQ, both preoperatively and
postoperatively.
Milner employed the unsystematic response cards (Milner, 1963) developed
by Grant (1951) and considered a more difficult task than the standard systematic
response cards. Scoring categories included the usual scores, and she employed
the Grant and Cost (1954) frequency score transformation for data analysis, but
Milner redefined the scoring of perseveration.

Grant and Berg (1948) defined

perseveration as those responses which would have been correct in the previous
category, preventing the scoring of perseveration in the first category, resulting
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in misleading scores for subjects who failed to complete the first category or who
displayed significant difficu]ty in the first category. Consequently, Milner
included those responses in the first category which represent repetition of the
patient's initia] concept, which was easily discerned since the first eight cards in
her response deck could only be matched unambiguously, but she implied that
she counted only perseverative errors, which would exclude those correct
responses defined as perseverative by Grant and Berg. Additionally, she
established the practice of terminating administration after completion of 128
cards, or completion of six categories, whichever came first.
Results revealed that preoperatively, WCST performance significantly
discriminated the dorso]ateral frontal group from all other localization groups,
except the smal1 parieto-temporo-occipital

group (N=5), with respect to total

errors (p< .05) and perseverative responses (p<.01). Postoperatively, the
differentiation was even more marked. The dorsolatera] frontal group made
significantly more errors than all other groups (p<.001), achieved fewer
categories (r<.001), and made more perseverative errors (p<.001), although there
were no group differences with respect to nonperseverative errors. Significantly,
while surgical excision further deteriorated the performance of the dorsolateral
frontal group, the nonfrontal group displayed an opposite trend. The
performance of patients who were tested only postoperatively displayed the
same pattern. None of the dorsolateral frontal patients completed more than two
categories, while 51 of the 69 control subjects did so.
Milner observed that while age and intelligence were controlled in this study,
size and extent of lesions were not and may have accounted for these effects.
Consequently, the performances of the five dorsolateral frontal patients with the
smallest surgical excisions were compared with 12 nonfrontal patients with the
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largest lesions, including some with complete lobectomies. Preoperatively, these
groups showed no significant differences, although the dorsolateraJ frontal group
tended to perform more poorly. Postoperatively, the performance of the
nonfrontal group was unchanged, despite the extent of tissue removed, but the
performance of the dorsolateral frontal group further deteriorated, with
significantly more total errors (p <.05), more perseverative responses (p <.001),
and fewer categories sorted (p <.05) than the control subjects. Milner concluded,
therefore, that locus of lesion was the relevant factor bearing upon impaired
performance of the dorsolateral frontal group in comparison with other braindamaged groups .
Laterality comparisons were nonsignificant, in contrast to the findings by
McFie and Piercy (1952a) and De Renzi et al. (1966), but Milner noted that left
hemisphere excisions were consistently smalJer than those on the right, and
suggested that those findings may indicate greater sensitivity of.the left
hemisphere. Subsequently, Milner (1971) reported findings that confirmed that
suggestion.
An earlier study by Teuber, Battersby, and Bender (1951) found results
discrepant from those reported by Milner on a modified sorting test, but the
extent of modifications appears to have changed task demands significantly.
Teuber et al. employed only 60 stimulus cards in which the figures were laid out
linearly, and "shifts from one principle of sorting to another [were] enforced after
every tenth trial" (p. 421). Subjects were also forewarned that a change may
occur (Milner, 1963). The authors did not specify criteria of performance, nor
indicate the order of presentation. Test subjects included 131 World War II
combat veterans with penetrating missile wounds, four to seven years postinjury, who were divided into three groups on the basis of site of wounds of
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entrance. These groups were identified as Anterior, Intermediate, and Posterior.
Forty control subjects with peripheral nerve injuries due to gunshot wounds
were also tested. Results revealed that the posterior subjects performed more
poorly than any other group, although only mean error scores were reported. In
view of the modifications to the sorting task used in this study, and questions
concerning extent of injuries not reflected in wounds of entrance, these results
cannot be considered comparable to other studies, even though Teuber et al. is
often cited in the literature as contradictory to more frequent findings regarding

Iocaliza tion.
Milner (1963) suggested that her results implicating the dorsolateral surface of
the frontal lobes in impaired set shifting behavior were consistent with findings
with lower primates that dorsolateral frontal excisions but not ventromedial
(orbital) excisions impair delayed alteration and delayed response behavior
(Mishkin, 1957; Pribram, Mishkin, Rosvold, & Kaplan, 1952). However, Drewe
(1974) contended that Milner's findings were surprising in view of increased

perseveration by primates on nonspatial reversal tasks followed orbital but not
dorsolateral excisions. Consequently, she sought to replicate Milner's findings
with a more heterogenous

group.

Drewe tested 91 patients with unilateral localized lesions of varying etiology.
Patients were divided into four mutually exclusive localization groups, right
frontal (RF), left frontal (LF), right nonfrontal (RC), and left nonfrontal (LC).
Groups were equivalent with respect to age, sex, chronicity, and nature of lesion.
She did not specify which card set was utilized, systematic or unsystematic, but
since the Grant and Berg manual (undated) was followed with respect to scoring
and administration,

it is likely the systematic response cards were utilized.

Drewe added the scoring category, Number in Maximum Classification,
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primarily to reflect perseverative responses in the initial category since these
were not reflected in Grant and Berg's definition of perseverative responses. This
scoring category was defined as the number of cards sorted into each category
(color, form, number, unique), excluding criteria runs of 10.
Results reflected very complex relationships between type and number of
errors made, which varies from group to group, but on the whole these findings
are consistent with those of Milner, despite substantial differences in procedure
and scoring. Patients with frontal lesions achieved fewer categories and showed
greater perseveration than nonfrontals, and there was no significant difference
with respect to nonperseverative errors. However, in contrast to Milner, they did
not make more total errors, and a greater range of variability in categories
achieved was evident. These patients performed more like Milner's preoperative
patients than her postoperative patients; in fact, patients after frontal lobectomies
performed better than patients with other frontal lesions.
In general, left frontal patients performed more poorly than right frontal
patients, consistent with Milner's findings, and those of previous researchers,
although they did not differ on perseverative errors. However, differences in
definition may account for this finding. Drewe found that Number in Maximum
Classification was a more sensitive measure of overall performance than
perseverative responses, and on this measure left frontals were more impaired.
Some discrepancy with respect to anatomical locus within the frontal lobe was
evident, but Drewe concluded that her findings may be consistent with Milner's
actual data, although the area of maximum sensitivity is the medial surface of the
frontal lobes that are critical rather than the dorsolateral convexity.
The most significant findings which emerged from this study, however, relate
to the complexity of relationships between scores on the WCST and the site of
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damage. Drewe concluded: "All scores on the WCST do not necessarily measure
the same ability or disability, nor does the same 'impaired' score in different
patients indicate a necessarily similar deficit" (1974, p . 168).
Robinson, Heaton, Lehman, and Stilson (1980) noted that few other
neuropsychological measures effectively localize focal frontal impairment, and so
sought to replicate findings reported by Milner (1963) and Drewe (1974) that
perseverative responses on the WCST are useful in localizing brain damage.
They contrasted performance of a normal control group of paid volunteers
(N=123) on the WCST, with the performance of seven brain-damaged groups: (a)

right frontal (N=13); (b) left frontal (N=lO); (c) right frontal plus focal right
nonfrontal (N=ll); (d) left frontal plus focal left nonfrontal (N=12); (e) right
nonfrontal (N=9); (f) left nonfrontal (N =J4); and (g) diffuse (N =38), controlling
for severity of impairment as reflected in the Average Impairment Rating
(Russell et al., 1970) on the HRNB, as well as age and education. Like Drewe,
Robinson et al. apparently used systematically configured response cards but
followed Milner's definition of perseveration rather than Grant and Berg's, thus
apparently counted only errors as perseverations, including those in the first
category.
Results revealed significant differences among groups with respect to WCST
perseverative responses, in which covariance due to age, education, and severity
of impairment was controlled (p <.02). The performance of all brain-damaged
groups was significantly impaired in comparison with normals, except that of the
left nonfrontal group. Comparison of the four frontal groups with nonfrontal
groups confirmed previous findings with respect to the sensitivity of the WCST
to frontal lobe impairment, but no difference was found for frontal groups in
comparison with diffusely impaired patients. This should not be surprising,
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Robinson et al. noted, since the frontal lobes comprise approximately 40% of the
brain. These findings suggest that the perseveration score on the WCST is quite
sensitive to general cerebral dysfunction, except possibly when focal impairment
does not extend to the frontal areas.
These findings were further confirmed by linear discriminant analyses using
perseverative responses, age, education, and Average Impairment Rating on the
HRNB to classify subjects on the basis of lesion site. Perseverative responses
entered the analyses first and AIR failed to enter at all, yielding a correct
classification rate of 68%, suggesting that perseverative responses, with age and
education, account for variability in the AIR due to severity of impairment.
Consequently, a second discriminant analysis was computed to determine if
perseverative responses on the WCST would enhance the discriminant validity of
the AIR. The 12 individual variables that comprise the AIR were entered into the
analysis, with age, education, and perseverative responses. Again, the
perseverative response score entered the analysis first, and this combination
yielded a correct classification rate of 85%, when the population base rate of
frontal lobe impairment was set to .67. Discriminant efficiency deteriorates with
more extreme population base rates, however.
With respect to lateralization, however, these findings are discrepant with
those of Milner and Drewe. The combined right frontal groups were
significantly more impaired than the left frontal groups, which could not be
accounted for by differences in severity, as assessed by the AIR. However,
Milner's (1963) caution concerning the multidimensionality

of determinants on

WCST performance should be noted in this regard, particularly since
performance on this measure was assessed only on the basis of a single score.
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Variability in task complexity and other procedural differences in
administration and scoring, in addition to the usual differences in subject
selection, has confounded interpretation of differing results across these studies,
but surprisingly the differentiation of frontal vs. nonfrontal patients has proven
to be very robust, although substantial variability has been evident with respect
to individual scores. Nelson (1976) addressed the issue of the effects of task
complexity directly by significantly simplifying the task, even in comparison
with the systematic response cards, in creating what she referred to as the
Modified Card Sorting Test. Nelson removed all ambiguous cards from the
response set (apparently using systematic cards), thereby eliminating examiner
uncertainty concerning what concepts patients were using to sort, and removing
patient uncertainty concerning which concept was being reinforced by the
examiner. This left 24 cards in each 64 card set, and Nelson combined two sets of
cards for a complete response set of 48 cards. Administration instructions were
also revised as follows:
Here we have four key cards lexaminer points to stimulus cards]. I want you
to sort these cards [indicating the response cards] under the key cards
according to certain rules: but the whole point of the test is that I shall not tell
you what the rule is. I want you to find that out by trying out different rules
and each time I shall tell you whether it's right or wrong. Now, go ahead and
try to find out the rule. (p. 316)
Following these instructions, whichever category the patient chose was
scored "correct," and subsequent responses were scored accordingly. In contrast,
in standard administration procedures color is the initial category, followed by
form and number in that order when the criterion run of 10 consecutive correct
responses was achieved, with the cycle being repeated a second time for a total of
six categories. Nelson also completed six categories, but after six consecutive
correct responses, stated: ''The rules have now changed; I want you to find
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another rule" (p. 316). This instruction was repeated each time the patient
completed six consecutive sorts to whichever new category was selected. Testing
was discontinued when six categories had been completed in this fashion, or all
48 cards had been placed. Nelson reported that she utilized Milner's definition of
perseverative responses (PM), although her testing procedure would have
excluded perseverative responses in the initial category. Additionally, Nelson
devised a new scoring of perseveration (PN) which consisted of repetition of an
incorrect response despite feedback that it was incorrect.
Despite these substantive differences in administration and scoring,
comparison of the performance of 64 brain-damaged inpatients, divided into four
groups on the basis of cerebral quadrant of lesion site, with the performance on
46 control subjects, including 32 inpatients with extra-cerebral lesions and 14
normal subjects, Nelson found that frontal patients made significantly more
perseverative errors (both PM and PN) than nonfrontal groups, after the records
of 13 patients (lesion group not specified) who successfully completed the
Modified Card Sorting Test were excluded from analysis. However, the lesions
groups barely missed showing significant differences with respect to total errors
and categories completed (p =.056), and no difference was evident between right
and left lesion groups, either frontal or nonfrontal. Milner (1963) observed that
patients often were able to verbalize which responses were correct and which
incorrect, although they seemed unable to conform their behavior with their
observations, suggesting that task difficulty may be less salient in influencing
outcome on the WCST than other cognitive process factors. Nelson's findings
lend credence to that interpretation.
Nonetheless, Heaton (1981) noted that comparison of results across studies
was handicapped by the variety of procedural variations employed in these
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studies. Consequently, he sought to standardize materials and procedures in
order to better focus attention upon the neurological and cognitive variables
bearing upon test performance, rather than upon methodological variables. He
included the subjects used by Robinson et al. (1980) in a normative study which
provided the basis for standardization

of administration and scoring procedures

and materials. He employed two sets of the systematic configuration response
cards (64 cards in each set) devised by Grant and Berg (1948), but the specified
order of cards within each set was that first used by Robinson et al. in which five
of the initial eight cards are ambiguous, including the first card, unlike the Grant
and Berg set in which the first eight cards are alJ unambiguous.

Instructions

were specified as follows:
This test is a little unusual, because I am not allowed to tell you very much
about how to do it. You will be asked to match each of the cards in these
decks to one of the four key cards. You must always take the top card from
the deck, and place it below the key card you think it matches. I can't tell you
how to match the cards, but I will teJl you each time whether you are right or
wrong. If you are wrong, leave the card where you've placed it, and try to get
the next card correct. Use this deck first, and then continue with the second
deck. There is no time limit on this test. (p. 19)
A standard scoring sheet was also devised, and the following order of correct
concept matching was specified: CF NC F N. Designated scoring categories
included:
1) Total Errors
2) Total Correct (including criteria runs and initial correct responses
following shifts)
3) Categories Completed (all criteria runs of 10 correct responses)
4) Perseverative Responses
a) those which would have been correct in the previous category;
b) those responses prior to completion of the first category which match
the first incorrect unambiguous response;
c) ambiguous responses are also scored as perseverative responses if they
are both preceded and followed by unambiguous perseverative
responses;

70

d) within any category, three consecutive incorrect unambiguous
responses will establish a new "perseverate-to" principle for that
category, although ambiguous perseverative responses may be
interspersed among those three consecutive perseverative responses,
which may be scored beginning with the second of the three
consecutive perseverative responses.
5) Perseverative Errors (those perseverative responses which are also
incorrect)
6) Nonperseverative Errors (errors which are not perseverative responses).
Several optional scoring categories were also defined:
1) Percent Perseverative Errors (Perseverative Errors 7 Total Responses)
2) Trials to Complete First Category
3) Percent Conceptual Level Responses (runs of three or more consecutive
correct responses 7 Total Responses)
4) Failure to Maintain Set (number of runs of five to nine consecutive correct
responses)
5) Learning to Learn (for patients who complete at least three categories,
mean sum of the differences of percent error score for consecutive
categories with at least 10 trials).
Heaton's normative study employing these procedures included comparisons
of WCST performance of 208 subjects with structural cerebral lesions, confirmed
by neuroradiological techniques, and 150 normal controls, including subjects
studied by Robinson et al. (1980). Brain-damaged subjects were divided into
Diffuse (N=94), Nonfrontal (N=35), Focal Frontal (N=43), and Frontal Plus
(N=36). Normal subjects were paid volunteers without histories of neurological
illness, head injury, or substance abuse. All subjects were administered the
WAIS-R, HRNB, and WCST. WAIS-R Full Scale IQ and HRNB Average
Impairment Rating (AIR) were used as measured of general netiropsychological
impairment.
Results revealed that the total brain-damaged group were more impaired on
all measures (including W AIS-R FSIQ and AIR), except Failure to Maintain Set,
which was relatively rare in all groups. Since Focal Frontal and Frontal Plus
groups were not significantly different on demographic or neuropsychological
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variables, these groups were combined for data analysis. This combined frontal
group performed significantly more poorly than the nonfrontal group on WCST
Total Errors, Perseverative Errors, Percent Perseverative Errors, Perseverative
Responses, and Percent Conceptual Level Responses. Groups did not differ on
Categories Completed, Nonperseverative Errors, Trials to First Category,
Learning to Learn, or Failure to Maintain Set. Thus, the primary differentiation
between groups was in terms of perseveration. The Diffuse group performed
much like the Frontal group.
The most efficient cutoff score for predicting brain damage in this population
is a perseverative response score of 19 or above, which correctly classified 74% of
the brain-damaged group and 72% of the nonbrain-damaged

group. In

compa rison, inferring a base rate for this population based on group composition
reported, calling all subjects brain-damaged, would have resulted in 58% correct
classification. A slightly higher cutoff score (20 or above perseverative
responses) achieved 71.1% accuracy in discriminating focal frontal from focal
nonfrontal brain-damaged subjects, but with better accuracy in classifying focal
frontal patients (79.8% vs. 51.4%). The cutoff score for perseverative errors was
13 and 16 for discriminating brain damage and focal frontal lesions, respectively,
yielding approximately equivalent efficiency to a cutoff based on perseverative
responses. A cutoff score based on total errors above 24 was also approximately
equivalent in classifying focal frontal impairment but was not useful in
identifying general cerebral dysfunction. Other measures were not useful in
predicting brain damage or focal frontal involvement in individual cases,
although in most cases the correlation between AIR and these variables was
substantial for the brain-damaged group (.47 to .61), except for Learning to Learn
(-.18) and Failure to Maintain Set (-.05). Nonperseverative errors were most
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strongly associated with overall neuropsychological functioning for the normal
group, but the strongest association for the brain-damaged group was with
measures of perseveration.
Construct Validity
Strang (1983) devised eight new hypothesis testing scoring categories to
investigate the normative expectation that intact persons will change concept
strategies when they receive "incorrect" feedback, and persist with hypothesized
concepts when the feedback is "correct." Four responses to examiner feedback
regarding accuracy are possible: (a) Wrong-Shift, defined as shifting to a new
concept when the examiner responds "incorrect" ; (b) Wrong-Stay , defined as
persisting with the same concept when the examiner responds "incorrect"; (c)
Right-Shift, shifting concepts when the examiner responds "correct"; and (d)
Right-Stay, persisting with the same concept when the examiner responds
"correct." However, since up to 62.5% of all responses may be ambiguous, it is
often not possible to ascertain whether a subject has shifted to a new concept.
Consequently, each score was computed twice: once, assuming that the patient
persisted with the previous concept when responses were ambiguous, and again
assuming that the patient had shifted. In discriminant function analyses, with
significance level set very conservatively, of the 32 most promising WCST
variables, only the transformed hypothesis testing score, Stay-Behavior
(assuming stay), entered the prediction equation, with population base rates set
at values ranging from .10 to .90, yielding a correct classification rate of .81.
Additional post hoc analyses also supported the usefulness of these hypothesis
testing scores.

In order to better investigate the relationship among these scores, factor
analysis was performed, employing 30 WCST variables. A three-factor solution
was obtained, with the first factor representing cognitive perseveration, the

73

second factor representing what appeared to be slow or partial learning, and the
third factor representing successful strategies. Strang hypothesized that
underlying this proliferation of scores reflecting problem-solving approaches to
the WCST may ]ie a single simple dimension.
More recent results (Anderson et al., 1991), however, have suggested that
WCST performance is multidimensional, consistent with findings by Robinson et
al. (1980) that perseverative responses reflect general cerebral dysfunction.
Anderson et al. tested 91 patients with single, focal brain lesions, as established
by CT and MR images, in contrast to previous studies. All subjects were tested at
least three months post CVA (N=71) or neurosurgical resection for tumor or
seizures (N=20). Patients with a history of psychiatric disorders, head injuries,
substance abuse, or neurological disease were excluded from the study . Patients
were divided into frontal groups (including dorsolateral, mesial, and orbital
frontal lesions), frontal plus (lesions extending posterior to rolandic areas), and
nonfrontaJ. All patients were administered the WCST and WAIS-R. The WCST
was administered and scored according to standard procedures (Heaton, 1981),
y ielding the usual scores: number correct, number of errors, perseverative
r esponses, perseverative errors, nonperseverative errors, and categories
completed. None of these measures revealed significant differences, or even a
trend toward significant differences, between frontal and nonfrontal groups. The
cutoff scores which best discriminated the groups were the same as those found
b y Heaton, but these correctly classified only 62% of the subjects (42% of
n onfrontals). Anderson et al. considered the possibility that systematic
differences in lesion size may have contributed to these findings, but found
differences in lesion size did not result in systematic differences within the
ffrontal groups. Differences between left and right hemisphere groups were also
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not found, nor were differences evident between frontal groups divided on the
basis of anatomical divisions within the frontal lobes. Finally, no consistent
anatomical correlates of specific patterns of WCST performance were found.
Anderson et al. concluded that while both human and animal studies clearly
demonstrate frontal lobe mediation of cognitive abstraction and set shifting tasks,
"performance on a multifaceted cognitive task such as the WCST will necessarily
involve the coordinated interaction of multiple and separate brain regions" (pp.
15-16). Regional blood flow studies (rCBF) confirm that while prefrontal lobe
regions are activated by performance on the WCST, so are several other brain
areas (Weinberger, Berman, & Zee, 1986).
Anderson et al. (1991) observed, with Heaton and others, that the WCST may
be most useful in assessment of multiple cognitive constructs, including ability to
abstract information from relevant stimuli, ability to shift cognitive set, and
perseverative tendencies, regardless of anatomical correlates.
Moderator Variables
While individual studies have demonstrated significant effects in
differentiating the WCST performance of various clinical groups, replication of
these effects has often been impeded by a variety of methodological variables
which makes comparisons across groups and settings difficult. Moderator
variables, including age, education, and IQ differences, are among those
variables which may influence test research outcome, but this issue has received
less attention relative to the WCST than for the CT.
Age and Education Correlates
Developers of the WCST employed groups of college students in their
research, who were uniformly young and well-educated, with only one
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exception. Berg (1948) administered what became known as the WCST to a
group of 22 older students, ranging in age from 58 to 73 years, reporting that
none of these students progressed beyond the first category shift. Loranger and
Misiak (1960) also found that older normal subjects were very impaired on the
WCST. Only two of her 50 aged female subjects between the ages of 74 and 80
were able to complete all six categories and the mean number of categories
completed was only 1.86 (S.D. = 1.54). Correlation with age was not significant
(r=-.16), however, due to the restricted age range of her sample. Years of
education was also not significantly correlated with WCST performance (r=.21).
Misiak and Loranger (1961) found somewhat higher correlation between age and
WCST perseverative errors (.34) in a group of elderly subjects, combining the
aged females tested by Loranger and Misiak with 36 males, age 68 to 80.

In studies comparing the performance of clinical subjects with other groups,
most studies have used restricted age and education ranges, which may have
modulated relationships that might have been discerned in more heterogenous
groups. Exceptions to this general rule often have not provided data sufficient to
analyze the relationship.

For example, Drewe (1974) concluded that age was

significantly associated with WCST performance only when other disabilities
were not present, but she provided no data to support that conclusion. Nelson
(1976) anecdotally observed that the standard WCST procedure was often too
difficult for older subjects, but also provided no data concerning the effect of her
modification on performance by older subjects. Similarly, Tarter and Parsons
(1971) asserted that the significant differences observed in their study between
college students and hospitalized controls was the result of age and education
differences, but provided no support for that conclusion.
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Robinson et al. (1980) provided more adequate data analysis of age and
education variables. They reported significant correlations of age with
perseverative responses (r=.23, r<.05) but nonsignificant correlations with
education (r=-.19, r<.10) for brain-damaged subjects. For normal subjects, the
relationships were reversed: education correlated significantly with
perseverative responses (r=-.17, r<.10) but age did not (r=-.25, r<.01). In
attempting to classify focal brain-damaged subjects into frontal vs . nonfrontal
groups, both age and education entered all discriminant function analyses, as
variables contributing to discrimination equations. The proportion of the
variance accounted for by these variables was not reported, however.
Heaton 's follow-up normative study, based in part on these same data,
provides much more complete analyses of the influence of age and education
correlates. With the exception of Learning to Learn and Failure to Maintain Set
scores , which proved to have little predictive value in any of the analyses, age
showed mild to moderate correlations with all other variables, ranging from .12
with nonperseverative errors to -.33 with categories achieved for the total braindamaged group. Correlations for the normal group were comparable, except for
Trials to First Category, which was essentially unrelated. The relationship with
education was much more modest for the brain-damaged group, but roughly
equivalent for the normal group .
The opposite pattern was obtained by King and Snow (1981). In their analysis
of patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation, patients who were
ultimately found to be brain-damaged by independent diagnoses showed
roughly equivalent correlations for education and age (.23 and -.29, respectively),
but these moderator variables were essentially unrelated for patients found not
to be brain-damaged.
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Analysis of these demographic variables for the normal group using four age
groups (under 40 years of age, 40-59 years of age, 50-59 years of age, and over 59
years of age) and three levels of education (less than 12 years, 12-15 years, and
over 15 years) revealed that age and education variables do not interact.
Significant main age effects were obtained for six of ten WCST scores, but in each
case this was due to the poor performance of the oldest group (over 59 years),
who achieved mean scores on all variables within the impaired range.
Significant main education effects were also obtained for six of the ten scores, but
in this case these results were primarily due to the excellent performance of the
best educated group. However, in several instances the performance of the least
educated group fell just into the impaired range. These results suggest that
interpretation of WCST performance should be amended somewhat for older
persons, and performance of poorly educated subjects should perhaps be
interpreted conservatively, despite the attenuation of education effects
accompanying brain damage.
Somewhat different findings were obtained by Heinrichs (1990), who
compared the performance of psychiatric patients and brain-damaged patients.
Results reveal that his sample was relatively impaired on all measures, with
education showing stronger relationships with WCST variables (.44 to .54) than
age (.34 to .37). Heinrichs concluded that these relationships appear to vary with
respect to populations under consideration.
IO Correlates
A majority of studies have also attempted to equate IQ levels of research
subjects and controls, but have seldom evaluated the relationship of IQ correlates
to WCST for clinical vs. control groups. Fey (1951) was the first to report IQ as a
covariate. She found no significant relationship between Full Scale IQ on the

78

Wechsler-Bellevue (Form I) and categories completed on the WCST for either the
schizophrenic group or the normal control group. The correlations between
categories completed and W-B subtests also were not significant. She concluded
that intelligence is not a major factor influencing performance on the WCST, and
noted parenthetically that the success of some "feebleminded" children on the
WCST is supportive of that conclusion.
Milner (1963) reported group IQ scores for her brain-damaged subjects, but
failed to specify what test was administered and did not report any IQ/ WCST
analyses, other than comparing IQ Joss for frontal vs. nonfronta] groups
preoperatively and postoperatively.

Drewe (1974) specified that her subjects

were administered a short WAIS and reported that groups did not differ on
Verbal IQ, but patients with left hemisphere lesions obtained significantly higher
Performance IQ scores than patients with right hemisphere lesions (r<.01) and
patients with nonfrontal lesions also scored significantly higher on the WAIS
Performance Scale than patients with frontal lesions (r<.05). Drewe suggested
that this may have accounted for some of the results, but did not analyze this
relationship further.
Loranger and Misiak (1960) examined the interrelationship among several
tests of nonverbal intellectual function, including the WCST, for elderly females.
Using concepts completed as a measure of success on the WCST, they found
moderate correlations with all measures administered, including Porteus Mazes
(r=.59), Primary Mental Abilities Reasoning (timed: r=.46; untimed: r=.36), and
Ravens Progressive Mazes (r=.65). A follow-up of this study (Misiak &
Loranger, 1961) employing an enlarged sample found these relationships to be
somewhat weaker, however. Centroid factor analysis of these measures yielded
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only one factor, which they termed a general intellectual factor, on which WCST
perseverative errors loaded .35.
Robinson et al. (1980) incorporated WAIS Full Scale IQ into the Average
Impairment Rating on the HRNB, which was covaried as a measure of severity in
their analyses. They did not analyze the relationship of IQ with WCST
performance independently.

However, in discriminant analyses intended to

facilitate differentiation of focal frontal brain damage, the AJR score representing
Full Scale IQ was the only variable which did not enter the prediction equation,
suggesting that the variability represented by that measure was accounted for by
other measures. The normative follow-up of this study by Heaton (1981),
however, revealed moderate relationships for most WCST variables with Full
Scale IQ except for Failure to Maintain Set, Learning to Learn, and
Nonperseverative Errors, for the brain-damaged group (.32 to .45). Interestingly,
the correlations are more modest for the normal group. In contrast, Heinrichs
(1990) found a much more substantial relationship between WCST performance
and WAIS-R Full Scale IQ in his more impaired group of subjects (.69 to .77).
Pendleton and Heaton (1982) found similar moderate correlations in both braindamaged and normal control groups between Full Scale IQ and WCST
perseverative responses.
Only one study has investigated the relationship of WAIS subtest variables
and scale scores with WCST performance. Strang (1983) compared the
performance of her brain-damaged group with her normal group on all WCST
variables which have been reported in the literature and WAIS subtests and scale
scores. Results reveal that for the pooled data from both samples, most of the
major WCST scores commonly used yielded Pearson correlation coefficients
ranging from r=.40 to r=.60. No difference was observed between the strength of

80
reJationships between Verbal IQ and Performance IQ scores, but a trend toward
more frequent significant correlations was observed for Performance Scale
subtests than for Verbal Scale subtests.
However, a very different pattern of relationships is observed when braindamaged and nonbrain-damaged

groups are considered separately. For the

brain-damaged group, none of the WCST scores are correlated with WAIS
summary scores, except for Categories Completed (r=.41 with FSIQ). The
strongest subtest score relationships are with Comprehension, which was
correlated with every major score above r=.40. Only slightly less frequent
correlations were found for Digit Symbol and Block Design. For Digit Symbol,
only Total Correct (excluding criterion runs and signal trials) and Total Trials
were not significantly correlated; for Block Design, only Categories Completed
and Total Correct were not significantly correlated. Similarities and Picture
Arrangement demonstrated secondary relationships with major WCST variables.
This pattern of relationships was not expected, particularly the very consistent
correlations with Comprehension.
A somewhat different pattern of relationships was evident for the normal
group. For this group, WAIS summary scores were consistently related to
performance on major WCST variables, and less association was observed with
Comprehension.

However, the relationship with Block Design and Digit Symbol

was even more evident. These results were interpreted as suggesting that among
brain-damaged patients the use of practical problem-solving skills, most
especially involving common sense, may be prerequisites for these measures of
success on the task presented by the WCST, but with intact cerebral functioning,
nonverbal reasoning skills take on greater importance.
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Taken together, these results show marked variability in the association
,etween moderator variables, particularly intelligence, and WCST performance.
,..,heseresults might be expected on the basis of variable constructs assessed by
·he WCST in various populations and emphasize the need for further
darification relating to the cognitive processes involved in WCST performance.
,..,
his might best be accomplished by directly relating performance on the WCST
o CT performance characteristics.
Comparison of the CT and WCST
Despite their obvious differences, the CT and WCST share many similarities.
30th are complex measures which require concept formation based on
dentification of common elements in a visual array, sufficient flexibility to form
md then reject hypotheses based on an ambiguous pattern of reinforcement, the
1bility to profit from feedback concerning the accuracy of responses, the ability to
shift response sets, as well as the ability to maintain response sets when
1ppropriate (Pendleton & Heaton, 1982; Strang, 1983). Only a few studies,
i10wever, have directly compared these measures.
King and Snow (1981) compared the performances of 150 subjects referred for
neuropsychological evaluation on the WCST and CT. Patients were divided into
;wo groups on the basis of discharge diagnoses not derived from
i\europsychological test data . The WCST was administered according to Milner's
11963) procedures, except that all patients completed all 128 cards, rather than

;erminating testing after completion of six categories. Dependent measures
compared were categories completed on the WCST and total errors on the CT.
?artial correlation coefficients were computed, controlling for the effects of age
and education on both variables. The correlation obtained for the brain-damaged
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~roup was r=-.44 (p <.001) and for the nonbrain-damaged group r=-.42 (p <.001).
~he correlation for the pooled data from both groups, again controlling for age
md education effects, was r=-.55 (p <.001). At most, this degree of
<orrespondence accounted for approximately 30% of the variance in both
neasures. King and Snow concluded that these are not measures of identical
constructs.
Similar results were reported by Pendleton and Heaton (1982), who also
;ound 30% shared variance in a correlational study comparing the CT and WCST.
Subjects were 207 brain-damaged patients who had been referred for
1europsychological evaluation at the University of Colorado Health Sciences
Center. Lesion site was confirmed and type was independently confirmed by
1euroradiological and neurosurgical data. Brain-damaged patients were divided
n to three subgroups: (a) Frontal, including those with lesions extending into
10nfrontal areas; (b) Nonfrontal; and (c) Diffuse. A fourth group included 150
10rmal paid volunteers. Performance of each group was compared with respect

o CT total errors and WCST perseverative responses. Correlations for all groups
vere roughly similar, ranging from r=.48 to r=.58, and all were significant at p
..::
.001, reflecting approximately 30% shared variance. Moreover, Full Scale IQ
mrrelated more highly with the CT (p <.01) than for WCST perseverative
esponses (p <.05). Diagnostic accuracy of these measures was also compared.
:{esults reveal that the WCST is slightly more sensitive to frontal than to other
cerebral lesions, but the WCST was more accurate in classifying nonfrontal and
iliffuse groups. However, these differences did not reach statistical significance.
':'his same pattern of results was obtained when these measures disagreed with
:espect to classification: The WCST was more accurate in classifying frontal lobe
Jatients whereas the CT was more accurate in classifying nonfrontal patients,
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and these results did reach significance (p <05). Together these results suggested
that these measures assess somewhat different cognitive abilities, despite their
similarity. Consequently, Pendleton and Heaton recommend continued use of
both tests.
Despite these differences, Brandon and Chavez (1985) found that when both
tests are administered in the same battery, presenting the CT first facilitates
performance on the WCST, as measured by the relationship between CT total
errors and WCST perseverative response and total error scores. The authors
postulated those results were due to the more diversified range of abstract
concepts represented in the CT, but this effect suggests considerable similarity in
the cognitive processes assessed by each task, at least for this population of
normal functioning college students.
Rothke (1986) investigated the extent to which differences in set shifting cues
given in the instructions on each test may have suppressed correlations between
them. A heterogenous group of 52 inpatients in a VA medical center were
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. In the first condition,
subjects were administered the WCST first and both tests were given with set
shifting instructions. In the second condition, subjects were also given the WCST
first, but neither test was given with set shifting instructions. In the third
condition, subjects were given the CT first, and both tests were given with set
shifting instructions. In the fourth condition, subjects were given the CT first,
and neither test was given with set shifting instructions. Thus, in each condition,
one test was given with standard instructions and the other with modified
instructions. When set shifting cues were given, patients administered the WCST
were informed that the sorting principle might change from time to time, while
the CT was given in the standard manner, being informed at the beginning at
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each new subtest, ''The principle might be the same as it was in the last one or it
might be different." When no set shifting cues were given, the WCST was given
in the standard manner, where the only information given was feedback
concerning the accuracy of responses. Similarly, the CT was given without any
mention of subtests or a change of principles. Unlike the results reported by
Brandon and Chavez (1985), Rothke did not find a significant effect for order of
presentation of these tasks. However, a significant effect for cueing conditions
was demonstrated (p <.001). Eliminating set shifting cues for the CT did not
substantially affect performance, but WCST perseverative responses were much
reduced by providing set shifting cues . The author concluded that for this
relatively impaired population, these tasks measure substantially different
cognitive skills . Rothke postulated that mental set shifting ability is of
paramount importance on the WCST, while the CT measures more complex
skills.
Strang (1983) compared performance on all WCST variables reported in the
literature, in addition to her new hypothesis-testing

scores, and CT performance,

including total errors and subtest scores. Since WCST variables are typically
frequency scores which reflect the greater number of trials required with poorer
performance, they may be expected to vary with CT error scores, which are also
frequency scores. Partialing out this source of methodological variance resulted
in much attenuated relationships between WCST variables and CT error scores.
This resulted in significant relationships in the brain-damaged

group only for

WCST perseveration related scores, although total errors was also significantly
correlated with performance on CT Subtest VIL The most consistent
relationships were with CT Subtests V and VII and total errors, with less
consistent correlations with Subtest IV, and no significant relationship with
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Subtest I-III and VI. For the normal group, the only significant correlations using
transformed WCST scores were with proportion of Matching to Form and
Reinforcements to Form with CT total errors and Subtest IV. It should be
remembered that form is the easiest concept for most subjects and the most
frequent perseverate-to principle. These relationshlps for normals appear to
reflect ability to shift flexibly from thls intuitive matching principle.
The relationship between WCST variables and the CT is further attenuated
when the effect of moderator variables was partialed out. For the normal group,
partialing age or FSIQ or any combination of age, FSIQ, and education reduced
the significant correlations to none. For the brain-damaged

group , significant

correlations remained when any one moderator variable was partialed out, but
partialing age and FSIQ simultaneously

reduced all correlations to less than r=.27

(7.29% common variance) .
When the hypothesis shlfting scores were considered in relation to CT
performance for the total group, it was evident, as might be expected, that
Wrong-Shlft behavior is associated with better CT performance, and Wrong-Stay
is an unsuccessful strategy. However, controlling for demographlc variables also
reduces these relationshlps to nonsignificance in the brain-damaged

group. In

contrast, for the normal group, when controlling for all three demographlc
variables simultaneously, Shift-Behavior remains significantly correlated with
performance on Subtest VI (p <.01).
Overall, thls very complex study suggested that WCST performance may be
viewed from a variety of perspectives, which may reflect multiple cognitive
processes, but relationshlps between these measures and CT performance, when
controlling for variance due to age and intellect, are nonsignificant.

This may be

due to the complexity of cognitive processes reflected by CT error scores, which
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may not vary consistently in predicted directions, or these measures may simply
reflect different cognitive processes.
Conclusions
Although the CT and WCST derived from common sources, in some senses
their development may be described as mirror images of each other. Reitan
(1966b) referred to the CT as a continuing long-term experiment, and added:
We are still administering the same tests in the same way we did more than a
decade ago. Of course, standardization of testing procedure has been
necessary in order to be in a position gradually to accumulate enough subjects
for study of specific neurological variables. As a result, we have not been able
to modify or manipulate the test battery in order to learn experimentally what
the tests measure or the particular requirements of the tests which might be
most sensitive to cerebral dysfunction. The approach has been oriented
toward subdivision and analysis of the independent neurological variables
while the dependent variables (psychological measurements) have been held
constant. (p. 163)
In contrast, the WCST has been developed out of seemingly endless
methodological variations. Heaton (1981) described 32 different scoring methods
which have been utilized, and almost as many variations of materials and
procedures. Only a few of these variations have been studied systematically;
consequently, comparability across studies has been lacking. Unlike the CT,
where a single score conceals complexity of constructs, with the WCST a
proliferation of scores has impeded investigation of the constructs they each
reflect and the interrelationships

among them. Heaton's (1981) standardization

appears to have brought some measure of consistency to research and clinical
practice involving the WCST. What is now needed is a means of relating the
performance profile obtained on WCST variables to the broader pattern of
patients' neuropsychological functioning, particularly that represented by CT

...
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performance, in order to relate test findings to adaptive behavior in a natural
environment.
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CHAPTERIII
METHODSANDPROCEDURES
Modified Administration Procedures
While pre viou s research has firmly established both the CT and WCST as
sensitive measures of complex problem-solving skills, concept formation, and
cognitive flexibility, the specific cognitive skills assessed by each task have not
been addressed, except by correlating error scores on one test with error scores
on the other test. Bond and Buchtel (1984) argued that while the issue of
identifying the cognitive skills assessed by neuropsychological measures is an
important one, correlational studies which compare error scores on one test with
those of another may be uninformative. In particular , they observed that
correlations such as those which have been reported for the CT and WCST may
reflect the unreliability of the tests rather than differences in abilities measured
by these tests. This, however, is difficult to ascertain for several reasons . A
considerable practice effect has been found to be characteristic of both measures,
and those effects appear to vary from population to population (Matarazzo,
Matarazzo, Wiens, Gallo, & Klonoff, 1976; Matarazzo, Wiens, Matarazzo, &
Goldstein, 1974; Matarazzo, Matarazzo, Gallo, & Wiens, 1979), which renders
test-retest reliability estimates essentially meaningless. Split-half reliability
estimation for these measures is also not useful, because subsequent items are
not equivalent in terms of difficulty or independent (Simmel & Counts, 1957), nor
is the last half comparable to the first half. Since no alternate form exists for
either measure and would be very difficult to construct, reliability estimates are
not presently available.
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Bond and Buchtel (1984) also described other problems attendant upon
correlational analyses of error scores in describing common constructs measured
by each of these tests. Among these are uncertainty concerning what processes
given scores by specific individuals reflect. This is an especially important
consideration when cognitive strategies may vary considerably. Bond and
Buchtel recommended a process tracing approach, or a "think aloud" approach,
as one means of minimizing these obstacles. This technique involves asking
subjects to verbalize the rules or the reasoning underlying their responses.
Such an approach has the advantage of providing supplementary data that
are useful to help clarify the hypothesis-testing process employed by subjects as
they seek to identify relevant features of the stimuli comprising these tasks.
Thereby , it is possible to differentiate types of errors subjects make in
responding . It is not likely that subjects "te11al1 they know" in explaining the
reasoning underlying their responses; rather verbal explanations are often
incomplete and ambiguous. Yet, this technique permits more accurate
description of cognitive processes characteristic of particular patients' problemsolving strategies. For example, some patients fail on these tasks due to an
overly concrete perceptual focus, while others respond incorrectly due to failure
to maintain cognitive set, while still others are deficient in idea fluency, or
display perseverative responding. From the perspective of designing and
implementing cognitive rehabilitation strategies, it is important to differentiate
among these different types of errors, to the extent that these approaches to
problem-solving tasks are characteristic of individual patients, or groups of
patients.
This verbalization approach to assessment represents a modification of
standard testing procedures, and is not without methodological problems of its
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own, but it has been used with some success in other contexts. Reitan has
recommended this approach on an informal basis as a means of gathering
additional information concerning patients' problem-solving strategies on the CT
(Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), and it has been used also with concept formation tasks
(Bourne, 1965).
However, this technique has not been previously reported in the literature. It
is not known whether asking subjects to verbalize their reasoning may have
changed the nature of cognitive processing involved in task performance. This
question was addressed in the current study by comparing results of testing
collected under standard administration conditions with test results of subjects
who were asked to verbalize reasoning. Noncomparability of mean error scores
would suggest that adding a verbalization component to these tasks has
substantially modified the nature of the cognitive processes called upon in
performing these problem-solving tasks. Moreover, if the strength of association
between types of error scores between groups is significantly different
statistically, it could conduded that the tasks presented under modified
administration conditions (verbalization of reasoning) were not the same tasks
presented under standard administration conditions (reasoning not verbalized).

If asking patients to verbalize their reasoning on these tasks is found to
substantially alter the nature of the task, obviously conclusions that were based
on data collected under modified instructions could not be generalized to data
collected under standard instructions.
Cognitive Process Variables
A primary concern of neuropsychological
advent of more sophisticated neurodiagnostic

evaluation, particularly since the
procedures, is the prescription of

9]

treatment goals and the design of remediation strategies. This requires more
specific definition of deficits than statements of "impaired problem solving
skills," or "impaired cognitive flexibility," or other such general statements.
However, evaluating performance of higher cognitive functions by counting
errors on the CT and WCST fails to provide such specific information . What
referral sources seek to know is, "What does this patient do that impairs
performance on this problem-solving task and how can that behavior be
changed?" Since the CT and WCST have been found to be among the most
sensitive measures of brain damage, it is reasonable to believe that patients'
performance characteristics contain the information necessary to respond to those
questions. If that is so, patients' verba]jzation of the reasoning underlying their
responses may well access that data. For that information to be useful, however,
it must be translated into reliable scores, and those scores must reflect relatively
consistent performance characteristics, independently of age and IQ covariates.
Asking patients to verbalize the reasoning underlying quantifiable responses
introduces the problem of how one patient's qualitative responses may be
compared to other patients ' qualitative responses. Some anecdotal reports are
available for the CT in whlch patients have been asked to verbalize their
reasoning (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), but these responses have been interpreted
subjectively, whlch does not allow systematic comparisons across patients or
groups of patients.
Two studies have more systematically addressed the issue of identifying itemby-item response determinants on the CT, however, and these may serve to
provide some guidance in defining relevant response parameters. Simmel and
Counts (1957) concluded that some form of counting was the most persistent
response determinant for theif subjects. They described counting responses
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based upon the number of stimuli or elements in the configuration, counting
responses based upon perceptually similar stimuli, counting responses based
upon perceptual dissimilarity, counting responses based upon spatial continuity
of both similar and dissimilar stimuli, and counting responses based upon
dominant perceptual features. Simmel and Counts also noted that subjects who
are confused as to the correct principle may have perseverated to an obviously
incorrect principle, or reverted to a preferred (incorrect) principle when the
stimulus configuration changed or a dominant perceptual feature appeared, even
though they may have been more recently reinforced for employing the correct
principle .
Perrine (1984) referred to the concept formation literature (Bourne,
Dominowski, & Loftus, 1979) for a cognitive process model which might help
clarify the response tendencies described by Simmel and Counts. Following
Bourne (Bourne et al., 1979), he differentiated between attribute identification,
defined as characteristics of a stimulus configuration which convey information
about membership or nonmembership in a class, and rule-learning, which
describes the process whereby attributes are related logically. Perrine described
the relationship between these components as hierarchical, having both concr:ete
(attribute identification) and abstract (rule learning) stages. Concept formation
tasks may involve only the concrete stage, or both the concrete and abstract
stages. Using tasks devised to assess performance on these stages separately as
independent variables, Perrine concluded that the WCST is primarily an attribute
identification task (concrete) whereas the CT is more a rule learning task (both
concrete and abstract). However, even though the relationship between these
concept formation scores and CT subtest and WCST scores was significantly
greater than the relationship between CT subtest and WCST scores from a
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statistical perspective, the improvement in predictive power was generally
marginal from a clinical viewpoint. Further, even these findings may have been
influenced by the greater similarity of the attribute identification tasks to the
WCST than the CT, and vice versa for the rule learning tasks.
An assumption underlying such approaches is that the cognitive processes
employed in problem-solving or concept formation tasks is "task-driven,"
wherein the strategies employed are dependent upon the nature of the task.
However, as Bond and Buchtel (1984) have noted, individuals may select a
common response by utilizing a variety of processes. Measuring only the end
product of those processes may conceal as much as it illuminates.
What is needed is an approach which can measure the processes employed by
subjects as they arrive at a solution to the task presented to them. Asking patients
to verbalize their reasoning as they problem-solve may be the most direct means
of accomplishing this goal. For the WCST those responses consist only of the
perceptual attribute (utilizing Perrine's terminology) identified by the subject in
determining his or her response. Thus, verbalized WCST responses serve to
provide a less ambiguous means of scoring the responses than is true for
conventional administration.

However, for the CT, devising a coding system

which permits comparison of verbalized responses across items and across
subjects is a formidable task.
Perrine's Model of Concept Formation
Perrine's (1984) concept formation model for describing the process whereby
patients select a response from the choices available to them on the problemsolving tasks represented by the CT provides a means for differentiating subjects'
reasoning. In terms of this model, the attribute identification stage of response
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selection may be viewed as the perceptual component of that process, while the
rule-learning stage appears more conceptual. Thus, when patients verbalized
their reasoning on these tasks, attribute identification occurred when subjects
discriminated features in the stimulus upon which their response was based,
while the rule-learning component consisted of the significance subjects
attributed to those features. For example, on Subtest Ill of the CT, many subjects
chose "3" as the correct response because "three are not solid." In that instance,
"openness" (nonsolidity) constituted the attribute identification portion of the
response, while counting (elements that are not solid) comprised the rulelearning component.
However, the task of applying this model to subjects' verbal responses is
somewhat equivalent to devising a valid and reliable coding system for the
Rorschach Inkblot Technique. Different individuals describe the same reasoning
differently, and on occasion similar language may describe very different
reasoning processes. Similarly, one person may utilize different language to
describe similar responses or may fail to use language which differentiates
among different kinds of responses. For example, in Subtest IV, one person may
respond, "Three because that part is missing," while another person, referring to
the same perceptual features, may respond, "Three because that's where the line
is." Even more problematic is when such language shifts occur within the same
protoco1. The question arises as to whether these differences in language relate to
different cognitive processes. If so, coding subjects' reasoning on the CT may not
be feasible since utilizing the language in subjects' descriptions of how stimuli
relate to the number responses given has proven to be inherently unreliable, and
therefore invalid.
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The Attribute Identification Score
The alternative which was utilized in this study was the convention of
identifying the perceptual attributes of stimuli to which the language used by
subjects referred. For example, on Subtest III, subjects may have chosen "1" as
the correct response because "One is different." In this instance, "different"
referred to the solidity of one portion of the stimulus; consequently, the
perceptual attribute would be "Solid" rather than "Different." Similarly, subjects
may have chosen "2" as the correct response because "Two are alike" (referring to
the fact that two stimuli have four sides). ln that case, the perceptual attribute
would be "Form." In this fashion it is possible to avoid the ambiguities inherent
in attempting to code multiple ways of describing "diiference" in a consistent
fashion. In contrast, if the patient had stated in the first instance, "solidness," but
the number response was "3," the perceptual attribute would be "Open," because
the language of the verbal response clearly referred to the nonsolidity of three
elements in the stimulus. Table 2 lists the Attribute Identification codes identified
for the purposes of this study and brief definitions for each. These codes may be
viewed as describing where the subject was looking in formulating the response,
or what part of the stimulus was included in the response. This approach brings
a greater degree of standardization

to the task and permits increased reliability in

coding responses.
An additional problem encountered is that due to the complexity of CT
stimuli, a response may refer to two or more perceptual attributes, or a verbal
response may be ambiguous as to which attribute takes precedence. Often it is
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Table 2
Definitions of Attribute Identification (Concrete) Codes
1.

Gestalt (G)

Tho se respon ses in which th e perceptual focus is on the stimulu s
configuration as a wh ole
a. do es not differentiat e between solid and dott ed or inferred (missing)
lin es
b. dissimilar elements are treated as equival ent.

2. Color (C)

Respon ses in which clements in the stimulu s configuration ar e
differentiated on the basis of color.
a. Where achromatic colors are used to d escribe configural elements
("th e long whit e one"), score for so lidity not color.
b. An exception to the above rule will be when respon ses ar e based
up on the achromatic color of element s which are unlik e with respect
to solidity .

3. Form (F)

Responses based upon the form or shap e of concr ete non ge om etric
figures. If shap e or form is used descript ively rath er than to differentiate
element s in th e configuration ("3 small squar es" to refer to dott ed lines),
form would not be scored .

4. Element (E)

Respon ses in which elem ents in the stimulu s configurati on which are not
perceptually uniqu e or di stinct ar e arbitrarily differentiat ed from other
perceptually similar elem ent s.

5. Size (Z)

Respon ses in which elements in the stimulu s configuration are
differentiat ed on the ba sis of size.

6. Solidity (5)

Respon ses in which element s in the stimulu s configuration are
differentiat ed on the basis of solidity, or where th e perceptual focu s of
att ention is on elements outlined by a solid line .

7. Open (0)

Respon ses in whid1 th e openne ss of th e stimulu s or stimuli is identified
as the perceptual focus of attention, in contrast to stimuli which are
identified as "solid ." Includes responses focusing attention on brok en or
dotted lines.

8. Missing (M)

Respon ses using inferred lines or components which are considered
missing as the object of rul e formulation. Include s dotted line s which are
de scribed as missing.

9. Background(B)

Response s which include the background area beyond the border s of the
stimulu s.

10. Direction

(D)

Respon ses which consist of elements representing a remote point or
location pointed to or identified by another element in the stimulu s.

not possible to differentiate which of these alternatives is true. Consequently, in
the interest of increased reliability in coding responses, a decision tree approach
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was adopted for coding perceptual attributes. This approach establishes a
hierarchy of coding rules, ordered in such a way that the most reJevant or highest
order perceptual attributes are listed first. (See Appendix E for the full model.)
Use of this approach permitted achievement of a satisfactory level of test-retest
reliability in recoding perceptual attributes. (See Procedures section for reliability
coefficients.)
The Conceptual Abstraction Score
Perrine's model described a two-part process of concept formation in which
Attribute Identification referred to the identification of relevant perceptual
attributes of stimuli and Rule Learning referred to logical relationships between
attributes, leading to hypothesis formation. With reference to the CT, Attribute
Identification refers to identification of the relevant features of stimuli upon
which the rule is based, whereas Rule Learning refers to the logical relationship
between the attribute identified and the number response chosen. For example,
on Subtest III, the Attribute Identification task is to discern that the stimulus
which is different is the relevant dimension, while the Rule Learning task is to
discover that the position of the different stimulus corresponds to the correct
number.
Howe':er, during the course of this study, it was discovered that a three-stage
coding system was required to reliably differentiate verbal responses:
(a) Concrete: subjects selected a perceptual feature which they believed relevant;
(b) Abstract: the perceptual feature or features were organized conceptually to
create a pattern; (c) Rule: this pattern was related to the number response given.
For example, in Subtest IV, the quadrants are numbered in a clockwise direction,
and the principle requires identifying the quadrant of the stimulus which is
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missing or different. The Concrete (Attribute Identification) task is identification
of the portion which is not there or which is different from the rest of the
stimulus; the Abstract conceptual task is to perceive this attribute as one quadrant
of the whole stimulus; the Rule Leaming task is to select a number corresponding
to the position of the missing or different quadrant when ordered in a clockwise
direction.
Table 3 lists the Abstract scores identified for the purposes of this study and
brief definitions for each. As was the case with the Concrete (Attribute
Identification) score, reliability in coding was enhanced by utilizing a hierarchical
decision-tree approach in coding the Abstract score. (See Appendix F for the full
model.)
The Rule-Learning Score
Rule Learning is the third element in this model of concept formation. This is
identical to Perrine's Rule-Learning model and refers to the logical relationship
between the Abstract Pattern and the number response given for the item. For
example, in the following response, "1 because there's 1 object" (referring to a
solidly outlined square figure in Subtest V), the Attribute Identification score
would be "S" because the stimulus included in the response is outlined in a solid
line; the Abstract Pattern score would be "I" because the attribute identified
occupies space corresponding to multiple quadrants of the stimulus and has been
combined into a single percept; and the Rule Learning score would be "C"
because the number response results from counting the Abstract Patterns
identified. In contrast, if the response had been, "4 because there's 4 lines" (using
the same stimulus), the Attribute Identification score would remain the same; the
Abstract Pattern score would be "Q" because the attribute identified occupies
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Table 3
Definitions of Abstract Pattern Codes
1. Category
Within (W)

Responses which combine elements with like attributes into a unitary set,
then differentiate elements within the set.

2. Category
Between (K)

Responses which combine elements with like attributes into a unitary set,
and apply the rule to the set without further subdivision.

3.

Location (L)

Responses based upon the position of concrete attribute s, other than
those responses which reflect the correct position of a specified quadrant.

4. Unlike (U)

Responses which consist of one unique element which is described or
treated as different than other elements in the stimulus array.

5.

Alike (A)

Responses which consist of elements described as "alike" or the "same"
or differentiated from elements not included in the response on the basis
of unique attributes.

6.

Number (N)

Responses which consist of attributes described as a shape repr ese nting a
number value.

7.

Form (F)

Responses which consist of attributes described as a concrete,
nongeometric shape other than a number.

8.

Missing (M)

Responses which consist of attributes which are physically present but
are described as "missing."

9.

Quadrant (Q)

Responses which consist of attributes which occupy space corresponding
to quadrants or fourths of the stimulus, or multiples thereof.

10. Integrated (I)

Responses which consist of attributes occupying space corresponding to
two or more quadrants which have been combined into a single percept.

11. Division (D)

Responses which consist of attributes occupying space which does not
correspond to quadrants of the stimulus, or multiples thereof.

space corresponding to quadrants of the stimulus, or multiples thereof, and the
Rule Learning score would also be unchanged because the number response still
results from counting the Abstract Patterns identified. (See Table 4 for additional
scoring examples.)
In this fashion, it is possible to assess the hypothesis testing behavior of
individual subjects, in response to confirmation or disconfirmation of hypotheses.
Bourne (1965) reported that efficient hypothesis testing behavior was
characterized by formulation of all-encompassing hypothesis initially, and

100

Table 4
Examples of Scoring Cognitive Process Variables
VERBAL RESPONSE
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modifying elements of the hypothesis one at a time, until the correct principle is
discovered. The coding system described here permits that type of analysis with
respect to the CT. Table 5 lists the Rule Learning scores identified for the
purposes of this study and brief definitions for each. As was the case with the
Concrete and Abstract scores, reliability in coding was enhanced by utilizing a
hierarchical decision-tree approach in coding the Rule-Leaming score. (See
Appendix G for the full model.)
Summary and Ratio Scores
The primary scores described above were transformed to a variety of ratio and
summary scores which comprise the Cognitive Process variables. These scores
reflect a smaller number of cognitive processes which are believed to be crucial
for performance of problem-solving tasks. These include, but are not limited to,
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Table 5
Definitions of Rule-Learning Codes
1. Random (R)

Responses based on Guesses.

2. Memory (M)

Responses
reasoning.

3. Counting (C)

Responses based upon counting Abstract Patterns identified.

4. Location (L)

Responses corresponding
fourth of the stimulus.

based

on a previous

response

without

clarifying

the

to correct placement of a single quadrant or

5.

Location Err (Le)

Responses corresponding to incorrect placement of a single quadrant or
fourth of the stimulus.

6.

Proportion
(P)

Responses based upon the proportion of the stimulus which was
identified as the Abstract Pattern, when the number response given
corresponds to the numerator of the fraction when the denominator= 4.

7.

Proportion Err (Pe)

Responses based upon the proportion of the stimulus which was
identified as the Abstract Pattern, when the number response given does
not correspond to the numerator of the fraction or when the denominator
;c4.

8. Arithmetic
(A)

9. Form (F)
10. Sequence (S)

Responses based upon a mathematical procedure other than simple
counting of Abstract Patterns.
Responses based upon the shape or form of the Abstract Pattern.
Responses which are based upon a sequence other than described above.

the following: (a) ability to shift strategies when solutions are ineffective; (b)
ability to maintain strategies when solutions are effective; (c) ability to generate
alternative solutions; (d) ability to identify relevant perceptual attributes; (e)
ability to apply abstract rules to variable perceptual stimuli. (See Appendix H for
definitions of these variables.)
Hypotheses

If these or other similar cognitive processes predict performance on these
tasks, the scores which have been derived from coding of patients' verbalized
reasoning on the CT and WCST should form interpretable cognitive process
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factors, when entered into a factor analysis, which are at least moderately
independent of age and lQ covariates . This may be stated in the form of the
following research hypotheses:
1. Mean Total Error and Subtest Error scores on the CT and mean Error

scores, Categories Completed, and Perseverative Responses on the WCST will not
differ significantly (statistically) between a group of patients who verbalized the
reasoning for their responses on the CT and WCST and a group of patients who
did not verbalize their reasoning on the CT and WCST, and are comparable to the
first group with respect to diagnosis, age and Full Scale WAIS-R IQ.
2. Correlations among CT Total Error scores, CT Subtest Error scores, WCST
Error scores, WCST Categories Completed, WCST Perseverative Responses,
WCST Nonperseverative

Errors, and WCST Failure to Maintain Set will not differ

significantly (statistically) between a group of patients who verbalized the
reasoning for their responses on the CT and a group of patients who did not
verbalize their reasoning on the CT, when both groups are comparable with
respect to diagnosis, age and Full Scale WAIS-R IQ.
3. The relationships between coded variables derived from verbalized
responses on the CT will produce three or more interpretable (cognitive process)
factors, which are more independent of age, education, and IQ subtest and
summary scores than CT error scores.
4. The relationships between coded variables derived from verbalized
responses on the WCST (defined in Appendix I) will produce three or more
interpretable (cognitive process) factors, which are more independent of age,
education, and IQ subtest and summary scores than summary WCST scores
(Categories Completed, Perseverative Responses, Nonperseverative
Errors, Failure to Maintain Set).

Errors, Total
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5. The relationship between Total Error Scores and Subtest Error Scores on
the CT and Perseverative Errors, Nonperseverative

Errors, Categories

Completed, Perseverative Responses, and Failure-to-Maintain Set scores on the
WCST will not be statistically significant, when controlling for FSIQ, age, and
education.
6. The relationship between interpretable factor scores from the WCST factor
analyses (hypothesis 4) and each factor score derived from the CT factor analysis
(hypothesis 3) will be statistically significant, when controlling for FSIQ, age, and
education.
Purpose
In view of the need for more accurate description of the cognitive deficits
that characterize the problem-solving behavior of patients with brain injuries or
dysfunction, the purpose of this study was to devise a coding system to classify
CT and WCST responses using a "think aloud" methodology, in order to achieve
the following goals: (a) describe the cognitive strategies employed by individual
patients in performing these tasks, and (b) differentiate the cognitive strategies
assessed by the CT versus the WCST.
Objectives
The goals described above were addressed in terms of the following
objectives:
1. To determine whether asking patients to verbalize their reasoning on

WCST and CT responses substantially alters the nature of these tasks.
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2. To devise a coding system derived from these verbal responses and
determine if verbal responses obtained using this methodology can be reliably
coded by trained examiners.
3. To determine the relationship between the cognitive processes reflected by
~cores on the WCST versus the cognitive processes reflected by scores on the CT.
Procedures
Subjects
Subjects receiving modified test instructions and those receiving nonmodified
instructions (comparison group) were obtained from archival records in the
Clinical Psychology Department at Iowa Methodist Medical Center (IMMC), a
;10 bed privately-funded,

nonprofit general medical center located in Des

Moines, Iowa, affiliated with the only post-acute care rehabilitation center in
central Iowa, Younkers Rehabilitation Center (YRC), which provides a full range
cf rehabilitation services for victims of stroke, traumatic injury, heart disease,

reurological disorders, tumors, and a variety of other disabling conditions. In
,ddition, IMMC offers inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment and
ilpatient psychiatric care. The Clinical Psychology Department has on staff two
lcensed neuropsychologists

and receives a large number of referrals for

1europsychological evaluation from neurologists, physiatrists, psychiatrists, and
ether medical specialists associated with these treatment programs and others.
Cognitive rehabilitation is also provided as an adjunct service by the Clinical
Jsychology Department, and in that connection since July, 1990, technicians
rroviding neuropsychological

testing have routinely asked patients to verbalize

heir reasoning on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Category Test, when
hese measures were administered and time permitted. These responses were
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recorded verbatim to supplement the clinical data available to the
neuropsychologist

to provide baseline data for treatment planning purposes.

Records of neuropsychological

testing since July, 1990 were reviewed in order

to identify patients whose charts contained verbalized records of both complete
WCST and Category Test administration, and completed WAIS-R protocols.
Charts of 132 such patients were identified. Additionally, patients were
identified whose charts contained completed CT and WCST protocols,
administered according to standard instructions (nonverbalized), and who also
completed the WAIS-R. Charts of 88 patients who met these criteria were
identified. However, patients in this comparison group were tested over a much
wider time period for several reasons. First, most patients referred since July,
1990 received verbalized test administration on the CT and WCST for clinical
reasons; second, staff changes occurred just prior to that time, and previous staff
members apparently administered both of these test instruments in their entirety
much less frequently than was true after July, 1990. As a result, testing records
were searched to mid-1986 in order to identify a sufficient number of patients for
the comparison group.
Confidentiality of these patients was protected by duplicating only those
portions of the protocols which contained no personally identifying information,
with the exception of date of testing, date of birth, and age. Duplicated protocols
were coded with a sequential identifying number. At the same time, the Report
of Neuropsychological

Evaluation was consulted to obtain other data relevant to

assessing comparability of the two groups, which was entered on a coding sheet
identified by the assigned identification number. These data included sex,
handedness, diagnosis, and medical information relevant to neuropsychological
functioning (history of hospitalization for head injury, substance abuse history,
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treatment for neurological or psychiatric disorder, and learning disabilities).
After these data were entered onto the coding sheet and protocols were
photoduplicated

as described above, original protocols were returned to the files.

Coded protocols were then divided into the comparison group (nonmodified
instructions) and experimental group (modified instructions).
Although patients whose protocols were selected for the purposes of this
study did not sign informed consent forms, the designated custodian of the
records, the Director of the Psychology Department at IMMC, on the
recommendation of a five-member research committee appointed by the
president of IMMC, and chaired by the research director, approved the use of
these records for the purposes described, with the limitation that patient
confidentiality would be protected, according to the procedures described above.
No attempt was made to ensure that patients whose protocols were selected
for inclusion in this study were representative with respect to demographic
characteristics of the general population or the population of patients referred to
the Psychology Department at IMMC for neuropsychological evaluation. In fact,
it is unlikely that these groups of patients are comparable with the general
population in terms of these characteristics, since young males are at increased
risk of head injuries, and closed head injury is the primary diagnostic
classification for both groups of patients.
These groups of patients are also unlikely to be representative of all patients
referred for neuropsychological

assessment since the selection criteria

(completion of the WAIS-R, CT, and WCST) excluded most severely impaired
patients, patients with very poor frustration tolerance who could not persist in
completing these difficult tasks, and aphasic patients who were unable to
adequately verbalize responses on the Verbal Scale of the WAIS-R or verbalize
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their reasoning on the CT and WCST. As a result, it is likely that patients
selected for inclusion in the study induded a disproportionate

number of

patients with right cerebral hemisphere damage, since patients with left
hemisphere damage are much more likely to be aphasic.
Further analysis of the influence of these variables on outcome was not
attempted.

Table 6 lists primary, secondary, and tertiary diagnoses (when

available) for patients in each group.

It will be noted that a history of head injury was present in 73% of all patients,
at least by patient self-report, although the reason for referral may have been
another diagnosis. As a result, reliably differentiating among this group of
patients on the basis of diagnosis is not practical. Consequently,
induded

diagnosis is not

as a variable or covariate in this study.

Since previous researchers have identified age and IQ, and to a lesser degree
education, as covariates of CT and WCST performance, mean values of these
demographic

variables were computed for each group, and comparability of

Table 6
Diagnostic Classification Within Each Patient Group
DIAGNOSIS
Traumatic Brain Injury
CVA
Toxic Exposure
Brain Tumour
Dementia
Psychiatric
Chemical Dependency
Seizure Disorder
Other Neurological
Unspecified

EXPERIMENT AL GRP
1st
3rd
2nd
88
6
3
7
1
3
1
3

8
5

6
23
5

6

1

7

1
5
2

COMPARISON GRP
1st
2nd
3rd
59
4
2
1
3
1
3
4
1

1
4
5
4

10

4

3

3
1
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group means were assessed using t tests. Table 7 lists mean age, education, and
JQ scores of patients by sex and handedness for each patient group and for both
groups together. It will be noted that though the groups were comparable with
respect to IQ and education, the age comparison revealed that the experimental
group was significantly older (p

<.03) than

the comparison group.

Inspection of decade age ranges in the two groups revealed that the
proportions of subjects in both extremes of the continuum were quite dissimilar
for the two groups.

(See Table 8.) Consequently, covarying age was necessary

on all group comparisons.
Test Admini stration
For both of these groups of patients, testing was administered in a standard
manner by qualified technicians under the appropriate supervision of licensed
psychologists who are credentialed as clinical neuropsychologists.

Each

examiner has completed at least an M.A. or M.S. degree in psychology, but each
group was tested by different examiners, with the exception of the small number
of patients in the Comparison Group who were tested subsequent to July, 1990
and were not asked to verbalize reasoning on the CT and WCST. Among the
Table 7
Demographic Characteristics of Patient Groups
GROUP

N

AGE

ED

PIQ
Mean (S.D.)

VIQ

FSIQ

Exp. Grp Total

132

*37.1 (14.3)

13.2

(2.7)

95.9

(14.1)

97.3

(13.6)

96.2

(13.5)

Comp . Grp Tot.

88

*33.1 (12.4)

12.8

(2.5)

97.6

(13.5)

98.4

(14.0)

98.1

(13.7)

Combined Tot.

220

35.5

(13.7)

13.1

(3.0)

%.5

(13.9)

97.7

(13.7)

96.9

(13.6)

*P

< .05
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reasons for employing standard administration for these subjects were time
limitations, impaired expressive language skills, or assignment to an examiner
who was reluctant to employ modified test instructions.
The Booklet Category Test (BCT) was substituted for the Halstead Category
Test for both groups, even for those tested prior to 1990. The BCT (Defilippis &
McCampbell, 1979) consists of either one or two large loose-leaf binders
containing reproductions of the CT stimuli on a black background to correspond
to the smoked screen on which the CT slides are projected. Patients are
presented a strip of paper on which numbers one through four have been
printed, and rather than responding by pulling a lever on the projection
apparatus, they point to the number they have chosen as their response.
Feedback consists of the examiner's verbal response, "correct" or "incorrect"
rather than the bell or buzzer which provides feedback on the CT apparatus. The
BCT has the advantage that it is much less cumbersome than the CT and may be
readily transported to patients' rooms and other testing sites. It is also less
intimidating for many patients and facilitates examiner interaction to help
maintain patient collaboration.
Validation of the BCT has been hampered by practice effects when both the
Halstead CT and the BCT are administered within a short time period. To some
extent, however, this has been compensated for by counter-balancing

Table 8
Distribution of Decade Age Ranges Within Patient Grou12s
GROUP

<20

20-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60-69

>69

Experimental

7.58%

24.24% 29.55%

21.21%

9.85%

3.03%

4.55%

Comearison

15.91%

30.68% 22.73%

19.32%

10.23%

2.27%

0%
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administration order in a variety of populations. These studies have consistently
demonstrated a high degree of consistency between scores on the two forms
(r=.913 and r=.893, for example) and equivalent patterns of correlation and group
discrimination (Defilippis & McCampbell, 1979). Although validation research
continues, the BCT is generally viewed as an equivalent form of the CT.
Coding of Responses
Verbalized CT responses for the experimental group were coded by the
experimenter, employing the decision tree procedures in Appendices E through
G. These procedures were developed, also by the experimenter, using patient
protocols which were not included in this study for the purpose of statistical
analysis. These protocols were among those which were discarded due to
missing data, generally because the WCST was not available or was not
administered according to modified instructions.
Criteria employed in the development of the coding system were based upon
the theoretical approach described by Perrine (1984), as outlined in the
description of Coding Process Variables in the section above. Definitions and
coding procedures were constructed in such a way that discrimination among
verbal responses which varied in terms of Concrete Attribute Identification,
Abstract Pattern Identification, or Rule Learning was enhanced. Such
discrimination was measured on the basis of test-retest (recoding) reliability for
recoding by the examiner of four protocols which had been initially coded, also
by the examiner, four months previously

5.

Since verbal responses of subjects

who made few errors on the CT provided little variety of scoring q.eterminants or
5Although interscorer reliability would have provided a more accurate measure of reliability in
coding responses, the complexity of the coding system precluded use of trained volunteers for
the purpose of this study.
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coding challenges, protocols which contained fewer than 50 errors were
eliminated from the selection pool, and protocols used for assessing reliability
were randomly selected from among those which remained. Although it is not
typically used in this manner, an adaptation of the point-by-point agreement
ratio was computed, based upon a total sample of 2,160 scores (Kazdin, 1982).
Reliability for recoding responses utilizing this procedure was .943.
Consequently, it was concluded that use of coding rules provided adequate
reliability.
Data Entry
After all CT protocols were coded following the procedures described above,
the experimenter entered all data into appropriate cells on a spreadsheet
software program (Excel 4.0) running on an Apple Macintosh Ilci computer. This
spreadsheet contained formulas for computation of frequency and ratio scores
for all variables defined in Appendix I. WCST responses, both those scored
conventionally and those based upon patients' verbal responses, were entered
into a second spreadsheet program, which contained formulas for computation
of WCST variables listed in Appendix H. After all data were entered and all
summary and ratio scores for both the CT and WCST were computed, these data
were combined with WAIS-R IQ scores and demographic variables, with each
subject identified by sequentially assigned ID numbers.
Data for the Comparison Group were summarized and collated in the same
manner, except that CT cognitive process variables and WCST verbalized scores
were not available for this group. Consequently, only CT error scores and
conventionally scored WCST variables were combined. At this point, the
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combined scores for each group were exported to files for statistical analysis
using SPSS for the Macintosh, version 4.0 (SPSS, 1990).
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Data analysis for this study proceeded in three distinct phases, reflecting the
separate purposes of the three sets of hypotheses described in the previous
chapter. First, error scores on the CT and conventional scores on the WCST, and
relationships among those scores, for the Experimental Group were compared to
the same scores for the Comparison Group in order to determine if there were
differential performance characteristics between these groups, which might have
suggested that asking patients to verbalize their reasoning altered the nature of
the task. Since it had been established previously that these groups were not
comparable with respect to some variables which have been found to influence
performance on these tasks (age and some subtests on the Performance IQ scale),
it was necessary to statistically control for the influence of these variables in
performing these comparisons.

This was accomplished by use of analysis of

covariance (ANCOVA), in which scores reflecting performance comprised the
dependent variables with group membership comprising the independent
variable, while covarying age and WAIS-R performance.

Since IQ scores were

age-corrected, and age was already entered as a covariate, nonage-corrected IQ
scores (summed scale scores) were utilized to avoid confounding correction
terms. Comparing correlations between pairs of scores was accomplished in the
same manner, partialing out the influence of age and IQ variables, then
covarying one score on another score, with group membership as the
independent variable.
The second set of analyses related to hypotheses three and four, which
concerned the identification of separate cognitive process factors comprised of
subsets of cognitive process variables from the CT and WCST. It was
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hypothesized that at least three interpretable factors for each test would emerge
from factor analyses of the ratio and summary variables defined in Appendices
Hand I. It was further hypothesized that these factors would be at least
moderately independent of age and IQ variables . Therefore, this set of analyses
was accomplished using principal components factor analysis with oblique
rotation since it was not expected that these factors would be independent of
each other. The relationship of these factors to age and IQ variables was assessed
through the use of multiple regression techniques, with age and WAIS-R subtest
scores regressed on each interpretable factor which emerged from factor analysis
of variables from each test.
The third set of analyses was intended to test hypotheses 5 and 6. It was
hypothesized that when age and IQ covariates were partialed out, the correlation
between CT error scores and WCST conventional scores would not be
statistically significant, but that CT factor scores would be significantly correlated
with WCST factor scores, when age and IQ covariates are partialed . This set of
analyses was performed using multiple regression techniques, regressing the
combined sets of covariates and independent variables onto each dependent
variable, forcing covariates into the equation first, in order to partial out their
influence.
Results of Group Comparisons
Hypothesis 1
It was anticipated that mean CT error scores and Categories Completed,

Perseverative Errors, and Total Errors on the WCST for the Experimental Group
would not be significantly different statistically from the same scores for the
Comparison Group, when controlling for variance due to age, education, and
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FSIQ (nonage corrected) covariates. This expectation was tested using
ANCOV A, with summary scores on both the CT and WCST serving as
dependent variables, and group membership as the independent variable,
covarying blocked age, education, and summed WAIS-R scale scores (FSSUM).
The results of these comparisons are listed in Table 9. Of the 11 comparisons,
onJy mean scores for CT Subtest IV Errors (C4Err) were significantly different (p
= .017).

The relevance of this single significant comparison for conclusions concerning
the comparability of the scores for the two groups was explored further,
covarying all possible combinations of age, education, and FSSUM variables.
The two groups were found to be comparable only when age by itself was
covaried (p = .075), but treating age and group membership both as independent
variables, without covariates, produced the least differentiation between groups
with respect to C4Err. Adding education and FSSUM as covariates decreased
comparability of the groups.
All other comparisons listed in Table 9 were also recomputed using this
procedure, and group differences were found only for CT Subtest VI (C6Err) and
WCST Total Errors (WTE). Covarying education and FSSUM was found to
Table 9
Comparison of Mean CT and WCST Summary Scores
GROUP

III

IV

Experimental

16.0

*13.4 13.7

Comearison

16.4

*10.7

*p < .02

WCST

CT

V

11.9

VI

VII

TOT

CAT

PSV

NPS

TE

FfM

10.7

4.8

58.6

4.7

19.7

14.1

31.1

.98

8.3

4.3

51.9

4.6

20.3

19.2

36.9

.86
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produce comparability between groups on C6Err (p = .16) and covarying
education by itself produced comparability between groups on WTE (p = .24).
No interaction terms were found for any of these analyses; consequently,
although groups were found to be not comparable with respect to age and
covariates for individual variables was sometimes dissimilar, as might be
expected, no evidence was found for group differences as a function of
administration condition.
Hypothesis 2
Not only were CT and WCST mean scores expected to be comparable
between the experimental group and the comparison group, when controlling for
age, education, and IQ covariates, but the relationships among those scores were
also expected to be comparable. This hypothesis was tested utilizing analysis of
covariance to evaluate the covariance between pairs of variables, after partialing
out age, education, and FSSUM, with group membership comprising the
independent variable. The main effect in each comparison for group
membership is listed in Table 10.
Only 3 of 55 comparisons revealed statistically significant differences in
covariance between variables as a function of group membership. Two of those
involved WCST Total Errors, while the third difference was the correlation
between CT Subtest III Errors (C4Err) and CT Total Errors (CTE).
Multiple regression analysis in each instance revealed that patterns of
covariation for age, education, and IQ scores for these variables were dissimilar
between groups. Consequently, it would not be expected that relationships
among these scores would be similar across groups. As a result of these findings,
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Table 10
Probabilities of Group Differences Between Variables
VARIABLES
Subte st III
Subt est IV
Subtest V
Subte st VI
Subtest VII
Total Errors
Cat. Completed
PSV Respon ses
NonPSV Resp .
Fail to Maintain
Total Errors

III

NIA

IV

V

.14

.25

NIA

.18

VI
CT

VII

.28
.16
.31

.22
.06
.09
.18

*.03
.15
.18

NIA

.38

NIA

NIA

TOT

.35

NIA

CAT
.32
.09
.11
.20
.83
.35

NIA

PSV
.35
.08
.11
.21
.77
.33
.80

NIA

NPV FrM
WCST
.31
.11
.08
.13
.91

.34
.74
.06

NIA

.32
.11
.12
.24
.86
.41
.65
SI
.13

NIA

TE
.58
*.03
.07

.11
.45
.12
**.003
.11
.40
.28

NIA

*p < .05; **p < .01

covariate relationships for all variables were computed for both groups . These
results are shown in Table 11.
It can be seen that age, education, and IQ covariates for all scores are quite

dissimilar between the groups. Consequently, although most correlations
between pairs of CT and WCST variables were comparable between groups,
when age, education, and Full Scale IQ were partialed out, the three correlations
which were not comparable were sufficient to raise questions concerning the
comparability of groups. However, given the group differences which were
previously identified, it was unclear whether dissimilar relationships among
variables across groups reflected differences due to administration procedures or
due to other variables.
This question was explored further by analyzing relationships among other
sets of scores on which administration procedures did not vary between groups.

It was reasoned that if groups were comparable with respect to diagnosis,
. severity of impairment, and other relevant variables, relationships among
WAIS-R subtest and summary scores would be similar across groups, since these
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Table 11
E_2for Age, Education, and IO Regressed on CT/ WCST Variab]es
Covar. Age
C3Err
C4Err
CSErr
C6Err
CTE

.06

WCAT
WPSV
WNPV
WFTM
\"7TE

.07

Ed

OS

A

V C
s PC PA BO
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP

.11
.03

OA

osr vs

FS Tot.

.03
.17

.04

.05
.21

.04
.02

PS

.18
.27

.08
.03

.20
.26

.05

.02
.06

.03

.10
.02

.07

.32

.18
.27
.24
.18
.37
.28
.31
.16
0
.40

COMPARISON GROUP
Covar. Age
C3Err
.05
C4Err
.05
C5Err
C6Err
CTE
.08
WCAT
WPSV
WNPV
WFTM
WTE

.07

Ed

OS

A

V

C

s

PC

.08

PA

BO

OA OS}'.

vs

PS
.40

.32
.23
.30
.50

FS Tot.
.44
.41
.22
.29
.03 .59

.17
.09
.07
.14

.15
.13
0
.05
.13

tasks were administered in the same way for all subjects. The results of these
multiple regression analyses are shown in Table 12.
These analyses revealed that relationships among WAIS-R subtest and
summary scores were quite dissimilar, with the exception of Wechsler's (1944)
"Hold" scores on the verbal scale, Information, Vocabu]ary, and Comprehension
subtests, plus Similarities. However, the so-called Hold scores from the
performance scale, Picture Completion and Object Assembly, were among those
which were most dissimilar across groups.
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Table 12
R2 Change for Age, Education, and IO Interrelationships
Covar. Age
Info.
DS
Arith .
Voe
Comp.
Sim.
PC
PA
BO
OA
OSY

Ed

OS

.03

.02
.02
.09

.52

.02
.04

.04

Covar. Age
Info .
OS
Arith.
Voe
.03
Comp.
Sim .
PC
PA
BO
OA
OSY

.07
.02
.12

Ed

OS

C
s PC PA BD
EXPERIMENT AL GROUP
.52
.25 .04
.03
.09
.36
.01
.12 .02
.05 .03
.42
.39 .04
.09
.24
.02 .07
.02
.06 .48
.02
CO1\1PARISON GROUP
A

A

V

V

C

.55

s

PC

PA

BD

OA DS~

vs

PS

FS Tot.

.02
.08
.08
.04
.03
.10
.07

.02
.02
.03
.02

.02

.23

.02 .09
.13
.01
.12 .06 .02
.05

OA OSt

vs

PS

.02

.08

.02
.28
.48
.02

.04

.06

.44
.08

.13
.08
.08
.18

.25
.11
.55

.03
.09

.13

.43
.50

.33

.04
.09

.06
.04

.22

.39
.39
.20

.08
.05
.09

.12
.25
.22
.22
.18

.02
.05

.59
.50
.58
.82
.53
.62
.50
.53
.57
.77
.40

FS Tot.
.63
.24
.66
.76
.67
.75
.52
.68
.71
.45
.46

These findings strongly suggested that the comparison group was not
comparable to the experimental group with respect to variables influencing CT
and WCST performance. The pattern of dissimilarity among WAIS-R scores
raised the possibility that groups differed with respect to severity, but sufficient
data to evaluate this possibility were not available. More importantly, these
differences precluded determination of the effect of administration procedure
modifications on CT and WCST performance.
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Factor Analyses of Cognitive Process Variables
Hypothesis 3
A primary goal of this study was to determine if scores derived from a
theoretically based approach to concept formation could differentiate among the
problem-solving approaches displayed by individual patients on the CT. It was
expected that accomplishment of this goal would be reflected in the emergence of
at least three distinct and interpretable factors in factor analysis of the cognitive
process variables defined in Appendix H. It was further anticipated that these
factors would be relatively independent of age, education, and IQ variables,
unlike summary error scores.
Mean cognitive process scores were computed for each subtest individually,
as well as across all subtests used in the analysis. However, Leonberger, Nicks,
Larrabee, and Goldfader (1992) noted that multicolinearity results when
summary measures are entered in the same analysis with subtests used to
compute them; consequently, mean total variable scores were factor analyzed
separately from subtest variable scores. An additional problem cited by
Leonberger et al. is the use of multiple variables assessed by the same or similar
methods, which tends to inflate correlations among them. An attempt was made
to minimize this problem by converting variable scores to proportions, to reduce
the dependence of variables within subtests upon error scores on that subtest.
Since 19 process variables were computed for each subtest and factor analysis
of all variables simultaneously would require considerably more subjects than
were presently available for this study (Gorsuch, 1974), each subtest was
analyzed separately, and separate analysis was conducted for mean scores across
all subtests. Additionally, since normative data were not available for these
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scores, and cannot be derived from the results of this neuropsychologically
impaired group (see mean scores in Table 9), in order to facilitate the
interpretability of factor loadings on each factor analysis, the group was divided
into impaired and unimpaired subgroups, using Reitan's criteria for impaired
performance on CT total errors (>50), and the factor analysis for each subtest was
replicated for each subgroup. Table 13 lists the mean scores and standard
deviations of each subgroup on each CT subtest and for total errors .
It should be noted that these secondary analyses violated the recommended
minimum ratio for subjects to variables for factor analysis (5:1). Consequently,
these results were utilized only for the purpose of clarifying how factor loadings
differed for impaired versus unimpaired subjects, thereby clarifying
relationships among variables which comprised the factors.
Each retained factor from the primary individual analyses was transformed to
factor scores for each subject, and factor scores were then subjected to second
order factor analysis in order to assess the relationships among cognitive
processes across su btests. Subsequently, the relationship of each primary and
higher order factor to age, education, and IQ covariates was assessed utilizing
multiple regression analysis.
Table 13
Mean CT Scores for Unimpaired Versus Impaired Subgroups
GROUP

III

N

VI

V

IV

TOTAL

Mean (S.D.)

Unimpaired

58

7.6

(8.5)

4.9

Impaired

74

22.6

(11.1) 20.1

(5.3)

10.0

(4.9)

6.8

(5.0)

31.5

(12.7)

(10.5) 16.6

(6.4)

13.7

(7.0)

79.9

(21.0)
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SuHest llf
Factor pattern. The factor pattern for the results of factor analysis of Subtest
III 1ariables is shown in Table 14. Six factors with eigenvalues above 1.0 were
ext'acted, accounting for 79.9% of the variance, but the scree test and inspection
of tie factor loadings indicated that only the first four factors, accounting for
60.~% of the variance, should be retained .
Factor 1 in this analysis relates to maintaining set when the previous response
wa ; correct. Four of the seven variables which loaded highly on this factor were
ba~d on maintaining the determinants

in the previous response, although,

Talle 14
Factor Pattern Matrix for Fu 11Group on Subtest lII
Variable Number:
Ii rcent of Variance:
6. RKA
4. SLR
8.
PCK
Hi. C3
3. LR
KR
7.

1
28.1 %
.78
.74
.72
-.69
-.65
.53

2
15.4%

12. WSl
10. WSA
14.
15.
13.
11.

9.

WS3
WPCS
WS2
WSR

wsc

3
9.8%

4
6.9%

5
6.2%

6
5.7%

-.39
.35
.40

.34
-.88
.83
.53
.57

.42

5.
KC
1. \.1SIS
19. SV5-6
18. RAC4

-.79
-.71
.66
-.64
-.62

-.95
-.93

.71
.69

2. \.1S85
17. \JC4

Noe. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
defnitions listed in Appendix H.

.73
.70
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interestingly, maintaining the concrete determinant

(C) from the previous

response loaded on a separate factor and did not load on Factor 1. Not
surprisingly, Learning Rate (represented by the item number of the third
consecutive conceptually correct response) also loaded on this factor, as did Near
Correct, which is comprised of responses in which the correct principle is applied
incorrectly. Thus, this factor appeared to represent efficient learning to the
correct principle and maintaining that principle on subsequent items.
Factor 2, accounting for 15.4% of the variance, reflected an inefficient
approach to problem-solving
determinant simultaneously

characterized by shifting more than one
when the previous response was incorrect , which

usually included the abstract pattern (A) as one of the determinants shifted, with
no clear pattern emerging for selecting the other determinant to be shifted. This
factor appeared to represent variance attributed to subjects who repeatedly tried
different combinations of determinants without any systematic plan or
incorporation of feedback.
Factor 3, which accounted for 9.8% of the variance, was also represented by
variables which reflected somewhat inefficient and unsystematic learning.
However, this factor was differentiated from the previous factor by a moderate
positive loading for Leaming Rate, indicating that the correct principle was
learned but following numerous learning trials.
Factor 4, which accounted for 6.9% of the variance, reflected variance
attributable to subjects who perseverated on concrete features of the stimuli, but
who failed to apprehend that identifying the pattern which was most different
determined which concrete feature was relevant. Thus, RKC loaded highly on
this factor (in a negative direction), as did, by definition, MSIS.
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Factor 5 consisted primarily of two variables derived from other subtests,
PRAC4 and PSVS-6, which both related to some degree of cognitive rigidity or
shifting set from one subtest to another, although scores on these variables imply
learning of the Subtest IV principle. This variable accounted for 6.2% of the
variance.
Factor 6 was ambiguous, but accounted for 5.7% of the variance. MSBS
(maintaining set between sets when the stimuli change within the subtest) loaded
highly on this factor, but it showed no relationship with MSIS (maintaining set
within sets). NC4, which related to a rigid adherence to an almost correct
principle that resulted in many errors, also loaded highly on this factor. Since
variance attributable to adaptive set maintenance behavior was accounted for by
Factor 1, it appeared that this factor represented an automatic form of repetition
which is nonadaptive.
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup. Table 15 shows the factor pattern
for the unimpaired subgroup.

Results for these groups were quite similar, but

also differ in significant ways. Most importantly, whereas for the full group,
responses involving the Abstract Pattern were highly salient and loaded highly
on the first two factors, responses involving Concrete Attributes were much less
discriminating.
In contrast, within the group of subjects whose performance on the CT was
unimpaired, the variable which loaded first, and thus accounted for the greatest
proportion of variance, was RKC, and, as previously, loaded with MSIS. MSBS
also became a much more discriminative variable than was previously true. The
only other notable change in the factor patterns between these groups was the
dropping out of RKA and RKR as discriminative variables. Thus, the primary
difference between the full group and the unimpaired subgroup was the
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1able 15
factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest III
Variable Number:
Percent of Variance:
5

RKC

1 MSIS
4. SLR

2

MSBS

8 RPCK
3 LR
JS. NC3

1
32.8 %
.99

2
14.8%

.81
.74
.60
-.59
-.38

7.3%

5
6.2 %

6

5.5 %

.45
.38

.94
-.87
.70

15. WPCS

13. WS2
H. WS3

17. NC4
7 RKR
6 RKA

4

.86

1l. WSA
12. WS1

WSC
11. WSR

3
10.3 %

.32

.36

.41

B. PRAC4

.39

-.51
.85
-.74
-.56
-.52

-.54

.86
.53
.48

-.37
-.33
.91

H. PSVS-6

-.90

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
cefinitions listed in Appendix H.
6ange of position of RKC and MSIS with RKA and RKR, with increased
ciscriminative power for MSBS.
Comparison with impaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the impaired
s1bgroup is shown in Table 16. This pattern was dissimilar from the other
groups in many ways. Whereas in the other groups Maintaining Set accounted
f>r the largest proportion of the variance, in this subgroup it accounted for only
68% of the variance. Interestingly, NC3 did not load on this factor, as for the
cther groups, but PSV5-6 replaced it, although it loaded in the opposite direction.
JJthough the correlation between these variables was null (-.01), probably
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Table 16
Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest Ill
Variable Number:
Percent of Variance:
13. WS2
12. WS1
10. WSA
14.
11.
15.
9.
3.

WS3
WSR
WPCS

5.
1.

RKC
MSIS

wsc
LR

1
23.5 %
-.84
.82
-.78

-.45

2
19.4 %
-.39

3
11.6%

.94
.88
.77
.49
-.48

RKA
RPCK
PSV5-6
RKR
SLR

5
6.8%

6
5.9 %

7
5.5 %

.42

-.47
-.42
.94
.90
.91

17. NC4
6.
8.
19.
7.
4.

4
7.3%

.40
-.37
.35

16. NC3
2. MSBS

.36

.80
.77
.59
.59
.49
.42

.40

.83
-.51

18. PRAC4

.44
.78

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.
because they were each unique to unrelated subtests, both appeared to relate to
persisting with unsuccessful hypotheses. Thus, for the other groups, NC3 loaded
negatively on a factor associated with maintaining set when the previous
response was correct, but for this impaired subgroup, PSVS-6 loaded positively
on that same factor. This loading may well reflect the reason this factor
accounted for little variance within this subgroup. Whereas for the other groups
maintaining set appeared to reflect a purposeful and adaptive problem-solving
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strategy, for this subgroup it may represent cognitive rigidity and failure to
adopt a purposeful strategy.
Factor 1, which accounted for 23.5% of the variance, was a mirror image of
Factor 2 in the full group, with the addition of WS2 loading negatively with
WSA. Thus, not surprisingly, for this impaired subgroup, the largest proportion
of the variance was accounted for by systematic problem-solving strategies when
the previous response was incorrect.
Factor 2 for the impaired subgroup, accounting for 19.4% of the variance, was
similar to factor composition of Factor 3 in the other groups which related to less
efficient problem-solving strategies when the previous response was incorrect,
but for this subgroup many of the variables, including LR, loaded in the opposite
direction. Furthermore, for this subgroup SLR loaded somewhat moderately on
this factor. Thus, this factor represented usually inefficient problem -solving
strategies which in this instance were associated with some degree of success.
Therefore, the variance accounted for by this factor appeared to be due to flashes
of insight in which the correct rule was suddenly apprehended.
Factor 3 for this subgroup, accounting for 11.6% of the variance, was identical
in variable composition to Factor 4 for the full group, consisting primarily of
RKC and MSIS, but variables loaded in the opposite direction for this subgroup.
These are the variables which were highly discriminating in the unimpaired
subgroup, but for this subgroup, as for the full group, accounted for a much
smaller proportion of the variance. For the full group, this factor represented
subjects who perseverated on identifying a common physical feature on
succeeding items rather than identifying the element within each item which was
most different. For this subgroup, however, this factor represented subjects who
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were able to successfully identify the relevant physical feature, but apparently
this was not translated to the correct rule.
Factor 4 for this subgroup, accounting for 7.3% of the variance, has no
correlate in the other groups. It is comprised predominantly of NC4, WSC
loaded moderately in a negative direction, and it was somewhat predictive of
maintaining set when the principle was learned. Thus, it appeared that this
factor represented variance attributed to subjects whose concrete responses were
often relevant, but the rule was probably based on counting. Similarly, these
subjects achieved only incomplete rule learning in Subtest IV.
Factor 5 was similar to Factor 1 in the other groups, and represented variance
attributed to maintaining set. However, for this subgroup, this factor showed a
reduced loading for LR and SLR, reflecting the increased learning trials necessary
to establish set. As a result, it accounted for only 6.8% of the variance, and was
associated with increased perseveration on Subtests V and VI, suggesting that
these impaired subjects established set more slowly and were less flexible in
shifting to alternative principles when the previously learned principle became
ineffective.
Factor 6 reflected partial learning in Subtest III, probably due to perseveration
of the counting principle from Subtest II, and was also associated with
perseveration of the Subtest IV principle on Subtests V and VI. This factor also
had no correlate in the other groups.
The final factor for this subgroup was comprised predominantly of PRAC4
variance, which was attributed to slow learning of the demonstration items on
Subtest IV, but with success achieved within six trials. Consistent with that
pattern, this factor was associated with some degree of perseveration on concrete
physical features of stimuli in Subtest III.
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Subtest IV
Factor pattern. The factor pattern for Subtest IV, shown in Table 17, was
somewhat different from that of Subtest III. Factors were much more
dichotomized between those comprised of variables related to maintaining set
and those related to shifting determinants.

Factor 1 again was related to

maintaining set, although for this subtest, all set maintenance variables,
including RKC, MSIS, and MSBS, as well as PRAC4, loaded on this factor. In that
sense, this factor represented a more pure measure of set maintenance.
Table 17
Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Subtest JV
Variabl e Number :
Percent of Variance :
8. RPCK
6. RKA
5. RKC
l. MSIS
3. LR
4. SLR
2. MSBS
7. RKR
18. PRAC4
15.
10.
9.
12.
14.

1
38.1%
.93
.90
.89
.89
-.78
.75

3
8.5%

4
6.4%

5
5.4%

.71

.68
.63

WPCS
WSA

-.58
.95
.88
.82
-.75
.73

wsc
WSl
WS3

17. NC4
11. WSR

2
19.0%

.41

13. WS2
19. PSVS-6

.36

-.34
-.31
.88
.42

-.39
.80
-.54

16. NC3

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.

.87
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Factor 2 was comprised of variables related to ineffective problem-solving
when the previous response was incorrect. Shifting A and C determjnants (WSA,
WSC) were prominent on this factor, as was the total percentage of determinants
shifted (WPCS). Not surprisingly, shifting all three determinants simultaneously
(WS3) also loaded highly. In contrast, shifting just one determinant following an
incorrect response (WSl) loaded negatively on this factor, reinforcing the
interpretation of this variable from Subtest III. Rule shifting showed low loading
on this factor, as was expected on this subtest, where the primary task was to
discover the clockwise rotational pattern which comprises the rule. Interestingly,
variance on this score (WSR) was distributed to an approximately equal degree
across the first four factors, presumably reflecting the variety of hypotheses
utilized by subgroups of patients in seeking to discover the correct rule.
Factor 3 was comprised almost exclusively of variance associated with
incomplete rule learning. NC4, which reflected utilization of a left/ right location
scheme for this subtest, or an alternative nonclockwise rotation, loaded hjghly on
this factor. Subjects with hlgh NC4 scores usually were expected to respond
correctly, at least initially when the missing quadrant was located in the first two
positions (the first line in the stimulus moving from left to right), but incorrectly
when the missing quadrant was located on the second line (where clockwise
rotation reverses the expected order of quadrants three and four). Consequently,
rule learning necessarily involves shifting following correct feedback to
quadrants one and two, if a left/ right location scheme was utilized. Consistent
with this expectation, RKR (repeating the previously used rule when the
previous response was correct) loaded to a moderate level in a negative direction
on this factor. Consistent with that finding, WSR also loaded moderately.
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Factor 4 is predominantly comprised of WS2 (shifting two determinants
simultaneously following an incorrect response), with a low negative loading for
WSl and WSR, and a more moderate negative loading for PSVS-6. This pattern
suggested that subjects who simultaneously shifted two determinants were
somewhat unlikely to utilize a more systematic approach of shifting only one
determinant (although this negative correlation is not as pronounced as one
might expect) and were also somewhat unlikely to shift the rule utilized. Thus,
the variance associated with this factor appeared to be generated by subjects who
failed to learn the location principle for this subtest and probably continued to
utilize the counting principle articulated by Sirnmel and Counts (1957): "If in
doubt, count." Consistent with this hypothesis, PSVS-6 loaded negatively on this
factor at a moderate level, since these subjects were unlikely to have learned the
location principle to perseverate to on subsequent subtests.
Factor 5 consisted predominantly of NC3 with a low negative loading for
WS3. Thus, most of the variance associated with this factor arose from the
previous subtest.
Comparison with impaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the impaired
subgroup is shown in Table 18. Results for this subgroup were almost identical
to that for the full group. The only notable changes were in the direction
predicted in the analysis above.
For this subgroup, RKR loaded to a slightly less degree on Factor 1,
Maintaining Set, and to a somewhat greater degree on Factor 3, Nonclockwise
Rotation. The relationships among variables for Factor 4 were also slightly
stronger, with the addition of low negative loading for MSBS, LR, and SLR, as
might be expected given the learning failure associated with this factor. Factor 5
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Table 18
Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest IV
Variable Number:
Percent of Variance:
RPCK
MSIS
RKA
RKC
PRAC4
LR
SLR
MSBS

1
33.7%
.88
.86
.86
.85
.69
-.57
.56
.46

WPCS
WSC
WS3
WSA
WS1
WSR
NC4
RKR

2
20.9%

3
10.4%

4
5.8%

5

5.6%

-.31

.34
-.31

-.36
.93
.83
.77
.77
-.61
.55

.50

PSV5-6
WS2

-.32

.36

.48

-.35
-.51

.90
-.73
-.82
.65

NC3

-.89

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.
was also virtually identical, although SLR now loaded to a slightly greater
degree.
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup. When the factor pattern for these
groups was compared with that for the unimpaired subgroup (see Table 19),
somewhat more differences were apparent but the changes were relatively
minor, and in the anticipated direction.
PRAC4 for this subgroup (learning the principle on t-he first six practice items)
was not associated with maintaining set, probably because of reduced variability
on this variable among these subjects. Instead PRAC4 now comprised the fifth
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Table 19
Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest IV
Variable Number :
Percent of Varianc e:

RKR
RPCK

MSBS
LR
MSfS
SLR
NC4
RKC

RKA

1
38.1 %
.98

2
19.0%

3
8.5%

4

5

6.4%

5.4%

.94
.92
-.90
.86
.85
-.83
.82
.74

WPCS
WSA
WS1
WSC
WS3
WS2
PSV5--o
NC3

WSR

.94
.92
-.84
.84
.69

.34

.81
-.62

.50

.53

.91

PRAC4

.85

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions Jisted in Appendix H.
factor, on which the only other variable loading above .3 was PSVS.6. Thus,
among subjects who performed relatively well on the CT overall, but showed
inefficient learning of the Subtest IV principle ·on the demonstration items,
inefficient learning of the principle on subsequent subtests was also likely.
Additionally, Factor 3 for this subgroup was similar to Factor 4 for the other
groups, with the addition of NC3 and a weaker negative association with
adaptive problem-solving strategies (WSR and WSl). For this subgroup, unlike
the other groups, WSR was not associated with nonclockwise rotation but
showed a weak relationship with nonadaptive problem-solving (WPCS).
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Subtest V
Factor pattern. The factor pattern for Subtest Vis shown in Table 20. Again,
this pattern was similar in many respects to that of Subtests III and IV, but also
uniquely reflected the task differences presented by this subtest. Factor 1 was
again comprised of set maintenance scores, but RKR (maintaining rule) loaded
only weakly on this factor, probably reflecting the reduced variability of this
score among subjects who consistently maintained set on other scores when the
previous response was correct. That hypothesis was supported by the weak
loading for WSR, reflecting the low probability of rule shifting when the previous
response was incorrect, among subjects who consistently maintained set.
Factor 2 was comprised predominantly of ineffective problem-solving
strategies, with WS3 and WPCS loading highly, and WSR loading more
moderately, supporting the interpretation above for this variable. WS1 loaded
negatively on this factor, as expected, with low negative loading also for RKR,
probably reflecting the randomness of problem-solving strategies suggested by
high scores on this factor.
Factor 3 represented more systematic problem solving when the previous
response was incorrect, with WSA loading highly, and a low negative loading for
RKA and WSR. This factor appeared to reflect variance attributable to subjects
who correctly discerned that the task on this subtest was accurate pattern
identification, but failed to perceive the relationship between the number choices
presented them and subdivision of the stimulus. The adaptive role of this factor
was further supported by the moderate loading for RKR and the high negative
loading for PSVS-6, reflecting the low probability of rule perseveration from the
previous subtest of subjects who effectively problem solved.
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Table 20
Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Subtest V
Variable Number:
Percent of Variance:
1. MSIS
8. RPCK
5. RKC

6. RKA
3. LR
4.

2.

SLR
MSBS

14.
15.
11.
12.

WS3
WPCS
WSR
WSl

10. WSA
19. PSV5-6
7. RKR

1
36.2%

2
16.4%

3
11.3%

4

5

6

6.8%

5.8%

5.4%

.97

.96
.95
.91
-.90
.89
.71

-.31

.96
.33

.90
.68
-.63
.32

.38

13. WS2
9. wsc
16. NC3
17. NC4

-.39
.31

.35
-.30
-.42
.41
.83
-.75
.58

.31
-.98
-.47

.30

-.32

.77
.68

.31

18. PRAC4

.84

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.
Factor 4 was difficult to interpret. High scores on this factor were associated
with a very low probability of shifting two scores simultaneously when the
previous response was incorrect. High scorers on this factor were also somewhat
unlikely to shift C, but did often shift three scores simultaneously. These subjects
tended to have a moderately low proportion of total scores shifted or may have
shifted only one score. This pattern appeared to be characteristic of patients who
were not responding randomly, but were not systematic or well organized in
seeking to discover the correct principle. This factor might be described as
"confused problem-solving."
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Factor 5 was predominantly comprised of NC3 and NC4, with a low loading
by WSC. Thus, high scores on this factor appeared to relate to incomplete
learning, which may result from rigid thinking, since NC3 and NC4 describe the
correct principle used incorrectly. Subjects with high scores on NC3 had
difficulty giving up the counting principle from practice Subtest II and thus
counted the number of elements located in specific positions, and subjects with
high scores on NC4 were usually unable to give up a conventional left/ right
orientation in positioning elements in the stimulus, even when the six practice
items demonstrated an alternate placement. Not surprisingly, this factor had a
low loading on WSC, which probably represented some perseveration from the
missing element in Subtest IV to the dotted lines in Subtest V. The failure to
PSV5-6 to load on this factor was probably due to poor learning of the Subtest IV
principle, which was a prerequisite for perseveration to this subtest.
Factor 6 also appeared related to rigid thinking, but whereas Factor 5 was
associated with failure to learn, this factor was associated with slow learning.
PRAC4 (slow learning of the correct principle on the practice items) loaded
highly on this factor, but NC4 showed a weak loading, as does PSV5-6. For each
of those variables, the factor loading reflected a relatively high number of trials
required to learn the principle, but the principle was learned in each case, unlike
the variance associated with Factor 5. The weak negative loading of WSC, which
was almost a reverse, mirror image of the loading on Factor 5, supported that
interpretation.
Comparison with impaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the impaired
subgroup is shown in Table 21. These results replicated those for the full group
with respect to the first two factors, except that the low loading for WSA on
Factor 2 in the full group was replaced by low loadings for WSC and PSV5-6 in
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Table 21
Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest V
Variable Number:
Percent of Variance:
MSTS
RPCK
RKC

SLR
LR

RKA
MSBS

1

2

3

4

5

32.8%
.95
.94
.92
.87
-.81
.79
.71

20.1%

10.8%

6.7%

6.4%

.80
-.64
-.47

.38

-.36

.75
.70

.37

WPCS
WS3

WSR
WS1

.96
.94
.87
-.74

WSA
NC3

wsc

.41

WS2
NC4

PRAC4
PSV5-6
RKR

.36
-.50

-.30

.66
.61
-.52

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.
this subgroup. Additionally, the proportion of the variance accounted for by this
factor was slightly greater. These changes all reflected the somewhat greater
likelihood of ineffective problem-solving in this subgroup.
The remaining three factors for this subgroup were somewhat different from
the pattern in the full group, but still recognizable. Factor 3 was comprised
predominantly of high scores on WSA and a moderate likelihood of a low score
on WSC, with a weak negative loading for PSVS-6. Thus, this appeared to
represent variance attributed to subjects who recognized the correct concrete
attribute but had difficulty learning the quadrant principle for the abstract
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pattern. The negative loadings on NC3 and PSVS-6 suggested that cognitive
r gidity did not characterize the performance of these subjects, however. This
factor was somewhat similar to Factor 3 for the full group, but the negative
c)rrelation between WSA and PSVS-6 was much weaker for this subgroup and
the moderate loading for RKR was much weaker, and moderate negative
loadings for WSC and NC3 were present. Thus, thi s factor appeared to represent
less efficient problem solving for this subgroup than was true for the full group,
but rigid thinking was negatively associated with this factor for this subgroup.
Factor 4 for this subgroup was very different from that of the full group.
Where as in the latter case this factor charact erized subject s with intentional but
nonsystematic and confused problem-solving strategies who were unlikely to
s:1ift two score s simultaneously when the previou s re sponse was incorrect , for
th.is subgroup, high scorers on this factor were likely to shift two scores
simultaneously.

NC4 also loaded highly on this factor , which may characterize

subjects who became frustrated by this point and were responding randomly.
Factor 5 for the full group had no correlate in the impaired subgroup, but
Factor 5 in this subgroup corresponded to Factor 6 in the full group, with the
addition of a moderate loading in the negative direction for RKR. Thus, in this
subgroup, this factor continued to suggest slow learning, but with less success
than was true for the full group .
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the
unimpaired subgroup (see Table 22) was similar to that for the other groups, but
composition of factors was slightly different. Factor 1 replicated the first factor in
the other groups in most respects, but with the addition of low to moderate
negative loadings for PSVS-6 and WSC, reflecting the decreased incidence of
rigid problem solving in this subgroup . Additionally, WSR was not associated
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Table 22
Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest V
Variable Number:
Percent of Variance:
RKC
MSIS
RPCK

RKA
LR
SLR
MSBS

1
39.8 %
.98
.96
.95
.92
-.87
.86
.58

WS2
WSl
WPCS

wsc
WSR
PSVS-6
RKR
WSA
NC4

-.34

2
13.9%

.48

4
7.0%

5
5.7%

-.48

.91
-.86
.83
.61

-.42
.54

WS3

3
10.8%

.40
.79
.74
-.64
-.50
-.39

.35

.36
.88

PRAC4
NC3

.74
.64

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.
with this factor, probably also as a function of decreased perseveration of the rule
from Subtest IV for this subgroup .
Factor 2 continued to reflect ineffective problem solving, but it contributed a
slightly smaller proportion of the variance. Whereas shifting three determinants
simultaneously (WS3) loaded highly for the other groups on this factor, for this
subgroup shifting two determinants simultaneously (WS2) loaded highly, and
there was no association for WS3, probably due to limited variability on this
score. Both WSA and WSC showed a stronger association with this factor for this
subgroup, but WSR, which loaded moderately for the other groups, showed no
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association, and WSl wa s more negatively associated. Thus, for the unimpaired
subgroup, ineffective problem -solving, though still accounting for substantial
variance, was less maladaptive than for the other group.
For this subgroup, Factor 3 appeared to be almost a mirror image of this
factor in the other groups, particularly the full group. Whereas previously this
factor represented effective problem-solving when the previous response was
incorrect, for this subgroup it reflected very ineffective problem-solving.
Variable loadings for all groups were very similar, but the direction of the
loadings for this subgroup was opposite. Consistent with that change, the
moderate loading for RKR wa s replaced in this subgroup with a low negati ve
loading for NC4, reflecting rigid thinking .
Factor 4 for this subgroup was also in the opposite direction than for the full
group , but like the impaired subgroup, this factor appeared to represent random
or nonsysternatic responding, with a high loading for WS3.
Factor 5 for this subgroup had no precise correlate in the other groups in
terms of variable loadings, but like the other groups this appeared to represent
slow learning due to rigid thinking, with high loadings for PRAC4 and NC3, and
a low loading for WSA.
Subtest VI
Factor pattern. The factor pattern for Subtest VI, shown in Table 23, was very
similar to that for Subtest V, as might be expected for the only two subtests
sharing the same principle. The only notable difference for Factor 1, reflecting set
maintenance, was that WSR showed a weak association on Subtest V but not
Subtest VI, and RKR showed a somewhat higher loading on Subtest VI.
Presumably, that difference was related to the rule shift between Subtests IV and
V which was not present between Subtests V and VI.
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Table 23
Factor Pattern Matrix Subtest VI

4.
8.
5.
6.
l.
2.
3.

Variable Number:
Percent of Variance:
SLR
RPCK
RKC
RKA
MSIS
MSBS
LR

15.
12.
14.
9.
10.
11.

1
36.2%
.97
.97
.95
.93
.92
.91

3
10.3%

4

5

6.9%

5.8%

-.86

WPCS
WSl
WS3

.95
-.87
.63
.62
.60
.57

wsc
WSA
WSR

19. PSV5-6
7. RKR
18. PRAC4

2
18.0%

.53

13. WS2

-.46

-.49

-.32

-.85
.66
-.54

.49
.87

16. NC3
17. NC4

.80
.64

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.
Factor 2 also replicated Factor 2 from Subtest V, but represented even more
pronounced ineffective problem solving, with WSC, WSA, and WSR all loading
to an approximately equal degree, suggesting a random approach to discovering
the correct principle. Unlike Subtest V, RKR did not load on this factor in a
negative direction, probably due to reduced variability on this score.
The variable loading pattern on Factor 3 was also very similar to the variable
loading pattern on the third factor in Subtest V, with the exception that in the
latter case, WSA was the predominant feature associated with adaptive problemsolving when the previous response was incorrect, but on this subtest WSA did
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not load on this factor. Rather, maintaining the previous rule is the predominant
feature here, and was associated with negative loadings on PSVS-6 and PRAC4.
Thus, adaptive problem-solving associated with these scores apparently acted to
restrict variability on abstract pattern identification after learning the principle in
Subtest V and maintaining set with respect to formulating the rule based on the
quadrant principle was the differentiating variable.
Factor 4 reflected ineffective problem-solving, as in Subtest V, although the
loading pattern was somewhat different. For this subtest, this factor was
associated with shifting two determinants simultaneously, although WSR loaded
weakly in the negative direction indicating that this shifting was not entirely
random. PRAC4 loaded moderately on this factor, reflecting slow learning or a
moderate degree of cognitive rigidity.
Factor 5 replicated Factor 5 in the previous subtest and was represented
almost entirely by high loadings on NC3 and NC4. Thus, this factor reflected
cognitive inflexibility associated with tasks on previous subtests but was not
associated with any variables on this subtest to any substantial degree.
Comparison with impaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the impaired
subgroup is shown in Table 24. Factor 1 essentially replicated factor composition
of Factor 1 for the full group, with the addition of weak loadings for shifting just
one determinant at a time (WSl) but not two (WS2). Thus, for this impaired
subgroup, maintaining set was associated with utilization of a systematic
approach, as might be anticipated.
Factor 2 also was very similar to Factor 2 in the full group, reflecting
nonsystematic responses when the previous response was incorrect. Factor
composition was almost identical in the two groups, but small differences
emerged with respect to factor loadings. WSR loaded to a substantially greater
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Table 24
Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest VI
Variable Number:
Percent of Variance:
SLR
RKA
RPCK
MSIS
RKC
MSBS
LR
WPCS
WSR
WS3
WSl

1
37.0 %
.97
.95
.95
.90
.90
.89
-.79

.32

PSY5--o
RKR
WSA

2
17.1%

.98
.85
.68
-.66

.53

-.39
-.86
.69
.55
-.42

-.37
.76
.57
.43

.41
.34

NC3

5
6.3%

-.35

-.33

WSC

4
6.9%

-.31

.44

WS2
PRAC4
NC4

3
10.9%

.85
-.53

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.
degree in the impaired subgroup than was true for the full group, and WSC
loaded to a lesser degree. Further, NC3, reflecting a rigid approach to task
performance in Subtest III, loaded we_akly on this factor for the impaired
subgroup.

However, these differences between groups with respect to this

factor, which reflected random and nonsystematic problem solving, were
generally minor.
Factor 3 for this subgroup is also very similar to the third factor for the full
group, except that WSA now loaded to a moderate degree on this factor, as it did
for Factor 3 in Subtest V. Thus, for this subgroup, when the previous response
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was incorrect, this factor reflected subjects who tended to appropriately shift the
abstract pattern, rather than the rule.
Factor 4 in this subgroup was somewhat different than Factor 4 in the full
group, although still reflecting cognitive rigidity with moderate loadings on
PRAC4 and NC4 and a moderate loading in the negative direction on WSl.
Factor 5 was very different than the fifth factor in the full group, which
reflected only variance attributable to cognitive rigidity on previous subtests.
For this subgroup, thjs factor loaded principally on WSC, with negative loading
on NC3 and WSA. Despite these differences, this pattern still reflected rigid
thinking in attempting to shift the concrete features rather than the abstract
pattern.
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the
unimpaired subgroup is shown in Table 25. This pattern was almost identical to
the other groups with respect to Factors 1 and 2, reflecting, respectively,
maintaining set and responding nonsystematically.

Factor 3 for this subgroup

was very similar to Factor 4 for the full group, reflecting a nonsystematic
approach when the previous response was wrong, and was also associated with
slow or somewhat rigid thinking.
Factor 4 loaded on most of the same variables as Factor 3 in the full group,
but loadings were in the opposite direction. Consequently, whereas foi; the full
group this factor reflected a more systematic approach when the previous
response was incorrect, and was negatively associated with rigid thinking, for
this subgroup the opposite was true. This factor related to a rigid, perseverative
approach.
Factor 5 for this subgroup was also similar to Factor 5 for the full group with
respect to factor composition, but whereas for the full group a rigid approach on
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Subtests III and IV varied together, for this subgroup those variables (NC3 and
NC4) were negatively related. Consequently, this factor appeared to represent
subjects who identified the location principle in Subtest III but experienced
difficulty giving up the counting rule from Subtest II, so used the location and
counting principles together, failing to benefit from feedback in shifting to a
more effective approach. This confused thinking, however, did not extend to
Subtest IV for this group.
Table 25
Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest VI
Variable Number :
Percent of Variance:
RKA
RPCK
SLR
RKC
MSBS
MSIS
LR

1
37.0 %
.98
.95
.95
.94
.90
.89
-.86

WSl
WPCS

-.86
.85
.81
.67
.54

wsc
WSA
WS3
WS2
PRAC4
WSR
PSVS-6
RKR

2
19.9%

3
9.0%

4
6.6 %

.33

-.44

-.35
.35

.81
.72
.31
-.40
.56

.31
.82
.68
-.57

NC3
NC4

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.

5
5.4 %

.78
-.46
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Tota] Score
Factor analysis of cognitive process variables from each CT subtest
individually resulted in factor solutions of five or six factors in each instance
which were quite similar in many respects, although rather discrepant results
were obtained for Subtest Ill. Many of the similarities within subtests remained
even when separate factor analyses were conducted for impaired versus
unimpaired subjects, again except for Subtest III, where several unique factors
relating to ineffective problem-solving emerged for the impaired subgroup.
However, this was not surprising since this was the most difficult subtest (see
Table 9), and it might be anticipated that subjects would encounter difficulty on
this task for a variety of reasons.
What was more surprising was that the remaining subtests showed as much
similarity as was evident, both across subtests and across levels of impairment.
Consequently, mean scores across subtests were also factor analyzed to
determine if these patterns would emerge with respect to total scores for the CT
as a whole.
The factor pattern for mean scores across all subtests is shown in Table 26.
Factor 1 for this group was comprised of substantial loadings on all maintaining
set variables, with a more moderate loading for RKR. PRAC4 also showed a
weak loading on this factor, perhaps since a high score on that variable, though
suggesting slow learning, was also associated with successful learning within six
trials. Further, WSR loaded moderately on this factor, perhaps reflecting the rule
shifting across subtests which was related to effective performance in terms of
total errors.
Factor 2 represented nonsysternatic shifting of determinants when the
previous response was incorrect, as was true of the second factor in all other
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subtests as well (except Subtest III). Factor 3 appeared to represent a mixture of
responses types, with WS2 loading moderately, reflecting a nonsystematic
approach, but also PSVS-6 loaded prominently in a negative direction,
suggesting that this factor did not reflect random responding.

All of the rigid

thinking variables loaded to a substantial degree on Factor 4; thus, this appeared
to reflect some perseverative responding.
Since factors which emerged from mean cognitive process scores were not
appropriate to enter in subsequent factor analyses with subtest specific factors
Table 26
Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Total Score
Variabl e Number:
Percent of Varianc e:
RPCK
RKC
MSIS
SLR
MSBS
RKA
LR
PRAC4

1
38 .0%
.97
.96
.95
.93
.90
.87
-.87

3
11.0%

4
6.6%

.35

WPCS
WSA

wsc
WSl
WS3
PSV5-6
RKR
WSR

2
17.6%

.58
.50

NC4
NC3
WS2

.32
.92
.82
.73
-.68
.66

-.41

.36

-.83
.70
-.65

.34

.47

Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable
definitions listed in Appendix H.

.73
.52
.50
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(since they share common variance), this group was not subdivided into high
and low scorers for further analysis.
Second Order Factor Analysis Across Subtests
Although intuitively many similarities were evident among factors which
emerged in the analyses, it did not follow that factors composed of similar
variables across subtests were necessarily related. To assess the relationship
among cognitive process factors from one subtest to another, second order factor
analyses of subtest factors was performed. However, it was necessary to
recompute factor scores, deleting the marker variables which were entered in
each analysis described above in order to prevent the repetitive scores on these
variables form masking the relationships among the remaining variables. Such
recomputation did not substantially alter factor composition or loadings, except
where those variables which were deleted comprised the principal determinant
of the factor. Thus, Factor 5 was eliminated from the Subtest III analysis, Factor 5
was eliminated from Subtest IV, Factors 5 and 6 were eliminated from Subtest V,
Factor 5 was eliminated from Subtest VI, Factor 3 was merged with Factor 2, and
Factor 4 became the third factor. Additionally, the direction of factor loadings
changed in two instances: Factor 4 in Subtest ill, which previously reflected
variance attributed to subjects who perseverated on the concrete features of the
stimuli, changed to reflect variance attributed to subjects who did not
perseverate on concrete features, and a similar change occurred on Factor 4 in
Subtest V, which now became characterized by those who shifted two scores
simultaneously, often tending to shift C. None of these changes represents
substantial interpretive significance.
The results of second order factor analysis of the remaining factors are listed
in Table 27. Variable numbers comprising the subtest specific factors (from
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Table 27
Second Order Factor Anal)'.sis of All Subtest Factors
Var.
No.
Grd. Fl
(V: F3)
(VI: F3)
(IV: F4)
rv: F1
IJI:Fl
Grd. F2
V: Fl
VI: Fl
IV: Fl
(III: F3)
Grd. F3
(V: F2)
(IV: F2)
(V: F 3)
(IV: F3)
V: F4
IV: F4
VI: F3
Grd. F4
III: F3
III: F2
HI: Fl
V:F4
Grd. F'S
(IV: F2)
(IV: F4)
(IV: Fl)
VI: F2
Grd. F6
(III: F5)
(IV: F3)
Grd.F7

III:F4

1

2

3

4

5

-.9

-.8

-.4

.4

.3

6

7

-.3

.7
.5

8

9

10

11

.7

-.6

12

.8

-.9
-.7

.8 .9
.8
.9 .5 -.3
1.0 .7 -.9 .9 1.0
.9 .9 -.9 1.0 1.0
.9 .8 -.9 .8 .9
.3
-.8 -.3 -.3 -.3 .5

.9
.9

.8 1.0
.6 .8 -.3

.5
.5

.9
.9
.9

.3 1.0 -.4
.6 1.0
.8 1.0
-.7 -.3
.3

.4

.5

.7
-.5

.4
.9
.7

.3

.6
.3

.3

-.7

.8

.9

-.4

.4

.8 -.9

.3

-.7

.6

.8 -.3

.9

.9

.9

-.7
.9
.4

.9

.7

-.9

.8
-.4 1.0 -.4
-.4 .8
.8 -.6
.6 -.8

.5

-.3
-.4 1.0 -.4

.4

-.8

.4
-.4

-.7
.5
-.5

.5
.4

.7 1.0

-.4

.8

-.9

.4

.4
.5
.5

.9

-.3

.3
-.5

.8

.6

.3

.9

III:F3
IV: F3

1.0 .9
.7 1.0

-.8

-.3 -.6
.8 .6 -.9

.8 1.0
.6

-.7

.5

-.7

.6

.8

.4

.9
.3

.3
-.5

-.7

-.3

-.6
.6

.6 -.8

-.7
.8

Note. All subtest factor loadings above .3 are listed. Negative loadings are in
parentheses.

19

.4
.5

-.6

-.7

.8
.9

18

-.5

.6 -.8

.6 -.6

.4

-.6 -.5

17

.6

.5

.6

-.4

-.3

.5
-.6

.4

.7

.8 -.6
.8

16

.3

.3
.8
-.3

15

-.9

-.7
-.4

.9
.3
.9

14

13

2nd order factor loadings are in bold print in the order listed.
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Appendix H) entered in the analysis are listed across the top row of the table.
Similar variables in Appendix Hare numbered consecutively. Thus, if similar
variables loaded on common factors across subtests, several subtests should be
represented, with factor loadings forming a cluster, under each second order
factor.

Jt can be seen that some clustering was evident but the dispersion of loadings
was more prominent than the clustering. Further, many of the clustering
patterns which were evident tended to be specific to sets of similar subtests,
rather than common to all subtests .
Thus, this analysis suggested that many of the cognitive process variables
were task specific rather than generalizable across subtests. For example, on
second order Factor 1, Variable 11 (WSR) loaded positively on Factor 3 for
Subtests V and VI but negatively on Factor 1 for Subtests III and IV. Statistical
analysis of the correlates of these second order factors, therefore, appeared
appropriate.
Relationship of Cognitive Process Factors
to Error Scores
The relationship between second order factor scores and performance on each
CT subt .est and for CT Total Errors was assessed using stepwise multiple
regression analyses. Those results revealed that second order factors
significantly predicted error scores in each case (p < .00009), but the proportion
of the variance which was accounted for varied substantially, although Factor 2,
consisting predominantly of Maintaining Set scores, accounted for most of the
variance across all scores except for Subtest III. (See Table 28.)
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Table 28
Adjusted R2 for 2nd Order Factors on CT Error Scores
Predictors
(1)
Factor 1
(2)
Factor 2
Factor 3
(3)
Factor 4
Factor 5
Factor 6
Factor 7
Total Var.

m
.17
.12

IV
(1) .26
(2) .30

V
(1)

.47

VI
(1)

.64

TOTAL
(2) .25
(1) .48
(3)

.09
(3)

.04
(2)

.36

.02

.58

.46

.01
.65

.75

Note. Step at which predictor entered equation is given in parentheses.
These results represented some improvement in prediction of subtest error
scores from error scores on corresponding subtests, but the improvement was not
dramatic, as shown by Table 29.
Second order factor scores did show a very significant relationship with CT
performance, but, as Table 28 demonstrates, this relationship was comprised
almost entirely of variance due to Maintaining Set scores. The previously
documented relationship of age, education, and IQ variables with CT
performance might have accounted for these findings if Maintaining Set factor
scores were influenced to a substantially greater degree by covariates, as is likely.
Consequently, the foregoing analyses were recomputed, with age, education,
WAIS-R scale scores, and Full Scale sum, Verbal Scale sum, and Performance
Scale sum entered into the equation first, to account for variance from these
sources on CT error scores. Results are listed in Table 30.
Although partialing variance due to age, education, and IQ scores resulted in
marginally improved predictability of error scores, the proportion of variance
accounted for by each factor remained essentially unchanged. Thus, Maintaining
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Table 29
Adjusted RZ for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out
III

Predictors
Total Covar.
I II

IV
V
VI
Total Var.

(1)

(1)

V

IV

.18

VI

.24

.27
.32

.18

.24
.52

(1)

(2)
.24

(1)

.37
.37

.56
.56

.52

Set factor scores continued to account for nearJy all of the variance in error
scores.
This pattern was also evident among cognitive process factors specific to
individual subtests, as shown by the results of multiple regression analysis listed
in Table 31. [n each case, age, education, and IQ covariates, plus Maintaining Set
scores, accounted for almost all of the predicted variance in error scores.

It is not surprising that discovering the correct principle for each subtest and
consistently applying that principle across sets of dissimilar stimuli accounted for
most of the variance in CT performance (although to a lesser degree in
Table 30
RZ Change for CT Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out
Predictors
Total Covar.
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor4
Factor 5
Factor 6
Factor 7
Total Adj . R2

III
(1)
(2)

IV
.27
.15
.19

(4)
(3)

.01
.02

.18

.10

(1)
(3)

.07

(2)

.07

.41

.63

V
.24
(1)

.28

.52

VI
.18
(1)

.48

(2)

.01

.66

TOTAL

.36
(2)
(1)
(4)
(3)

.16
.23
.01
.01

.77

Note. Number in parentheses reflects step at which factor entered equation.
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TabJe 31
R2 Change for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out
Predictor s
Total Covar.
Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
Total Adj . R2

rrr
.18

1
2
3
4
5

Cl)
(4)
(2)

(3)

.48
.01
.10
.03
.81

(1)

IV
.27
.47

(I)

(3)
(2)

(2)

.05

.80

(4)

V
.24
.33

.04
.03
.03
.66

VI

TOTAL

.35

.18
(1)

.63

(2)

.01

(1)
(4)
(2)

.33
.01
.07

(3)

.04

.82

.82

Note . Number in parentheses reflects step at which factor entered equation.
Subtest V). However, a much more relevant issue from a treatment perspective
is how patients fail to discover the correct principle and maintain set.
Although the analyses described above revealed some patterns characteristic
of such failures, it was unclear how those patterns related to CT performance.
For that reason, variables related only to failures were factor analyzed separately
from Maintaining Set variables. Those results were very similar in factor
composition and factor loadings to the full model described above, but the
relationship of these factors and CT performance were rather different, as shown
by the results of multiple regression analyses listed in Table 32.
Since previous analyses had shown that Maintaining Set scores were strongly
related to the dependent variable, in order to assess the relationship between
error scores and factors related to incorrect responding independently

of

Maintaining Set factor scores, the former factors were entered into the analyses
first, following covariates, with Maintaining Set factors entered last.
This procedure revealed a substantially greater relationship between error
scores and factors related to incorrect responding than was true when the same
procedure was applied to the full model. In the latter instance, for each subtest
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Table 32

E2Change

for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out

P~edictor s
T )ta! Covar.
Factor 1 Wron g
Factor 2 Wrong
Factor 3 Wron g
Fact or 4 Wrong
Fact or 5 Wron g
Factor 1 Right
Fact or 2 Right
T Jtal Adj . R2

III
(1)

.18
.09

(2)
(3)

.11
.12

(4)

.26
.03
.79

(5)

V

IV
(3)
(1)
(2)
(4)
(5)

.27
.02
.28
.06
.01
.17

(2)
(I)

.24
.04
.08

(3)

.02

(4)

.82

.27
.65

VI

TOTAL

.18

(2)

.05

(1)
(3)

.11
.47

(3)
(I)
(2)

(4)

.81

.36
.03
.12

.04

.25
.81

and for Total Errors , even when Maintaining Set scores were forced to enter the
equation last, following the stepwise block for factor s related to incorr ect
responding, all of the var iance in error score prediction was accounted for by
Maintaining Set factors and none of the factors related to incorrect responding
entered the equation, with probability to enter set at .05. Nonetheless, these
factors were virtually equivalent, as shown by the correlations in Table 33
between factors in the full model (across the top row) and corresponding factors
from the separate models.
This discrepancy appeared to be the result of differential relationships
between these sets of factors and Maintaining Set factor scores due to the effects
of oblique axes rotation in the full model. Even though in oblique rotation
(oblimin) factors are not constrained to independence, the effect of maximizing
factor loadings served to minimize correlations between these factors. Thus, due
to the strong relationship between the dependent variable (error scores) and
Maintaining Set factor scores, the correlation between error scores and Incorrect
Responding factor scores was also minimized.

155
Table 33
Correlation of Full Model With Separate Right/ Wrong Factors
Subtest
Factors
Fl Wrong
F2 Wrong
F3 Wrong
F4 Wrong
F1 Right
F2 Right
F3 Ri ht

III
1

2

3
.89

V

IV
4

5

1

2
.98

3

4

1

2
.94

VI
3

.97

4

1

.87
.88

2
.98

3

1

.95

.93

TOTAL
2 3 4
.97
.86
.97

.96
.91

.97

.95

1.0

.96

.94
.91

In fact, when factor scores for the full model were recomputed

without

rotation, a much stronger pattern of relationships between error scores and
Incorrect Responding factor scores emerged (except for Subtest VJ), as shown in
Table 34.
Thus, the failure of Incorrect Responding factor scores to significantly predict
error scores appeared to be artifactual rather than reflecting the absence of
relationships.

Nonetheless, the cognitive processes reflected by these factor

scores, and to an even greater extent the second order factor scores, remained
ambiguous.

In part, this was because specific variable scores did not necessarily

reflect a uniform approach within subtests, even for an individual subject.
Further, task demands varied from subtest to subtest; consequently, variable
scores did not reflect similar processes across subtests. Despite this ambiguity,
however, factor scores may be more accurate predictors of CT performance than
were the error scores themselves since error due to "incidentally correct"
responses was partialed out. Further, error scores were substantially influenced
by age, education, and IQ covariates, while the previous analyses have shown
that partialing covariates did not substantially moderate the predictive power of
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Table 34
R2 Change for Unrotated Factor Scores with Covariates Partialed Out
Predictor s
Total Covar.
Factor 1 Wrong
Factor 2 Wrong
Factor 3 Wrong
Factor 4 Wrong
Factor 1 Right
Factor 2 Right
Total Adj. R2

III
(3)
(1)

(2)
(4)
(5)

.18
.08
.20
.08
.24
.02
.81

IV
(4)
(1)

(3)
(2)
(5)

.27
.01
.24
.03
.09
.17
.82

VI

V

(1)

.24
.10

(2)

.04

(3)

.28
.65

.18

(1)

.63

TOTAL
.36
(1)

.19

(2)

.25

.81

.81

factor scores. Thus, further investigation of covariate relationships appeared
warranted.
Covariates of Cognitive Process Factors
All covariates in the previous analyses (age, education, WAIS-R scale scores,
Verbal Scale Sum, Performance Scale Sum, and Full Scale Sum) were regressed
on each first and second order cognitive process factor. These results are listed in
Table 35. Covariates accounted for a slightly greater proportion of the variance
in error scores for each subtest than was true for the cognitive process factors.
This discrepancy was not substantially greater for the Maintaining Set factor in
each subtest, but was greater for all other process variables by a significant
margin, except in the case of Factor 3 in Subtest VI. This pattern suggested the
possibility that the relationship of covariates with cognitive processes related to
maintaining set may be principally responsible for the relationship of covariates
with error scores, since Maintaining Set factors (Factor 1) in each subtest
accounted for the largest single portion of the variance in subtest error scores in
the multiple regression analyses listed in Table 35.
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Table 35
R2 for Age, Education, and IO Regressed on Cognitive Factors
Covar. Age
III
.17
Fact. 1 .12
Fact. 2
Fact.3
Fact . 4
Fact. 5

Ed

IV

.20

Fact. 1 .16
Fact. 2
Fact. 3
Fact. 4
V
Fact. 1
Fact. 2
Fact. 3
Fact . 4
VI
Fact. 1 .17
Fact. 2
Fact. 3
Total
.37
Fact. 1 .28
Fact. 2 .04
Fact. 3
Fact. 4

.21

2/OFl
2/0 F2
2/OF3
2/OF4
2/OF5
2/OF6
2/OF7

DS

A

V

C

S

PC

PA

BO

O A DSy

.11

VS

PS

FS Tot.

.20

.20
.12

.07

0

.04
.07
.11

.07

.10

.04
.17

.24
.26

.24

.29
.13

.04

.11

0

.04

.04
.25
.18

.21

.25
.15

.18

0

.06

.06

.13

.18

0
.18

.10

.17
0

.16
.35

.12

.09 .16
.27

.37

.22 .30

.30

.04
0
0

.08

.08

.20

.17

.14

.20
0

.05

.10

.10
0
0

.03

Note. All subtest factor loadings above .3 are listed. Negative loadings are in
parentheses.

.10
.07
.11
.29
.26
.11

2nd order factor loadings are in bold print in the order listed.

The other principal finding to emerge with respect to these analyses related to
the dispersion of correlates across subtests and across factors within subtests.
Given the weak relationship of many of these variables, considerable

.03
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inconsistency should be expected. However, even when the relationship was
stronger, considerable variability was evident.
The influence of age was a notable exception to that general rule, since age
significantly predicted Subtest III errors and Factor I scores (Maintaining Set), as
well as Maintaining Set scores on Subtests IV and VI, Maintaining Set Scores
Total, and second order Factor 2 scores (Maintaining Set on Subtests IV, V, and
VI). However, all other covariates were quite inconsistent across factors and
across subtests. This finding appeared to reflect the ambiguity inherent in
interpreting the cognitive process factors.
Hypothe sis 4
It was also anticipated that factor analysis of verbalized responses on the

WCST would produce three or more interpretable cognitive process factors
which would differentiate among problem-solving approaches employed on this
task as well. Coding verbalized responses on the WCST did not present the
challenges which were present for the CT. Conventional scoring for the WCST is
based upon a process analysis of subjects' problem-solving approaches on this
task. The only ambiguities present on this task relate to uncertainty which
determinant is instrumental in determining card placement when cards match on
two or three determinants.

Asking patients to verbalize their reasoning was an

attempt to better clarify process analysis by reducing the proportion of
ambiguous responses without simplifying the task. However, in practice it was
found that many subjects verbalized two or more determinants for their
responses; consequently, such verbalized responses conveyed no more
information than did conventional responses.
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Comparison of Verbalized versus
Nonverbalized Scoring

If verbalized administration was successful in clarifying reasoning on this
task, verbal process scores should correlate only moderately or below with
conventionally scored responses but summary scores (Categories Completed,
Total Errors) would show very high correlation coefficients. Consequently, these
sets of scores were correlated. Results are listed in Table 36. Due to space
limitations, scores are designated by the order in which they were listed in
Appendix I. These correlations were all reasonably high, with the notable
exception of Right-Shift responses (#19), and to a lesser degree Missed Learning
Opportunities (#5) and Percent Nonperseverative

Errors (#6).

Consequently these scores were examined to determine the source of these
discrepancies.

(See Table 37.) Inspection of the data revealed that the low

correlation between verbalized and conventional Right-Shift scores resulted from
restricted range on this score under both scoring conditions . Consequently, this
score was dropped from further analysis. Reduced correlations for the other two
variables, however, appeared to reflect legitimate differences in the values of
these scores between scoring conditions.
Nonperseverative

Little difference in mean scores for

Error Percent was evident, but considerably greater variability

was present under verbalized scoring conditions. Thus, it appeared that for
some subjects verbalizing their reasoning substantially reduced ambiguity in
Table 36
Correlations Between Verbalized and Conventional WCST Scores
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
.92 .95 .82 .90 .73 .79 .84 .87 .92 .86 .93 .97 .86 .94 .91 .92 .69 .90 .26 .89
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Table 37
Descriptive Data for Right-Shift, Missed Lrng Oppor., and NPSV%
Variable s
Right-Shift Conventional
Right-Shift Verbali ze d
Missed Lrng Oppor., Conven.
Misse d Lmg Oppor., Verbal.
NonPSV Error %, Co nv en.
NonPSV Error %, Ver bal

N

132
132
132
132
132
132

Mean
.64

S.D.
.76

.10
7.69
13.58
12
13

.30
8.08
11.11

8
12

scoring perseverative versus nonperseverative

Min .

Max.

0
0

3
1
33
42

1

2
1
0

41

60

responses, but this was not true

for all subjects. Conventiona] scoring resulted in fewer missed learning
opportunities apparently because of a higher proportion of ambiguous
responses, which reduced scoring opportunities.

Therefore, these latter two

scores were retained for further analysis .
Factor Analysis of WCST Scores
Verbalized administration.

The factor pattern for factor analysis of all

retained scores from verbalized WCST administration is described in Table 38.
Only three factors emerged in this analysis, accounting for 82.5% of the variance.
Factor 1, which accounted for the largest proportion of the variance by far
was comprised of substantial loadings on all major variables, and appeared to
reflect ineffective, perseverative responding.
nonperseverative

Summary scores reflecting

responding (Conceptual Level Responses, Categories

Completed, and Learning to Learn) loaded negatively on this factor.
Interestingly, Unambiguous Form responses and Unambiguous S.D. both loaded
very highly on this factor, and Unambiguous Color responses loaded more
moderately, but Unambiguous Number showed only a weak loading, below .30.
This pattern was also evident with respect to maximum classification (Maximum
Color, Form, Number), but at a lower level. In contrast, Factor 2 was comprised
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Table 38
Factor Pattern Matrix for WCST Verbalized Administration
Factor Number:
Percent of Variance:
Total Errors%
Unambiguous Form
Unambiguous S.D.
Concept. Level Resp.
Perseverative Error%
Perseverative Resp .%
Wrong-Stay
Max. Determ. S.D.
NonPSV Error%
Categories Completed
Unambiguous Color
Maximum Form
Learning to Learn
Unambiguous No.
Maximum Number
Missed Lrng. Oppor.
Fail to Maintain Set
Total Correct%
Maximum Color

Factor 1
57.4%
.99

Factor 2
16.9%

Factor 3
8.2%

.96

.93
-.92
.91
.91
.90
.86

.79
-.77
.70
.69
-.67

.31

.41
-.29
.32
-.56
-.26
.37
.80
.78
.56
.30

.52

-.42
-.41
-.88
-.87
-.61

predominantly of Unambiguous Number and Maximum Number, but with a
negative loading for Unambiguous Color (at a moderate level), and almost no
relationship with Unambiguous Form.
This pattern strongly suggested that when the proportions of determinant
responses were unequal, whether due to ambiguous or unambiguous responses,
color and form responses were associated with perseveration, while unequal
number responses tended not to be associated with clear performance patterns,
other than a mild inclination to repeat unsuccessful responses, in a
nonperseverative manner.
Factor 3 accounted for a much smaller proportion of the variance and related
very mildly to effective nonrigid problem-solving, with high negative loadings
on variables relating to failure to maintain set.
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Conventional administration.

The factor pattern for conventional WCST

scoring is shown in Table 39. Three factors also emerged in this analysis, which
were almost identical to the verbal scoring factors, and accounted for similar
proportions of the variance.
Consistent with the correlation patterns described in Table 36, differences
between Factor 1 for the two sets of scores (r = .85) emerged only with respect to
Missed Learning Opportunities

and Nonperseverative

Error Percent. In the

former case, the loading for Factor 1 increased substantially, from .31 to .71, and
in the latter case the loading decreased from .79 to .59. Both of these changes
were in the predicted direction, consistent with greater accuracy in scoring
responses with verbalized administration, although hardly sufficient to justify
Table 39
Factor Pattern Matrix for WCST Conventional Scores
Variables
Perseverative Error%
Perseverative Resp.%
Unambiguous Form
Unambiguous S.D.
Total Errors %
Wrong-Stay
Concept. Level Resp.
Max. Determ. S.D.
Unambiguous Color
Missed Lmg. Oppor.
Maximum Form
Leaming to Learn
Categories Completed
NonPSV Error%

Factor 1
66.2%
.99
.99
.95
.94
.90
.88
-.84
.82
.72
.71
.68
-.68
-.66
.59

Factor 2
11.1%

.31

-.36
.34
-.36
.35

.36
.34

Unambiguous No.
Maximum Number

.93
.90

Fail to Maintain Set
Total Correct %
Maximum Color

.32
.51

Factor 3
9.2%

-.98
-.76
-.55
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the change in administration

procedure. Loading and factor composition for

Factors 2 and 3 for the two administration conditions were also very similar
(r = .77; r = .77), and in the predicted direction. In neither case did loading
changes significantly modify interpretive conclusions.
Covariates for WCST Cognitive Process Factors
Despite the similarities between factors which emerged from the two sets of
scores, the relationships with age, education, and IQ covariates were
considerably different for Factor 1 across scoring conditions, although the
remaining factors in each condition did not show any substantial relationship
with covariates. Results of multiple regression analysis for covariates on each
factor are listed in Table 40.
The proportion of the variance accounted for was somewhat greater for
verbal scores, but more striking was the very different pattern of covariation
between corresponding pairs of scores, suggesting that these factors may not be
equivalent measures. In fact, analysis of covariance, partialing out all age,
education, and IQ covariates, did not substantially change these correlation
Table 40
R2 for Age, Education, and IO Regressed on WCST Factors
Covar. Age

Verbal
Fact. 1 .24
Fact. 2
Fact. 3
Conv.
Fact. 1
Fact. 2
Fact. 3

Ed

I

OS

A

V

C

s

PC

.30

PA

BO

OA OSz:

.27

vs
.21

PS

FS Tot.

.14

.30
0
.05

.05

.19

.04

.15

.19

.04
0
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coefficients between similar factors from different scoring conditions (Factor 1,
r = .84; Factor 2, r = .76; Factor 3, r = .80). The relative equivalence of these
coefficients suggested that similar factor scores did not share common
covanance.
In an attempt to discern the source of differences in covariation between the
two sets of scores, multiple regression analyses were performed.

Age, education,

and IQ covariates were regressed onto each of the original WCST variables which
loaded on these factors. These results are listed in Table 41. Somewhat different
patterns of covariation emerged from these analyses as well. Only 7 of 20
comparisons showed very similar patterns of covariation, and an additional 3
comparisons were somewhat similar. The remainder were quite dissimilar,
although some similarities were evident.
The proportion

of dissimilar findings is far beyond chance and strongly

suggested that these sets of scores may reflect different cognitive processes. This
interpretation

was strengthened

by the fact that Verbal Scale Sum (VS) did not

significantly predict variance on any variable from conventional scoring but did
in four instances for verbalized scores (Categories Completed, Conceptual Level
Response, Perseverative

Responses, and Total Errors). It should be noted that

these latter variables were all among the major C(?ntributors to Factor 1 under
both sets of scores. The opposite pattern was obtained with respect to
covariation with Performance Scale Sum, which covaried with three conventional
scores, but not verbalized scores.
Additionally,
substantially

age and Digit Symbol Scale Score (DSySS) covaried to a

greater degree with conventional scores than verbal scores. These

differences all led to the conclusion that asking patients to verbalize their
reasoning on the WCST reflected very different skills than asking them to
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Table 41
R2 for Age, Education, and IO Regressed on WCST Factors

s

Covar .
Conv.
Cat.
CLR
FTMS
LTL
MLOP
NPSVE
PSVR

Age

TE
TC
MaxC
Max F
MaxN
Max SD
Sin.C
Sin. F
Sin.N
Sin. SD

.29

.20
.31

.23

.26

Ed

I

DS

A

V

C

PC

PA

BD OA DSy

VS PS

FS Tot.

.12
.24

.56

.28

.09

.23
.25

.20
.22
.24
.24
.12
.20
.17
.11
.13
.13

.16

.17

.14
.10

.20

.17

Wrg-St

.26

.31

.28

.19

Verbal

Cat.
CLR
FTMS

.19
.30

.57
.06

LTL

.06

MLOP
NPSVE
PSVR
.31
TE
TC
MaxC
MaxF
MaxN
Max SD .19
Sin. C
Sin. F
Sin.N
Sin.SD

Wr -St

.15
.24

.10
.16

.33

.14

.25

.28
.27

.16

.17
.21
.09
.18

.22

.04
.15

.13
.10

.07
.15

.19

perform the same task without verbalization.

.14

It was not clear, however, whether

performance varied as a function of verbalizing reasoning, or whether only the
verbal scores varied. Consequently, it is not known at this point which

166
procedure may be best suited to measuring the cognitive processes involved in
attribute identification and cognitive flexibility. Some light may be shed
concerning those relationships by investigating the relationships between the
WCST and CT factors, while controlling for covariates.
Comparisons

Between the Category Test and the WCST

Previous studies have found that the CT and WCST share approximately

30%

common variance, using conventional scoring. Other studies have found less
significant relationships when partialing out age, education, and JQ covariates .
In this study, the relationship between performance on these individual tasks
was assessed using multiple regression analysis, entering covariates first to
partial out their influence on the relationship between CT and WCST scores.
Those resu Its are shown in Table 42.
Although each dependent variable (with only two exceptions) on both the
WCST and CT were significantly predicted statistically by at least one variable
from the corresponding

test, the increase in predictive power in each case was

Table 42
Prediction of CT LWCST Variables, Controlling for Covariates
Dependent Var .
CT Total Errors
CT Subtest III Errors
CT Subtest IV Errors
CT Subtest V Errors
CT Subtest VI Errors
WCST Categories Comp.
WCSTTotal Errors%
WCST Non PSV Errors %
WCST PSV Responses %
WCST PSV Errors %
WCSTFrMSet
WCST Learn to Learn

Covar .
Ad -. R2
.31
.13
.22
.25
.20
.16
.29
.24
.23
.24
.03
.12

Independent Var.
WCST Categories Completed
None Entered
WCST Max. Class SD
WCST Total Correct
WCST Categories Completed
CT Subtest VI Errors
None Entered
CT Subtest VI Errors
CT Subtest IV Errors
CT Subtest IV Errors
CT Subtest VI Errors
CT Subtest VI Errors

R2 Change

SigfChg

.03

.0139

.05
.04
.09
.09

.0040
.0416
.0002
.0003

.03
.02
.02
.04

.0440
.0484
.0485
.0176
.0027

.06
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nonsubstantial.

These findings are very consistent with other reports in the

literature.
It was anticipated that factor scores derived from cognitive process variables

on each of these tasks would predict a significantly greater proportion of the
variance than using conventional scores alone on the other task. This prediction
Table 43
Prediction of CT LWCST Factor Scores, Controlling for Covariates
Deeendent
CT Subtest
CT Subtest
CT Subtest
CT Subtest
CT Subtest
CT Subtest

Covar. R2
Var .
III Factor 1
.08
III Factor 2
III Factor 3
.05
m Factor 4
.04
JJl Factor 5
.14
N Factor 1
.19

CT Subtest
CT Subtest
CT Subtest
CT Subtest

IV Factor 2
N Factor 3
N Factor 4
V Factor 1

CT Subtest V Factor 2
CT Subtest V Factor 3
CT Subtest V Factor 4
CT Subtest VI Factor 1
CT Subtest VI Factor 2
CT Subtest VI Factor 3
CT Total Factor 1

CT Total Factor 2
CT Total Factor 3
CT Total Factor 4
CT 2nd Order Factor 1
CT 2nd Order Factor 2
CT 2nd Order Factor 3
CT 2nd Order Factor 4
CT 2nd Order Factor 5
CT 2nd Order Factor 6
CT 2nd Order Factor 7
WCSf Factor 1
WCST Factor 2.
WCST Factor 3

.08
.12
.19
.04
.14
.14
.20

.06

.13

.11

.03
.26
.04

Indeeendent Var.
WCSf Maximum Color
None Entered
None Entered
None Entered
None Entered
WCST Verbal Factor 1
WCSf Verbal Missed Lrng Oppor.
WCSf Conventional Factor 3
None Entered
None Entered
WCST Verbal Factor 1
WCSf Verbal Unambiguous Form
None Entered
None Entered
None Entered
WCST Verbal Leaming to Learn
None Entered
None Entered
WCSf Verbal Factor 1
WCSf Verbal Factor 3
WCSf Verbal Total Errors Percent
None Entered
None Entered
None Entered
None Entered
WCSf Verbal Factor 1
WCSf Verbal Factor 3
None Entered
None Entered
None Entered
None Entered
None Entered
CT 2nd Order Factor 2
None Entered
None Entered

R2 Change

.03

SigF Chg
.0394

.03
.03
.03

.0453
.0255
.0464

.03
.04

.0238
.0101

.06

.0025

.05

.0052
.0122
.0178

.04

.03

.03

.0141
.0389

.03

.0354

.04
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was assessed utilizing multiple regression procedures, shown in Table 43,
controlling for the influence of covariates, as described above. For CT factors as
dependent variables, covariates were regressed first, followed by WCST factor
scores from verbal administration, then WCST factor scores from conventional
administration, followed by all individual WCST variables.
Results of these analyses showed even less relationship between factor scores
from one task and factor scores from the other task. Moreover, using variables as
predictors for factor scores failed to improve prediction. These analyses
provided no evidence that the tasks assessed by these tests are comparable in
substantive ways.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The objectives of this study were threefold: (a) determine whether asking
patients to verbalize their reasoning on WCST and CT responses substantially
alters the nature of these tasks; (b) devise a coding system derived from these
verbal responses and determine if verbal responses obtained using this
methodology can be reliably coded by trained examiners; and (c) determine the
relationship between the cognitive processes reflected by scores on the WCST
versus the cognitive processes reflected by scores on the CT. The results
described in the previous chapter will be described in terms of the research
hypotheses which address each of these objectives.
Comparison of Verbalized versus Conventional Administration
Prior validation studies have shown that the CT and WCST are among the
most sensitive indicators of brain damage (Kl0ve, 1974). Departures from
standard administration

procedures for these tasks, therefore, must be

undertaken cautiously to avoid modifying the nature of the skills being assessed.
For that reason, it was necessary to establish that the results obtained using
standard administration

procedures were comparable to results obtained when

patients were asked to verbalize their reasoning on these tasks, when both
groups were comparable in other relevant respects. The specific hypotheses
tested were (a) Mean Tota] Error and subtest error scores on the CT and mean
Categories Completed, Total Errors, Nonperseverative

Errors, Perseverative

Errors, Perseverative Responses, and Failure to Maintain Set scores on the WCST
will not differ significantly (statistically) between a group of patients who
verbalized the reasoning for their responses and a group of patients who did not
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verbalize their reasoning, and are comparable to the first group with respect to
diagnosis, age, education, and FulJ Scale WAIS-R IQ; and (b) Correlations
between Mean Total Error and subtest error scores on the CT and mean
Categories Completed, Total Errors, Nonperseverative Errors, Perseverative
Errors, Perseverative Responses, and Failure to Maintain Set scores on the WCST
will not differ significantly (statistically) between a group of patients who
verbalized the reasoning for their responses and a group of patients who did not
verbalize their reasoning, and are comparable to the first group with respect to
diagnosis, age, education, and Full Scale WAIS-R IQ.
Hypothesis 1 was tested using ANCOV A to compare scores between groups
while controlling for age, education, and IQ covariates. Results revealed that
only CT Subtest IV Errors (C4Err) significantly differed (p < .02) between the
groups. Further analysis of covariates for C4Err revealed that covarying only age
increased comparability on C4Err across groups. Treating both age and group
membership as independent variables further increased comparability between
groups, so that main effects were found only for age, as expected. The effects of
group membership were nonsignificant (p = .16), and no interaction effects for
age and group membership were apparent. Consequently, comparison of mean
scores across groups did not reveal group differences, when controlling for age,
education, and IQ covariates.
Rather different results were found for Hypothesis 2, however. ANCOV A
was also utilized for testing differences in correlation coefficients between all
possible pairs of CT and WCST variables, while controlling for age, education,
and IQ covariates. Significant differences were found for correlations between
three pairs of variables. Fifty-five comparisons were computed; consequently,
finding significant differences for three of these may have been due to chance.
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However, further analysis of these differences revealed different patterns of age,
education, and IQ covariation between pairs of identical scores across groups.
These results suggested that groups may not be comparable, despite finding no
significant differences between mean scores and between most correlations for
sets of scores across groups. Comparing relationships among WAIS-R subtest
and summary scores also revealed substantial differences between groups with
respect to relationships among scores.
Since administration

conditions for the WAIS-R were identical for both

groups, in view of differences among relationships for these scores between
groups, it cannot be concluded that differences in relationships for CT and WCST
variables is the result of administration

conditions.

Rather, the groups may not

be comparable with respect to diagnosis, severity, or other relevant variables.
These results are not surprising, since data were obtained from archival
records, and subjects were not randomly assigned to adminjstration

conditions.

Systematic differences between groups may have occurred because different
examiners tested subjects in each group, and decisions as to which test
instruments to administer were made by individual examiners based on clinical
judgment.

It is likely that these judgments were not based on consistent criteria.

Therefore, generalization of the results of this study to subjects who were
adminjstered these test instruments under conventional administration
conditions should be considered tentative.
Reliability of Coding Verbalized Responses
Asking patients to verbalize the reasoning underlying quantifiable responses
introduced the problem of how one patient's qualitative responses may be
compared to other patients' qualitative responses. Some anecdotal reports are
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availabJe for the CT in which patients have been asked to verbalize their
reasoning (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), but these responses have been interpreted
subjectively, which does not allow systematic comparisons across patients or
across responses.
Perrine (1984) referred to the concept formation Jiterature (Bourne et al., 1979)
for a cognitive process modeJ which might help clarify the cognitive processes on
the CT and WCST. For the purposes of this study, Perrine's model was utilized
for the development of a system of coding verbal responses on the CT. This
model described a two-part process of concept formation in which Attribute
Identification referred to identification of the relevant features of stimuli upon
which the rule is based, whereas Rule Learning refers to the logical relationship
between the attribute identified and the number response chosen. For example,
on Subtest Ill, the Attribute Identification task is to discern that the stimulus
which is different is the relevant dimension, while the Rule Learning task is to
discover that the position of the different stimulus corresponds to the correct
number .
However, during the course of this study, it was discovered that a three-stage
roding system was required to reliably differentiate verbal responses:
(a) Concrete: Subjects selected a perceptual feature which they believed relevant;
(b) Abstract: The perceptual feature or features were organized conceptually to
create a pattern; and (c) Rule: This pattern was related to the number response
given. For example, in Subtest IV, the quadrants are numbered in a clockwise
riirection, and the principle requires identifying the quadrant of the stimulus
which is missing or different. The Concrete (Attribute Identification) task is
identification of the portion which is not there or which is different from the rest
cf the stimulus; the Abstract conceptual task is to perceive this attribute as one
~uadrant of the whole stimulus; the Rule Learning task is to select a number
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corresponding to the position of the missing or different quadrant when ordered
in a clockwise direction.
Often, however, responses referred to two or more perceptual attributes, or
verbal responses were ambiguous as to which attribute took precedence.
Consequently, in the interest of increased reliability in coding responses, a
decision tree approach was adopted for coding verbal responses. This approach
established a hierarchy of coding rules, ordered in such a way that the most
relevant or highest order perceptual attributes and rules were listed first. (See
Appendices E through G for the full model.) Use of this approach permitted
achievement of a satisfactory level of test-retest (recoding) reliability (.94) for
recoding verbal responses after an interval of four months (for one examiner).
Achievement of this level of reliability permitted quantitative comparison of
verbalized responses across subjects and across responses.
Factor Analysis of Cognitive Process Variables
Category Test
The CT has been described as a test of complex, problem-solving skills (Reitan
& Wolfson, 1985) on the basis of previous factor analytic studies in which CT

error scores loaded with other variables known to predict abstract reasoning,
cognitive flexibility, and problem-solving skills (Barnes & Lucas, 1974; Corrigan
& Hinkeldey, 1988; Goldstein & Shelly, 1972; Halstead, 1947a; Haynes & Sells,

1963; Royce et al., 1976; Russell, 1982). However, in only one of these studies
(Royce et al., 1976) have CT subtest scores been entered into the analysis
individually, and in none of these instances has it been possible to evaluate the
nature of the errors committed by subjects in solving the task presented to them
by the CT. The methodology developed for the purpose of the present study has
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afforded that opportunity by devising a standardized coding system based upon
concept formation literature (Bourne et al., 1979) for describing how subjects
relate the perceptual stimuli presented to them to the numbers which constitute
their responses.
Since the focus of interest on this task is not how quickly the correct principle
on each subtest was discovered, but rather on how effectively the feedback
provided by the examiner (or the apparatus) was utilized, concept formation
scores were transformed to change scores, or process scores, to identify how
feedback was incorporated into subsequent responses. Thus, cognitive process
variables were obtained which reflected the degree to which response
determinants were repeated when correct feedback was received and response
determinants were modified when incorrect feedback was received. These scores
(see Appendix H) were tabulated for each CT subtest and for CT Total Errors.
It was hypothesized that factor analysis of these process scores would
produce three or more interpretable cognitive process factors which were
relatively independent of age, education, and IQ subtest and summary scores.
Since preliminary analysis revealed that, except for Subtests V and VI which
share a common principle, individual subtest error scores were relatively
independent of error scores on other subtests (although some relationships were
statistically significant), and that the small N precluded analyzing all data
simultaneously, process scores for each subtest were analyzed separately. In
order to enhance interpretability of results, the data analysis for the full group
was replicated for impaired and unimpaired subgroups, using Reitan' s definition
for impairment on the CT (>50 errors).
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Maintaining Set
These analyses revealed fairly consistent results across all subtests and for
Total Errors. The factor in all subtests accounting for the largest proportion of
the variance (28.1% for Subtest III to 38.1% for Subtest IV) was a Maintaining Set
fac or on which most variables that loaded highly related to learning the correct
subtest principle and maintaining that principle on subsequent items. This was
tru e also on all subgroup analyses, with the exception of the impaired subgroup
on Subtest III. This factor accounted for the greatest portion of the variability in
subtest error scores as well, ranging from 33% of the variance in error scores for
To al Errors and Subtest V to 63% of the variance on Subtest VI (see Table 31 for
de tails).
This factor also showed the greatest relationship with age, education, and IQ
cO\ariates across all subtests and for Total Errors. In most instances this
relationship was nearly as great as the relationship between error scores and
co\'ariates (see Table 35). It may therefore be postulated that this factor accounts
for most of the discriminability of the CT in differentiating brain-damaged from
no nbrain-damaged

subjects. In fact, this may well be a more reliable indicator of

effective problem-solving skills than error scores since this factor score is
conprised almost exclusively of variance due to repeating determinants which
are correct and is not inflated by "incidentally correct" responses (Simmel &
Co11nts,1957).
Shirting Determinants
However, from a clinical perspective, despite the importance of assessing
efftctive problem-solving skills, treatment must proceed from evaluation of how
patents fail problem-solving tasks. The remaining factors which emerged from
facior analysis of process variables across all subtests and for Total Errors
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predominantly related to how response determinants were changed when the
previous response was incorrect. These factors were often ambiguous but were
of three general types: (a) random or irrelevant shifting characterized by
nonsystematic shifting of multiple determinants simultaneously; (b) systematic
shifting of determinants in order to identify the relevant dimensions; and (c)
cognitively rigid shifting characterized by persisting with a previous principle
which was no longer effective or by difficulty abandoning assumptions.
Factor 2 for all analyses was a nonsystematic factor characterized by
simultaneously shifting multiple determinants, often all three, although the
degree to which each determinant loaded on this factor varied somewhat from
subtest to subtest. Shifting just one determinant consistently loaded negatively
on this factor, reflecting the absence of a systematic approach.
Factor 3 showed somewhat more variability across subtests. For Subtest III,
this factor represented somewhat more effective and systematic problem-solving
than the previous factor, with a moderate positive loading for Leaming Rate,
relating to slow but successful learning. This factor was not represented in
Subtest IV, but Subtests V and VI were consistent with Subtest III, although the
determinants shifted varied somewhat.
The remaining factors were less consistent across subtests, but related to some
degree with cognitive rigidity and difficulty abandoning assumptions.
The relationship of these factors to CT performance was unclear, however,
since almost all of the variance in subtest error scores was predicted by
Maintaining Set factors. (See Table 31.) It was hypothesized that the restricted
relationship of Determinant Shifting factors with subtest error scores may have
been due to artifacts associated with oblique rotation, which apparently served to
minimize the relationship between factors . Given the strong relationship
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between Maintaining Set factors and subtest error scores, this apparently served
also to minimize the relationship between Determinant Shifting factors and
subtest error scores. Consequently, Maintaining Set variables were factor
analyzed separately from Determinant Shifting variables.
This strategy produced almost identical factors in each case (see Table 33), but
multiple regression analysis revealed that the relationship of the Determinant
Shifting factors to error scores was rather different. For the full model, even
when Maintaining Set scores were forced to enter the equation last, following the
stepwise block for factors related to incorrect responding, all of the variance in
error score prediction was accounted for by Maintaining Set factors and none of
the factors related to Determinant Shifting entered the equation, with probability
to enter set at .05. However, when each set of scores was factor analyzed
separately, the relationship of Determinant Shifting factors to subtest error scores
was much more substantial.
Thus, the failure of Determinant Shifting factor scores to significantly predict
error scores appeared to be artifactual rather than reflecting the absence of
relationships.

Nonetheless, the cognitive processes reflected by these factor

scores remained ambiguous.
Second Order Factor Analysis
In view of the consistency of factor loadings across subtests and Total Errors,
it appeared that these primary factors may be descriptive of a general approach
to problem-solving tasks. Consequently, second order factor analysis was
performed, entering all factors across subtests, to determine if primary factors of
each type related to the same cognitive process. Results are shown in Table 27,
with variables identified across the top of the table by number (from the
definitions in Appendix H) and primary factors loading on each second order
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factor listed in the left hand column. It was expected that if primary factors
related to cognitive processes which were consistently applied across problemsolving tasks, variable loadings on primary factors would cluster within each
second order factor.
Seven second order factors emerged in this analysis, but although some
chs tering of variables is evident, only the first two second order factors have
primary loadings from all subtests and variable clustering is not consistent.
Second Order Factor 2 shows the greatest degree of variable clustering, with all
m aintaining set variables and primary factors from Subtests IV, V, and VJ
loading substantiaJly. Subtest III showed a very different pattern, however.
Although all subtests also loaded on Second Order Factor 1, the variable
clustering pattern on this factor was very discrepant, with maintaining set
variables from Subtests III and IV loading consistently (although comprising a
rel atively small proportion of the variance) but with unsystematic shifting
variables from Subtests V and VI loading negatively. Thus, low scores on
Umystematic Shifting variables on Subtests IV, V, and VI appeared to predict
high Maintaining Set variable scores on Subtests III and IV. The remaining
sect)nd order factors are specific to primary factors from subsets of two subtests.
fhis analysis strongly suggested that despite the consistency with which
similar factors emerged across subtests in the initial factor analysis of process
vanables, second order factor analysis indicated that these factors were primarily
des :riptive of variance unique to individual subtests or sets of similar subtests.
Fac:or patterns were reminiscent of the relationships among subtests described in
Table 29 where multiple regression analysis revealed that error scores on Subtest
III were significantly predicted only by error scores on Subtest IV, and error
scores on Subtest V were significantly predicted only by error scores on Subtest
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VI, and vice versa. Only Subtest IV showed a significant relationship with more
than one other subtest. As expected, error scores on Subtest IV were significantly
predicted by Subtest III, but also by error scores on Subtest VI. However, even
though these relationships were statistically significant (r < .05), they accounted
for only a minor portion of the variance, except in the case of Subtests V and VI,
which are based upon the same principle. It was expected that second order
factor analysis of process variables would reveal stronger relationships among
primary process factors across subtests, but this did not prove to be the case.
The failure to find second order factors which generalized across subtests
may reflect characteristics of the cognitive process variables which were devised
to measure hypothesized cognitive processes. Each of these scores was based
upon determinant shifting following feedback from the examiner. However,
perceptual differences between subtests may modify the significance of given
determinant shifts. For example, in Subtest III, the most salient determinant may
be R, while in Subtest IV the determinant which is most salient may be A.
Consequently, the relevance of R shifts is likely to be very different across
subtests. For that reason, intersubtest comparisons with respect to determinant
shifting are not likely to be fruitful.

In contrast, the failure to find second order factors for cognitive processes
which generalized across subtests may also reflect the uniqueness of task
demands presented by each subtest (again except for Subtests V and VI). In fact,
this explanation appears likely in view of the failure of Maintaining Set factors to
show stronger relationships across subtests. These factors show less dependence
upon perceptual dissimilarities between subtests in that they reflect a "win-stay"
strategy, without regard to perceptual shifts.
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Only two previous studies have addressed correlates of differential
performance on individual CT subtests. Royce et al. (1976) also found that
Subtests III and TVcomprised a factor separate from Subtests V and VI. They
referred to these as Halstead Abstraction I and Halstead Abstraction II, and
found somewhat different patterns of correlations with sites of cerebral damage
for each of these factors. Holland and Wadsworth (1976) also found evidence for
a different pattern of correlates for individual CT subtests in a study which
compared the performance of schizophrenic subjects with brain-damaged
subjects on a battery of neuropsychological

tests. They found that only CT

Subtest IV minus Subtest V significantly differentiated the groups . However, the
significance of these findings for cognitive correlates of CT subtest performance
is not known.
Covariates of Cognitive Process Factors
One means of assessing correlates of subtest-specific cognitive process factors
is to investigate the relationships of predicted age, education, and IQ covariates .
These results are shown in Table 35. As might be expected in view of the
restricted relationships among subtest errors scores and among cognitive process
factors across subtests, relationships of age, education, and IQ covariates with
both error scores and cognitive process factors were quite variable. These results
suggested that scores across subtests are quite clearly measures of different
cognitive processes.
More importantly, however, these findings suggested that most of the
relationship of CT error scores with age, education, and IQ covariates was
reflected in Maintaining Set factors, but that most Determinant Shifting factors
were relatively independent

of covariates. Previous research has found the CT to

be highly sensitive to brain dysfunction, but specificity has been less reliable in
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discriminating nonbrain-damaged

subjects due to the influence of covariates on

CT performance. If relationships of covariates with Determinant Shifting factor
scores are confirmed in cross-validation research, these scores may be more
useful than error scores in discriminating nonbrain-damaged

subjects.

Summary of CT Factor Analyses
It was anticipated that factor analysis of CT cognitive process variables would

produce three or more cognitive process factors which were relatively
independent of age, education, and IQ covariates. This expectation was fulfilled
for all CT subtests in most respects. The requisite number of factors did emerge
in all analyses and most were interpretable, although often ambiguous.
However, the first factor to emerge for all subtests related to Maintaining Set
variables, which predicted most of the variance in subtest error scores and
showed almost as much covariation with age, education, and IQ variables as did
the error scores themselves. Nonetheless, these scores may be more accurate
reflectors of CT subtest performance than error scores because they are not
influenced by "incidentaJly correct responses."
The remaining factors which emerged reflected Determinant Shifting
variables and were quite consistent across subtests, showing much less
relationship with age, education, and IQ covariates, although subtest specific
factors did not predict similar factors on other subtests. Similarly, Maintaining
Set factors from one subtest showed only minimal relationship with Maintaining
Set factors from other subtests. These relationships were reminiscent of
relationships between subtest error scores. It therefore appeared that CT subtest
scores, whether error scores, Maintaining Set factor scores, or Determinant
Shifting scores, were not substantially related, suggesting that CT subtests are
measures of different cognitive processes. Previous research offers little
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guidance as to what the correlates of individual subtests may be, and the factors
which emerged in this study do not shed much light on this question.
Factors which emerged in each subtest analysis were comprised of similar
variables, but contrary to expectations the relationship between similar factors
across subtests was minimal. Thus, second order factor analysis of primary
cognitive process factors from each subtest did not reveal consistent relationships
across subtests, and the pattern of covariation with age, education, and IQ
variables across subtest factor scores was also quite inconsistent. It was,
therefore, apparent that the cognitive process variables which were devised for
this study did not reflect the cognitive skills required to perform each subtest
task. For the cognitive shifting variables, this might be due to perceptual
differences between subtest stimuli which served to modify the significance of
given determinant shifts from subtest to subtest. That is, if a given determinant
was of unequal salience across subtests, shifting that determinant in response to
feedback would convey different interpretations from subtest to subtest.
The Maintaining Set factors are comprised of two components. First, scores
on this factor reflect a "win-stay" strategy, in which determinant scores that were
successful are repeated. Second, use of this strategy presupposes that the correct
determinants have been surmised. The latter component is reflected in Set
Leaming Rate (SLR) scores, which are measures of how consistently determinant
scores were repeated after the correct principle was learned. It might be
expected that this strategy would generalize across problem-solving tasks,
including different CT subtests. Discovery of the correct principle within each
subtest is reflected in Leaming Rate (LR) scores. If individual subtests reflect
dissimilar cognitive skills, it would not be expected that LR scores would show
substantial relationships across subtests.
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However, multiple regression analysis revealed that both subtest specific SLR
and LR scores did not generalize across subtests, except for Subtests V and Vl
(which are based upon the same principle), contrary to expectations. Inspection
of the data suggested that the failure of SLR scores to generalize may have been
due to learning failures which were not expected to generalize across subtests.
Consequently, the data were recomputed after eliminating these scores.
However, this adjustment did not substantially affect the generalizability of this
score.
These results are very puzzling. Task differences across subtests are not
relevant for this score, when learning failures are eliminated; consequently, SLR
should reflect only failures of working memory, or attentional lapses, and this
would not be expected to vary substantially as a result of task differences.
Unreliability of scores might account for these findings, but in that case Subtests
V and VI would not be expected to show discrepant patterns of relationship.
However, this is an impaired subgroup of predominantly head-injured
subjects whose performance on learning tasks would be characterized by
frequent p·roactive intrusions from previously learned material (Butters, 1992).
The probability of such intrusions would vary with respect to strength of prior
learning and task novelty. Thus, previous material which was overlearned,
counting stimuli for instance, may intrude more frequently on tasks which are
novel, such as Subtests III or IV, than on tasks which are more familiar, as in
Subtests V and VI. This principle would predict that mean SLR for Subtests III
and IV would be much smaller than mean SLR for Subtests V and VI. In fact, this
, pattern was partially confirmed. Mean SLR for Subtest III was .18 (S.D. = .04),
while for Subtests V and VI mean SLR was .64 (S.D. = .22) and .64 (S.D. = .24),
respectively. However, mean SLR for Subtest IV was greatest at .82 (S.D. = .31).
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Task novelty for the latter subtest, however, may have been influenced by the six
practice items on this subtest.
Further research concerning these patterns would be necessary to confirm this
explanation, but certainly these findings point to the need for more systematic
task analysis to define variables which reflect discriminable cognitive processes
utilized by subgroups of subjects in concept formation tasks, particularly CT
subtests. Fortunately, the determinant coding system devised for the purpose of
this study makes such analyses possible.
Such an approach must be based on the premise that because the CT is a
problem-solving test in which the central task is to surmise the correct principle
for each subtest through use of feedback from the examiner (or the apparatus),
not all responses are of equal salience. For example, incidentally correct
responses are of particular value in helping to identify the correct principle.
These are responses which are correct by chance rather than by design. These
offer subjects the opportunity to contrast the perceptual attributes of the item
which was incidentally correct with the perceptual attributes of previous items
which were incorrect to identify differences, which must logically be descriptive
of the correct principle. Consequently, determinant shifts following incidentally
correct responses are particularly relevant in identifying cognitive approaches to
this task.
Similarly, responses following an incorrect response within a series of
"almost correct" responses are particularly salient in helping subjects discover
the correct principle. These are responses in which the current operating
principle is very similar to the correct principle, but it is ineffective in some
instances. For example, in Subtests V and VI, many subjects count quadrants
which are outlined rather than basing their responses on the proportion of the
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stimulus which is outlined. This results in correct responses for most but not all
items. Thus, determinant changes following these disconfirming responses are
especially relevant in identifying problem-solving characteristics of subjects.
Careful item analysis of determinant changes employing such a process
approach to develop characteristic patterns of performance for various
subgroups of subjects wi11be of much value in identifying cognitive processes
descriptive of impaired performance on the CT.
\Visconsin Card Sorting Test
The WCST did not present the coding challenges which were present for the
CT, since this test has been traditionally scored utilizing a process approach to
analyze subjects' performance. The ambiguities for WCST conventional scores
stem from ambiguous responses in which cards match on more than one
perceptual attribute. In such cases, it is not possible to identify which feature
determined card placement. As a result of such ambiguity, Osman (1992) noted
that perseverative responses reflect a variety of processes, including (a)
intrusions of a prior mental set; (b) continuation of on-going behavior; (c) loss of
mental set; and (d) loss of conceptual power. Asking subjects to verbalize their
reasoning was an attempt to better clarify process analysis by reducing the
proportion of ambiguous responses without task simplification. It was expected
that factor analysis of verbalized scores would produce three or more cognitive
process factors which were relatively independent of age, education, and IQ
covariates.
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Comparison of Verbalized and
Nonverbalized Scores
Comparison of results of different scoring conditions revealed that when
subjects verbalized their responses they often responded by utilizing multiple
determinants.

In such cases, verbalized responses conveyed no more

information than did conventional scoring. As a result, the correlations between
verbalized scores and conventional scores were generally quite high. Exceptions
were for Right-Shift responses, Missed Learning Opportunities, and Percent
Nonperseverative Errors. Inspection of the data revealed that the low correlation
for Right-Shift responses resulted from restricted range of scores. Consequently,
this score was dropped from further analysis. Further analysis revealed that for
the remaining two variables, lower correlations between scoring conditions
resulted from reduced ambiguity on verbalized scores. Consequently, these
variables were retained for further analysis.
Separate factor analyses of both sets of retained scores revealed that the factor
pattern for both sets of data was very similar. In both cases, Factor 1 reflected
ineffective, perseverative responding and summary scores related to
nonperseverative

responding (Conceptual Level Responses, Categories

Completed, and Learning to Learn) loaded negatively on this factor. Primary
differences between the scoring conditions related to the variables which showed
the lowest correlation between scoring conditions, Missed Learning
Opportunities and Percent Nonperseverative

Errors. Both changes were in the

predicted direction, consistent with greater accuracy in scoring responses
utilizing verbalized reasoning.
Factor 2 for both scoring conditions related principally to Unambiguous
Number responses and Maximum Number responses, with lesser loadings for
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Wrong-Stay, Missed Learning Opportunities, and Total Correct Percent, with a
negative Joading for Unambiguous Color. This pattern suggested that when the
proportions of attribute responses (Color, Form, Number) were unequal, whether
due to ambiguous or unambiguous responses, color and form responses were
associated with perseveration, while unequal number responses were associated
with nonperseverative

responses. Thus, identifying the number attribute

appeared to represent a different cognitive process than color or form attributes.
Factor 3 for both scoring conditions contributed the smallest proportion of the
variance, and ironically was the only factor which related principally to more
effective probJem-solving strategies, with high negative loadings for variables
related to maintaining set.
This pattern was very different from the factor pattern which emerged for the
CT. In the latter case, effective problem-solving (Maintaining Set factor scores)
accounted for the largest proportion of the variance, with Jess relationship for
ineffective strategies. In contrast, on the WCST, ineffective strategies accounted
for a much larger proportion of the variance, with less relationship for effective
strategies. This distinction may be a function of the complexity of the tasks.
Covariates for WCST Cognitive Process Factors
Despite the similarity between factors for the two scoring conditions,
relationships with age, education, and IQ covariates were quite different for
Factor 1, although the remaining factors showed little relationship with
covariates under both conditions. Consequently, the relationship of the original
WCST variables with covariates was analyzed further, regressing covariates onto
each variable for each scoring condition. Only 7 of 20 comparisons showed very
similar patterns of covariation, and 3 other variables were somewhat similar.
This proportion of dissimilar findings across scoring conditions is well beyond
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chance 1e'v'e1s,and suggested that each set of saxes may be measuring different
cognitive processes. This view is strengthened by the differential relationship of
Verbal IQ subtest scores versus Performance IQ subtest scores across scoring
conditions. This pattern suggested that asking subjects to verbalize reasoning
may have produced scores which reflected verbal skills rather than problemsolving skil1s. However, it is not known whether performance varied as a
function of verbalizing reasoning, or whether only verbal scores varied in
comparison with conventional scores.
Comparisons Between the CT and WCST
It was anticipated that factor scores derived from cognitive process variables

on each of these tasks would predict a significantly greater proportion of the
variance on the other task than using conventional scores alone. This prediction
was tested utilizing multiple regression analysis, regressing all factor scores from
one test onto each factor score from the other test, and partialing out variance
due to age, education, and IQ covariates. However, the results of these analyses
showed even less relationship between tasks than utilizing conventional scores.
Consequently, no evidence was found that the tasks assessed by these tests are
comparable.
It should be noted, however, that these analyses were dependent upon the

success achieved in fractionating the cognitive processes on each task reflected
by conventional scores. As noted previously, this assumption is probably not
warranted in view of the ambiguity of factor and variable scores on CT
Determinant Shifting. Osman (1992) has suggested that this may well also be
true for WCST variable scores. Consequently, the relationship between cognitive
processes reflected by CT and WCST performance remains an open question.
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Conclusions
Assessment of concept formation and problem-solving skills is an essential
part of any comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation since these high-level
skills are among the functions most likely to be impaired following brain
damage. The Halstead Category Test, or the equivalent form, the Booklet
Category Test, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test have been found to be
among the most sensitive instruments for identifying patients with impaired
problem-solving abilities. However, for development of treatment plans for
remediating these deficits, it is not sufficient to know that patients are impaired
with respect to these skills; what is more important is to specify how patients are
impaired. Heretofore, such information could be obtained only inferentially or
anecdotally, since both CT and WCST performance have been conventionally
assessed only by summary error scores, which evaluate only the end product of
problem-solving.

For the purposes of this study, a modified administration

technique was devised which relied on patient verbalization of reasoning as they
performed these tasks, which provided a means for observing how patients erred
on these problem-solving tasks.
WCST Results
In the case of the WCST, although most such verbalized scores correlated
highly with conventional scores, this technique permitted less ambiguous
quantification of performance. However, patterns of age, education, and IQ
covariates for each scoring condition were found to be very different, raising
questions concerning what such verbalized scores measured. In particular,
verbalized scores correlated more highly with WAIS-R verbal scale subtest
scores, while conventional scores correlated more highly with WAIS-R
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performance scale subtest scores. These relationships may suggest that
verbalized scores reflected ability to accurately describe behavior rather than
reflecting dimensions of problem-solving abilities. However, since each set of
scores was based upon the same objective performance (scored once
conventionally and scored again based on patients' verbal descriptions of the
reason for their responses), the present data are insufficient for determining how
verbalization of reasoning may have affected performance.
Data were obtained from a comparison group to address this question, and
patterns of covariation for primary scores on the WCST and CT were quite
different between the comparison group and the experimental group, but the two
groups were significantly different with respect to age (p < .03), and patterns of
covariation were different between groups among WAlS-R subtest scores, for
which no differences in administration conditions were present. Consequently,
data from the comparison group were not useful for comparing performance
characteristics of verbalized responses versus nonverbalized responses. Further
research based upon a prospective design in which subjects are randomly
assigned to administration conditions, and matched with respect to age,
education, and IQ is needed to address this question.
Factor analysis of WCST scores for each scoring condition resulted in almost
identical three-factor solutions in each case, differentiated primarily on the basis
of the two scores with the lowest correlation between scoring conditions loading
somewhat differently. This was in the predicted direction and appeared due to
reduced ambiguity for these scores, Missed Learning Opportunities and Percent
Nonperseverative Errors, in the verbalized condition. Factors which emerged for
both scoring conditions were interpretable and related to (a) ineffective,
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perseverative responding; (b) nonperseverative number errors; and (c)
Maintaining Set.
CT Results
Verbalized responses on the CT were much more difficult to quantify than
was true for the WCST. Perrine (1984) suggested that the WCST is primarily a
task of attribute identification, whereas the CT involves both attribute
identification and rule learning. Perhaps for that reason, the CT represents a
more complex task and reliable coding of verbal responses is therefore more
multidimensional.

Perrine's model of concept formation, derived from Bourne

(1965), was utilized to describe a three-part hierarchy of response determinants,
consisting of (a) concrete perceptual attributes; (b) cognitive organization of
perceptual attributes into abstract patterns; and (c) relating abstract patterns to
the corresponding number responses. Decision trees were devised to prescribe a
set of rules for coding each score. Utilization of this approach yielded adequate
test-retest reliability for recoding responses. Such an approach permitted
quantification of the cognitive processes utilized by individual subjects as they
performed this task.
For the purposes of quantifying how patients incorporated feedback from the
examiner as to whether each response was correct or incorrect, concept formation
scores were transformed to change scores, so that for each CT subtest patients'
performances could be quantified with respect to the proportion of determinants
which were repeated following "correct" feedback, proportion of each
determinant which was changed following "incorrect'' feedback, proportion of
responses in which only one determinant was changed simultaneously versus
those in which multiple determinants were changed simultaneously, as well as
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other more specific summary scores. Sets of variables for each subtest were then
factor analyzed, with second order factor analysis of all fa_c~orsfrom each subtest
in order to determine if common cognitive process scores on each subtest
described cognjtive process scores on other subtests.
Results of these analyses revealed similar factor solutions for each subtest, but
despite the apparent similarity of these factors across subtests, subtest specific
factors were not predictive of similar factor scores on other subtests, except for
Subtests V and VI, which are based upon the same principle. Similarly, second
order factor analysis did not result in general factors across subtests; rather, the
factors which emerged tended to be specific to, at most, sets of similar subtests.
For each subtest, Maintaining Set factors predicted most of the variance in
subtest error scores, and these factor scores were influenced to approximately an
equivalent degree by age, education, and IQ covariates as were error scores.
Determinant Shifting factor scores were predictive of error scores to a much
lesser degree than Maintairung Set factor scores . In fact, it was necessary to enter
Determinant Shifting variables separately in order to discover any relationship
with error scores at all. Thus, these change scores appeared to be independent of
Maintaining Set scores, and also showed much more independence from age,
education, and IQ covariates.
These results appear to suggest that fractionating error scores on the CT by
utilizing a concept formation approach to cognitive processing is a promising
approach for describing subsets of cognitive failures in a group of brain-injured
patients. However, the cognitive process scores developed for the present study
achieved only limited success in accomplishing this goal because the change
scores utilized were too much dependent upon specific task characteristics and
too multiply-determined.

Further research utilizing careful task analysis for
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specific categories of responses may be more successful. For example, responses
following "incidentally correct" responses (responses correct by chance) are
especially salient in discerning how patients utilize feedback in modifying
behavior. Responses which receive feedback of "incorrect" within a series of
"almost conceptually correct" responses will be of value in assessing idea fluency
and systematic organization of multiple data in problem-solving. These and
other concept formation scores may perhaps be best derived through item
analysis of CT responses, utilizing the concept formation approach devised for
the purpose of this study.
Comparison of WCST and CT Factor Scores
Factor scores from the CT were expected to predict a greater proportion of the
variance in WCST factor scores than the proportion of the variance in WCST
summary scores predicted by CT error scores. However, this hypothesis was not
supported.

In fact, the relationship between CT and WCST factor scores was

slightly lower than the relationship between CT error scores and WCST
summary scores. However, this may have been due to the fact that CT factor
scores tended to be task specific rather than generalizable across subtests. Since
these scores were not predictive of factor scores across the much more similar CT
subtests, it was not surprising that they were also not predictive of WCST factor
scores.
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for
Further Research
While the results of this study were promising with respect to the
development of a reliable coding system for comparing verbalized responses on
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the CT and WCST across subjects and across responses, and in providing greater
clarification of the processes utilized by brain-injured patients in solving the
problems represented by these tasks, this study must be considered exploratory.
As with any study based upon archival data where subjects may not be
randomly assigned to groups, these results may be confounded by subject
selection procedures. Perhaps more importantly, recording of verbal responses
without prior knowledge of scoring procedures may have resu1ted in ambiguous
responses which would not be coded similarly by other scorers. Thus, although
adequate test-retest (for recoding) reliability was achieved, interscorer reliability
is unknown. Further, in view of the questionable comparibility of groups, it
could not be established in this study to what degree verbalization of reasonjng
may have affected performance on these tasks.
Utilization of process scores of unknown reliability or validity also raises
many questions concerning the significance of these results. Much further
investigation of the correlates of these scores is needed. In particular, normative
research is necessary to establish the relevance of these scores for various
cognitive and demographic correlates, and item analyses of results will be
needed to derive an appropriate means of measuring cognitive process variables.
Further, Osman (1992) suggested that WCST perseverative responses also
reflect a variety of processes, including (a) intrusions of a prior mental set; (b)
continuation of on-going behavior; (c) loss of mental set; and 4) loss of conceptual
power. Consequently, he has also utilized a verbalized administration procedure
for the WCST from which he has developed three additional scores to fractionate
the cognitive processes reflected by perseverative responses on this task. Further
research comparing the relationship between CT cognitive process scores derived
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from task analysis of specific categories of CT response items and fractionated
WCST responses is necessary to address this question.
Such research has the potential to clarify the relationship between brain injury
and executive and problem-solving functions, which is a prerequisite of effective
remediation of impaired higher level skills in brain-injured patients.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFIED WISCONSIN
CARD SORTING TEST
Modification to standard instructions are in bold print. Allow patients to respond
verbally to each response prior to providing feedback. Mark verbalized
responses to the right of the "f' on the answer sheet, and actual responses to the
left of the"/" . If patients do not spontaneously provide verbal responses, say
"because . .. "or "and you placed it there because ... ". If you do not
understand the reasoning, ask the patient to repeat, but do not inquire further. If
the patient verbalizes a response which is inconsistent with card placement,
repeat the response, and if the patient spontaneously self-corrects, record the
correction; otherwise, record the original response.
THIS TEST IS A UTILE UNUSUAL, BECAUSE I AM NOT ALLOWED TO TELL
YOU VERY MUCH ABOUT HOW TO DO IT. YOU WILL BE ASKED TO MATCH
EACH OF THE CARDS IN THESE DECKS TO ONE OF THE FOUR KEY
CARDS, AND I WILL TELL YOU WHETHER YOU ARE RIGHT OR WRONG.
YOU MUST ALWAYS TAKE THE TOP CARD FROM THE DECK, AND PLACE
IT BELOW THE KEY CARD YOU THINK IT MATCHES, AND ALSO SAY THE
REASON WHY YOU PLACED THE CARD WHERE YOU PLACED IT--THE
RULE YOU USED WHEN YOU PLACED IT IN THAT PILE. I CAN'T TELL YOU
HOW TO MATCH THE CARDS, BUT I WILL TELL YOU EACH TIME WHETHER
YOU PLACED IT IN THE RIGHT OR WRONG PILE, BUT REMEMBER WHEN I
SAY RIGHT OR WRONG THAT APPLIES TO WHERE YOU PLACED THE
CARD, NOT TO THE REASON YOU HAVE GIVEN. IF YOU ARE WRONG,
LEAVE THE CARD WHERE YOU'VE PLACED IT, AND TRY TO GET THE
NEXT CARD CORRECT. USE THIS DECK FIRST, AND THEN CONTINUE
WITH THE SECOND DECK. THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT ON THIS TEST.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFIED BOOKLET
CATEGORY TEST
Modifications to standard instructions are in bold print. Allow patients to respond
verbally to each response prior to providing feedback. Mark verbalized
responses verbatim in the space to the right of each response on the answer
sheet. (Do not inquire Subtests I and II). If patients do not spontaneously
provide verbal responses, say "because . .. ". If you do not understand the
reasoning, ask the patient to repeat, but do not inquire further. Inquire all
responses, unless the patient has correctly identified the correct principle for that
subtest three consecutive times. In that case, it is not necessary to continue
inquiring, unless the patient makes a mistake, or the item is marked with a"?". If
the patient spontaneously continues to verbalize reasoning, after three
consecutive correctly verbalized responses, those responses should be
recorded. Also all items marked with a "?" should be recorded, even when the
patient has correctly identified the principle three consecutive times.
IN THIS BOOKLET YOU ARE GOING TO SEE DIFFERENT FIGURES AND
DESIGNS. SOMETHING ABOUT THE PATIERN ON A PAGE WILL REMIND
YOU OF A NUMBER BETWEEN ONE AND FOUR. ON THE STRIP IN FRONT
OF YOU (pointing), YOU WILL SEE THE NUMBERS ONE, TWO, THREE, AND
FOUR. FIRST LOOK AT THE PAGE AND DECIDE WHICH NUMBER THE
PICTURE SUGGESTS, THEN POINT TO THAT NUMBER ON THE STRIP .
FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT NUMBER DOES THIS REMIND YOU OF? (turn to the
first page.) If the subject says, "one," ask him which number he should point to.
After he has pointed to the number 1, say: CORRECT. THAT IS HOW I WILL
RESPOND EVERY TIME YOU HAVE THE RIGHT ANSWER. I WILL RESPOND
WITH "INCORRECT" WHEN YOU HAVE THE WRONG ANSWER. IN THIS
WAY, YOU WILL KNOW EACH TIME WHETHER YOU HAVE THE RIGHT OR

WRONG ANSWER. HOWEVER, FOR EACH PICTURE ON THE PAGE YOU
ONLY GET ONE CHOICE. IF YOU MAKE A MISTAKE, WE JUST GO RIGHT
ON TO THE NEXT PICTURE.

I.

(Proceed with Subtest I) NOW, WHICH NUMBER WOULD YOU CHOOSE
FOR THIS PICTURE?

220
II. After subtest I, say: THAT WAS THE END OF THE FIRST SUBTEST. THIS
TEST IS DIVIDED INTO SEVEN SUBTESTS. IN EACH SUBTEST, THERE
IS ONE IDEA OR PRINCIPLE THAT RUNS THROUGHOUT THE
SUBTEST. ONCE YOU HAVE FIGURED OUT THE IDEA OR PRINCIPLE
IN THE SUBTESTS, BY USING THIS IDEA YOU WILL GET THE RIGHT
ANSWER EACH TIME. NOW WE ARE GOING TO BEGIN THE SECOND
SUBTEST AND THE IDEA IN IT MAY BE THE SAME AS THE LAST ONE
OR IT MAY BE DIFFERENT . WE WANT YOU TO FIGURE IT OUT.
(Proceed with Subtest II.)
When you reach the first page with circles, say : YOU WILL NOTICE THAT
WE FIRST SAW SQUARES, THEN LINES, AND NOW CIRCLES . EVEN
THOUGH THE PATIERNS CHANGE, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE
THE SAME IDEA TO GET THE RIGHT ANSWER.
Ill. After Subtest II, say: THAT WAS THE END OF THE SECOND SUBTEST
AND AS YOU PROBABLY NOTICED, YOU DON'T NECESSARILY HAVE
TO SEE A NUMBER TO HAVE A NUMBER SUGGESTED TO YOU. YOU
SAW SQUARES, CIRCLES, AND OTHER FIGURES. ALSO, YOU
PROBABLY NOTICED IN EACH OF THESE SUBTEST, THERE WAS ONLY
ONE IDEA OR PRINCIPLE WHICH RAN THROUGHOUT. ONCE YOU
FIGURED OUT THE IDEA, YOU CONTINUED TO APPLY IT TO GET THE
RIGHT ANSWER. NOW WE ARE GOING TO START THE THIRD
SUBTEST AND THE IDEA IN IT MAY BE THE SAME AS THE LAST ONE
OR IT MAY BE DIFFERENT. I WANT TO SEE IF YOU CAN FIGURE OUT
WHAT THE IDEA IS AND THEN USE IT TO GET THE RIGHT ANSWER,
AND l'D ALSO LIKE YOU TO SAY THE REASON YOU CHOSE THE
ANSWER YOU CHOSE-WHY YOU PICKED THAT NUMBER, BUT AGAIN
WHEN I SAY "RIGHT" OR "WRONG," THAT APPLIES TO THE NUMBER
YOU HAVE CHOSEN, NOT TO THE REASON YOU HAVE GIVEN.
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REMEMBER, THE IDEA REMAINS THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE
SUBTEST. I WILL TELL YOU WHEN WE COMPLETE ONE SUBTEST AND
ARE READY TO BEGIN A NEW ONE.
IV. After Subtest 111-V
, say: THAT WAS THE END OF THAT SUBTEST . NOW
WE ARE GOING TO BEGIN THE NEXT ONE. THE IDEA IN IT MAY BE
THE SAME AS THE LAST ONE OR IT MAY BE DIFFERENT. WE WANT
YOU TO FIGURE IT OUT.
VI. In Subtest VI after page #6 (first slide without numbers) say: THIS IS STILL
THE SAME GROUP, BUT NOW THE NUMBERS ARE MISSING . THE
PRINCIPLE IS STILL THE SAME .
VII.

After Subtest VI, say: IN THE LAST SUBTEST THERE IS NO ONE IDEA
OR PRINCIPLE THAT RUNS THROUGHOUT THE GROUP BECAUSE IT IS
MADE UP OF ITEMS YOU HAVE ALREADY SEEN IN PRECEDING
SUBTESTS . TRY TO REMEMBER WHAT THE RIGHT ANSWER WAS
THE LAST TIME YOU SAW THE PATTERN AND GIVE THAT SAME
ANSWER AGAIN.
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WISCONSIN CARD SORTING TEST FORM
ID No __________

___

Age ____

Education
Comments _____

Sex ____

Occupation ___
_ _______

Trials

____________

______

Date __

_

__

_

_

_ _

C, F,N,C,F,N

1. CFNO/CFNSe::i&rnPcs Prev£:a; R:f1Errf\b:U

8. CF N O / C FN Se::!SumPa, Prev£:a; Rln Errf\b:U

_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_

40. C FN O /CF NSe::!Sun Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJtU

9. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcsPrevl:esRlnErrf\b:(_j

_

41. C FN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa, PrevDls Fm Err NJtU

10. C FN O / C FN Se::!&m Pa, Prev£:a; Fm Errf\b:U

_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_

42. CFNO/CFNSe::iSunPa; Prev[a; Fm Err NJtU

2

CFNO/CFNSe::iSunPcs Prev£:a;FmErr f\b:U

3. C FN O / C FN Se::!&rn Pa, Prev£:a; Fm Errf\b:U
4. CFN O / CFN Se::!Sun Pa, Prev£:a; Fm Errf\b:U

5. CF NO/ CFN Se::!Sun Pa, Prev£:a; Fm Errf\b:U
6. CFNO/CFNSe::i&rnPcs Prev£:a; R:f1Errf\b:U
7. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs PrevDls Fm Errf\b:U

U
12 CFNO/CFNSe::l&rnPcs Prev£:a;FmErr N:xU
13. CFN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa; Prev[a; Fm ErrN:xU
14. C FN O / CFN Se::!&rn Pa, Prev[a; RJl ErrNJtU
15. CFN O / CFN Se::!&rn Pa, PrevDls RJl Errf\b:U
16. CF NO/ C FN Se::!&rn Pa, Prev£:a; Fm Errf\b:U
17. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs PrevDls R:f1ErrN:xU
,a CFNO/CFNSe::i&rnPcs Prev£:a; Fm Err N:xU
19. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs PrevDls RJlErr N:xU
20. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev[es FmErr N:xU
21. C FN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa, Prev[a; Fm ErrN:xU
22. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcsPrev£:a; FmErr N:xU
Z3. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcsPrev£:a;R:f1Errf\ti U
24. C FN O / CFN Se::!Sun Pa, Prev£:a; Fm ErrN:xU
25. CFN O / CFN Se::!Sun Pa, Prev[a; Fm ErrN:xU
a, _ CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPa.Prev£:a; RrlErr N:xU
27. CFNO/CFNSe::iSunPa.Prev£:a;R:f1Errf\ti U
28. CFN O / CFN Se::!SumPa, Prev£:a; R:f1ErrN:xU
29. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev£:a; RrlErr N:xU
~ - C FN O / C FN_Se::iSun Pa, Prev[a; Fm ErrN:xU
31. CFNO/CFNSe::i SunPa, Prev[es Fm ErrN:xU
3?. CFNO/CFNSe::i &rnPcs Prev[es Fm ErrN:xU
11. CFNO/CFNSe::i&rnPcs Prev£:a;FmErrf\ti

3.3. CFN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa, Prev£:a; Fm Err NJtU
34. C FN O /CF NSe::!Sun Pa, Prev£:a; Fm Err NJtU
3.5. C FN O / C FN Se::!&rn Pa; Prev[a; Fm Err NJtU

33. C FN O /CF NSe::!&rn Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJtU
'31. C FN O /CF NSe::!&rn Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJtU
~

CF NO/CF NSe::!Sun Pcs PrevDls Fm Err NJtU

$

C FN O /CF NSe::!Sun Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJtU

43. C FN O / C FN Se::!&rn Pa; Prev[a; Fm Err NJ!U

44. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs PrevDls FmErr NJ!U
45. CFN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJ!U
46. CFNO/CFNSe::i SumPcs PrevDls Fm Err NJtU
47. C FN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa, PrevDls Fm Err NJtU
48. C FN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa, Prev[a; R:11Err NJtU

49. C FN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa; PrevDls R:11Err NJ!U
50. C FN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJtU
51. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs PrevDls FmErr NJ!U

52. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs PrevDls FmErr NJtU
53. C FN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa; Prev[a; Fm Err NJtU

54. C FN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJtU
55. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPa; Prev[a; Fm Err NJtU

56. CFN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa; PrevDls Fm Err N:xU
fil. CFNO / C FN Se::!Sun Pa, PrevDls Fm Err NJtU

58. CFN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJtU

CFNO / C FNSe::iSun Pa, Prev[es Fm Err NJtU
00. CFN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa, PrevDls Fm Err NJ!U
$ .

61. CFN O / C FNSe::iSun Pa; PrevDls Fm Err NJtU

62. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPa; Prev[es RrlErr NJtU
63. CFN O / C FNSe::iSun Pa, PrevDls Fm Err NJtU
64. CFN O / C FN Se::!Sun Pa, PrevDls Fm Err NJ!U
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Current Category __

Number in Current Run __

Trials

C,F,N,C,F,N

65. CFNO/CFNSa:iSumPa5PrevD:lsFenErrNJt U _

97. C FN O / C FN Sa:i SumPa, PrevD:lsFm Err f\bt U

66. CFNO/CFNSa:iSumPa5 Prevll:ls FmErr NJt U _

98. C FN O / C FN Sa:i SumPa, Prev03s Fm Err NJt U

99. CFNO/CFNSa:iSumPa5 Prev03sFmErrNJt U
68. CFNO/CFNSa:i SumPa5 PrevD:lsR3nErr NJt U _ 100. CFNO/CFNSa:i SumPa, Prev03s Fm Err f\btU
69. CFN 0/ CFNSa:i SumPa, PrevD:lsFen Err NJt (_J _ 101. CFNO/CFNSa:i SumPa, Prev03s Fm Err f\btU
70. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevD:lsRlnErrNJt(_J _ 1CQ CFNO/CFNSEQ SunPa, Prev03s Fm Err f\btU
ol. CFNO/CFNSa:iSumPa5 PrevD:lsFen Err NJt (_J _

71. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFmErrNJt(_J

_ 103. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, PrevDls FmErr f\btU

72 CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFenErrNJt(_J

_ 104. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev03sFm Errf\bt U

73. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumPa5 PrevDls Fm Err NJtU _ 105. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev03s FmErr f\bt (_J
_ 100. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev03s Fm Err f\btU
74. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsR3nErrNJtU
75. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevD:lsFenErrNJtU

_ 107. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5 Prev03s FmErr f\bt U

76. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumPa, PrevD:lsFm Err NJtU _ 100. CFNO/CFNS€QSunPa5 PrevDls FmErr NJt (_J
77. CFNO/CFNSEq&rnPa,

PrevDls FenErr NJt(_J _ 100. CFNO/CFNSEq&rnPa,

Prev03s FmErr f\bt(_J

(_J
78. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa,PrevD:lsFenErrNJt (_J _ 110. C FN O / C FN SEQSumPa, Prev03s Fm Err N:Jt
79. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, PrevDls Fen Err NJt(_J _ 111. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumPa, PrevCes Fm Err f\btU
80. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsR3nErrNJt(_J

_ 112. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev03s FmErr f\btU

81. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFmErrNJt(_J

_ 113. CFNO/CFNSEQ SunPa, Prev03s Fm Err N:ltU

82. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFenErrNJt(_J

_ 114. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumPa5 Prev03s Fm Err f\btU

83. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsfmErrNJtU

_ 115. CFNO/CFNSa:i SunPa, PrevD:lsRJlErr NJt U

84. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDls FmErrNJt (_J _ 116. CFN O / C FN SEQSun Pa, Prev03s Fm Err f\btU
_ 117. CFNO/CFNSEQ SunPa, Prev03s Fm Err NJtU
85. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFmErrNJtU
00. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrellC~FmErrN:iLJ

(_J
_ 118. CFN O / C FN SEQSun Pa, Prev03s Fm Err N:Jt

87. CFNO/ CFNSEQSumPa, PrevDls Fm Err NJtU _ 119. CFNO/CFNS€Q&rnPa5 Prev03s RnErr N:xU
88. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFenErrNJt(_J _ 120. CFNO/CFNSEQ &.mPa, Prev03s FmErr f\btU
Prev03s FmErr f\btU

89. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFenErrN:i(_J

_ 121. CFNO/CFNSEQSunPa,

90. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevD:lsR:nErrNJtU

_ 122 C FN O / C FN SEQ&rn Pa, Prev03s Rn Err N:xU

91. CFNO/CFNSEq&rnP'a.PrevDlsR:nErrNJt(_J

_ 12.3.. CFNO/CFNSEQ&rnP'a.Prev 03s RnErrN:x(_J

~

CFNO/CFNSEQSumP'a. PrevDls FmErr NJtU _ 124. CFNO/CFNSEQ&rnP'a. Prev03s Fm Err N:xU

93. CFNO/CFNSEQ &rnP'a. PrevDls Fm Err N:i LJ _ 125. CFN O / C FN SEQSun Pa; Prev03s Fm Err N:xU

Sun Pa; Prev03s Rrl Err N:xU
94. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumP'a. PrevDls Rrl Err NJt(_J _ 126. CFNO / C FNSEQ
_ 127. CFNO/CFNSEQSunP'a.Prev03s Rrl Err N:xU
95. CFNO/CFNSEQSumP'a.PrevDlsRrlErrNJt(_J
_ 128. CFNO/CFNSEQSunP'a.Prev03s RrlErrN:x(_J
96. CFNO/CFNSEQSumP'a.PrevDlsFmErrN:i(_J

Errors ___

Perseverative Responses ____

Nonperseverative Errors ___
Trials to Complete 1st Category ___
If Right, Shift% ___

Categories ___

Perseverative Errors____
Failure to Maintain Set ___

If Right, Stay %c_____

Learning to Learn ___

_

% Perseverative Errors ____

_

% Conceptual Level Response __

lf Wrong, Shift % ____

If Wrong, Stay% __

_
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APPENDIX D. Modified Scoring And Recording Form For
The Booklet Category Test
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SCORING AND RECORDING FORM FOR THE BOOKLET CATEGORY TEST

Nick A. DeFilippis, Ph.D. and Elizabeth McCampbell, Ph.D.
ID Number ____
Date ____
Occupation, ____
Education .___
Total Number of Errors Subtests I-VII,___________
SUBTEST I
SUBTEST II
SUBTEST II

I

Age.____
Sex.__
Premorbid Intellectual Level.__

_

l

SUBTEST II

D lO. 00 19 .
Ed I I I rn:rnI I I I mm I I mm I I I
20
2
2
1
1.000 ·
- ODD
I I IU:rn
I I I IUllI I I IU'.U
I I I L:UI
Total No. Errors
12_
33_
D
Q Subtest II
U:UilI I I 1:U:U
I I I IU:U
I I I SUBTEST III
l.

_

l.

m

lll

I

4

II DoodAAAA booo __ _
1

-

I I
5

IU.HI I

:0:

5

I I wrn1I I I [...I HJ I I I
14

BBB booo
I 1:rn:rn
I I I 1:UII
I I I I rnrnI I I EmI
6
6
15
3
1111 CABE 0000
I I I 1011
I I I IUII I I I m:m rn:m1I I I
-

-

II

.

II

7

I
I ¼f so
I I I El] I I I · I EU!I I
I
II
l
7

-

-

1m:m
8.

8.

4_

DODD
I I I 1mm1

17.

I LJ I I I IJJI I muI I I I 1.:.:J
I I
9
Totst No Error, · 000
\JQQ6
t
SubteS I I I WU]
I I I I [ml I I I IUi(i

U.llll
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SUBTEST Ill

SUBTEST Ill

6LJLJLJ
.-------,66DD~~

7

FmI I I ---

8.

Q6QQ
I llT:".1
I I __
9.

QDD/.\

0@00

l!Ti:II I I __

I I.U
L I I
11.

@/SJO!SJ
II

mm I

--

@aaa
kimI I I

wm1Dfill

I I I M~HI
--

--1-----.----1

V ==
==I

I I I

20.

I I I 1rnm
--

1DDD
I I l!Will
I

--

29.

I I l':'!'!iI --

21.

0@00
I E!JI I

0000
1mmI

---

I I --

8@00
I rn!mlI I

1

I I L.U11--------1

Daoo

--

r~nI I

I

30.

ClDO/.\

1

1DD6

I I I 1~
1~rn
__
28.

19.

QDO/.\

I rn:rn
I '--

0D00

ooa6

10.

GJIBlGJ~~

~

27.

17.

18.

@@a@
I I mmI

12.

I b~uI I

SUBTEST Ill

2

ooaD
I I I

31.

rnrn1
--

aDoo

--

I WltlI I
32

0000
1mm1
II

ll-----t

lDA&
1mm
I__
I I

34

1DD6

000@

I I I ll!Wil
....______,I I I [ml -25.

GJ[IDGJ[ID
I I 1mm
I

~000
1mm1
I I I__
35.

@)@)f!I~

I I 1mm
I..______.
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SUBTEST III

£[;}LiJ(]_..----s_ ~
1 IH=i=I
II

3~GJ~~
I I I

fi_

7_

I

40~GJ@IBJ

g_

---I

SUBTEST IV

I
11-

4_

I__

I n:niI

D
n

12 _

I I 11--------J

18-

20 -

II

I I I~!~!]
11----~
21-

LJ

I I I [II

1mrn

14_$

I I IUJI

.

I ummI I __
22_

II

IO:U
III
~

f

V

~

13.

0
I I I
0
WlUI
I I 11----~
C'

HH~I
._______,

1mm1
I

IWWI I

~

11-------J

W:U:1

1:rnrn

II

m;rnI

19_

n
. _J

---.E

II I

17_

L.

~

I

I

I I IU:U
I
10_

3.

[?

Eb

16-

I HJ I I

Total No . Errors
Subtes1: III _

ummI I
2_ ~

~

D

8

I I I rnrni1

___B

~

I I I M#I
..___
__

IIC:II I I

lli@&(i)

L

-~1s_

I I I IU:U

rnrn1

I EUII I __

SUBTEST IV

I rn:nI I

rnrn1

~ ~D~
I I

.ce---

SUBTEST IV

23.

0
mmll
I I I._____,
O
I
I I.___~
0
1mm1

24_

I I I 1cm
L--------1
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C. ...----,

SUBTEST IV

35 _ ,

25_
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26 _
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27_

C.
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[!:/
,,_
0
SUBTESTV

...

SUBTEST V

SUBTEST V
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SUBTEST VI
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I tmml
I I __

n

1mm
III
20.

I

--

111+-

I I mmI..____.
Total No. Errors

Subtest
DODD
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APPENDIX E. Decision Tree For Coding Configural Attributes On BCT
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DECISION TREE FOR CODING CONFIGURAL ATTRIBUTES ON BCT
1. Are only perceptual
elements which are unique or
share common perceptual
features included in the
response?

2. Do the descriptions refer to a
relevant perceptual feature
which differentiates elements in
the response?
Score
verbal

,____ 1. Are those characteristics
described in the response?

3. Does the response include
the BACKGROUND of the
figure among the perceptual
elements identified?

4. Are all perceptual
elements (including missing
quadrants or the interior of
the design) included in the
response?

5. Are perceptual characteristics of
all figures or elements in the stimulus
described in the response?
6. Is the response based
upon perceptual
characteristics which
describe only part of the
elements in the stimulus?

~-

...___

1-----ll

----i

7. Are elements
in the response
differentiated on
the basis of
dissimiarity?

8. Are unlike
elements treated
as equivalent?

9. Are the elements which are included in the
response "PULLED OUT" of the stimulus
configuration, leaving behind elements which share
that perceptual attribute?

1. Does the element included in the response
,. represent a remote point or location pointed to
by another element in the stimulus?

235
FROM
PAGE 1
Does the response
include only a missin
element?

YES

2. Do the elements included in th
response consist only of
ACHROMATIC FIGURES (which
may be contrasted with chromatic
figures)?

3. Are the elements which are included in the
response differentiated from all other perceptual
elements on the basis of CHROMATIC COLOR
of perceptual elements?

5. Are the elements which are included in the
response differentiated from all other perceptual
elements on the basis of SOLID or OPEN or
DOTTED perceptual elements?

6. Does the stimulus include solid
(or filled) perceptual elements?

8. Are only solidly
outlined (hollow)
elements included
in the response?

7. Are only the solid
(filled) perceptual
elements included in
the response?

._ ____

4. Are the elements which are included in the
response differentiated from all other
perceptual elements on the basis of SIZE of
the figures or perceptual elements?

1. Are the elements which are included in the
response differentiated from all other
perceptual elements on the basis of a specific
SHAPE or form?

___
R----1

,__

----11

2. Are the elements which are included in the
response differentiated from all other perceptual
elements on the basis of MISSING or inferred lines of
perceptual elements?
3. Does no single perceptual
feature differentiate the elements
included in the response from all
other perceptual elements?

Score combination of
features, in order of
priority, necessary to
differentiate elements
in the response
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APPENDIX F. Decision Tree For Coding Abstract Attributes On BCT
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DECISION TREE FOR CODING ABSTRACT ATTRIBUTES ON BCT
___

Does the response include all configural elements in
..,.the stimulus or differentiate among dissimilar
elements included in the response?
Are only physically contiguous elements which are identified as a
single form included in the response?
Is each set of individual
elements sharing common
configural features treated
individually?
Is the rule applied to the
individual elements within
each unit comprised of
common configural features?

Is the rule applied to
individual unit(s) as a whole ,
without further subdivision?

Is at least one unit or
category comprised of
more than one element?

Is the position of specified configural elements within
the stimulus array relevant to the response given?
-----~
Does the number response given reflect the
correct position of a specified quadrant or fourth
of the stimulus array?
Does the number response given reflect an alternate
numbering scheme of a specified quadrant or fourth of the
stimulus array?
Is an additional step necessary to
transform the position of the configural
elements to a number response?

__

..._ __

Is the response from Subtest Ill (including
__,, Subtest Ill items in Subtest VII) or before?

~II

Go to Shape, Page 2

Go To Page2
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From

Pa e 1
Does the response consist of one unique
configural element (or set of identical configural
elements) which is described as "different" from
or unlike other configural elements not included
in the response?

----4

1-------ll

Are the configural elements included in the
response described as the "same" as other
configural elements, but the other configural
elements are in the previous response?
Are configural elements included in the
response described as the "same" as other
configural elements in the stimulus?

___

Are the configural elements included in the response
compared to those not included on the basis of
characteristics other than physical similarity?

Is a specific configural feature (or set of configural features
identified which differentiates elements included in the
response from those which are not included or which is
shared by all perceptual elements?
Is more than one element included in the response?

Are the configural elements
specified described as a shape
representing a number value?
Are the configural elements specified described as a
concrete, non-geometric shape other than a number?
Are the configural elements WHICH ARE
PHYSICALLY PRESENT described as "missing"?

-~

Go To Page 3
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From

Pa e 2

1--------

Do all configural elements included in the response
occupy space which corresponds to quadrants or 4th's of
the stimulus configuration, or multiples thereof?

Are any other configural elements specified which do not
occupy space corresponding to quadrants or 4th's?

Is the space occupied by two or more individual quadrants
combined into a single perceptual element?

Score

a

Do any configural elements specified represent
component parts other than quadrants or
fourths, or multiples thereof?

240

APPENDIX G. Decision Tree For Coding Abstract Attributes On BCT

241

DECISION TREE FOR CODING SCORING RULES ON BCT
YES

1. Is the number response given based on a
"Guess" or "I don't know"?

Score R
..__,.

2. Is the number response given
based on a previous response without
clarifying the reasoning?

YES

Score M
..__ .. 3. Is the number response given based on
counting abstract attributes identified?

YES

Score C
Is the number response given based upon the
location of the abstract attribute identified? 1------.
4. Does the number response given correspond to
the linear placement of the abstract attribute identified
on items from Subtest Ill?

~-5.

Does the number response given correspond to the
clockwise placement of the quadrant of the stimulus
containing the relevant abstract attribute?
. oes t e num er response given correspon to a
location numbering scheme other than clockwise
placement of the quadrant of the stimulus containing the
relevant abstract attribute?

'--------lN

YES

Score Le

1. Is the number response given based upon the
proportion of the whole stimulus which was
identified as the abstract attribute?

2. Does the number response given
correspond to the numerator of the
fraction when the denominator=4?

3. Is the number response given
based upon a mathematical
procedure other than simple
counting of abstract attributes? ----YES
----

NO

Score Pe
1---~

Does the number response given based upon correspond
to the shape or form of the abstract attribute?
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DEFINITIONS FOR CT RATIO AND SUMMARY VARIABLES
VARIABLE

DEFINITION

1.

MSIS: Maintain Set
Within Sets

Percent of responses in which all 3 determinants did not change
following feedback of correct, when test stimuli remained consistent.

2.

MSBS: Maintain Set
Between Sets

Percent of responses in which all 3 determinants did not change
following correct response, when test stimuli did change.

3.

LR: Learning Rate

Mean item number across subtests which represents the third
consecutive response utilizing all 3 correct determinants.

4. SLR: Maintain Set
following Learning

Percent of responses following Leaming Rate item in which all 3
determinants were correct.

5.

RKC: Keep Concrete
Score If Correct

Percent of responses in which the Concrete Score remained
unchanged following a correct response.

6.

RKA: Keep Abstract
Score If Correct

Percent of responses in which the Abstract Score remained
unchanged following a correct response.

7.

RKR: Keep Rule If
Correct

Percent of responses in which the Rule remained unchanged
following a correct response.

8.

RPCK: Percent Scores Percent of total determinant scores which remained unchanged
Kept When Correct
following a correct response.

9.

WSC: Shift Concrete
Score If Wrong

Percent of responses in which the Concrete score shifted following
an incorrect response.

10. WSA: Shift Abstract
Score If Wrong

Percent of responses in which the Abstract score shifted following
an incorrect response.

11. WSR: Shift Rule If
Wrong

Percent of responses in which the Rule shifted following an incorrect
response .

12. WSl: Shift 1 Score If
Wrong

Percent of responses in which one determinant score changed
following an incorrect response .

13. WS2: Shift 2 Scores If Percent of responses in which two determinant scores changed
following an incorrect response.
Wrong
14. WS3: Shift 3 Scores If Percent of responses in which three determinant scores changed
Wrong
following an incorrect response.
15. WPCS: Percent Scores Total percent of determinant scores changed following an incorrect
Shifted When Wrong response.
16. NC3: Percent Near
Correct Subtest III

Percent of responses in Subtest HI in which Location comprised the
Abstract score rather than the Rule .

17. NC4: Percent Near
Correct Subtest IV

Percent of responses in Subtest IV in which quadrant location was
not based on clockwise rotation.

18. PRAC4: Percent
Subtest IV Practice
Correct

Percent of first six responses in Subtest IV (where quadrants are
labeled) which are correct.

19. PSV5-6: Percent
Subtest V-VI
Perseverations

Percent of responses in Subtests V & VI in which the Rule (Lor Le) is
perseverated from Subtest IV.
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DEFINITIONS FOR WCST RATIO AND SUMMARY VARIABLES
VARJABLE

DEFINITION

1. CAT: Categories
Completed

Number of sets of 10 consecutive correct responses.

2. CLR: Conceptual
Level Responses

Percent of responses which are correct occurring in runs of 3-10
cards.

3.

FfMS: Failure to
Maintain Set

Number of sets of 5-9 consecutive correct responses, followed by an
incorrect response.

4.

LTL: Learning to
Learn

Mean of the summed error rate for each category.

5.

MLOP: Missed
Learnjng Oppor.

Sum of correct unambiguous responses and incorrect ambiguous
responses (which provide sufficient information to deduce principle)

6.

NPSVE: Percent
Non perseverati ve
Errors

Percent of responses which are incorrect and do not meet criteria
for perseverations.

7.

PSVE: Percent
Perscverative Errors

Percent of respon ses which are incorrect and are also perseverative.

8. PSVR: Percent
Perseverative
Responses

Percent of responses which meet the following criteria: a) would
have been correct in the previous category; b) match the first
incorrect unambiguous response prior to completion of the first
category; c) is an ambiguous responses that is both preceded and
followed by unambiguous perseverative responses; or d) is the 2nd
or subsequent of three consecutive incorrect unambiguous responses
which establish a new "perseverate-to" principle for that category,
although ambiguous perseverative responses may be interspersed
among those three consecutive perseverative responses.

9. TE: Percent Total
Errors

Percent of responses which are incorrect.

10. TC: Percent Correct

Percent of correct responses which are not included in criteria runs.

11. MAX C: Percent
Color Resp.

Percent of responses utilizing the color determinant.

12. MAX F: Percent
Form Resp.

Percent of response utilizing the form determinant.

13. MAX N: Percent
Number

Percent of responses utilizing the number determinant.

14. MAX SD: S.D. of
Determinant
Responses

Standard deviation of Color, Form, and Number responses (measure
of difficulty shifting).

15. SIN C: Unambiguous
Color

Percent of responses using unambiguous color determinant.

16. SIN F: Unambiguous
Form

Percent of responses using unambiguous form determinant.
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VARIABLE

DEFINITIO N

17. SINN : Unambiguou s Percent of respon se using unambiguou s number determinant.
No.
18. STN SD: S.D. Single
Determinant Resp .

Standard deviation of unambiguou s color, form, and numb er
responses.

19. R SH: Right-Shift
Respon ses

Number of respon ses in which th e det erminant that was correct in
the pr eviou s respon se shift ed.

20. WRG ST: WrongStay Responses

Number of respon ses which repeat ed th e det erminant s incorr ect in
the pr eviou s respon se.
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